INFLUENTIAL PASHTUNS IN AFGHAN POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001468 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: INFLUENTIAL PASHTUNS IN AFGHAN POLITICS Classified By: Political Counselor Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As the country's largest ethnic group, Pashtuns will play a determining role in this year's presidential election. If the 2009 election breaks down along ethnic lines, as it largely did in 2004, President Karzai will have a significant advantage over other candidates, especially if no other Pashtun candidate attracts significant support in the south and east. A split in the Pashtun vote, especially in urban centers where Karzai is less popular, might force Karzai into a second round of balloting or, less likely, allow one of his challengers to unseat him. This cable identifies the most influential Pashtun leaders and personalities key to influencing voters in this summer's presidential election. If Karzai can hold on to support from most of these leaders, he will be the favorite for re-election. If another Pashtun candidate emerges who can collect support from a significant number of these Pashtun leaders, the election becomes less of a certainty. Karzai's Closest Supporters -------------- ¶2. (C) Several Pashtuns in Karzai's Cabinet play important roles as trusted advisors and de-facto campaign managers. We would count among them Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, IDLG Director Jelani Popal, Education Minister Farooq Wardak, and Information and Culture Minister Abdul Karim Khoram. All have government positions that give them influence in electoral politics. Popal, Wardak and Khoram also have connections to political parties or mujahideen networks, which they can use to line up votes for Karzai this August. ¶3. (SBU) Lower House MP Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf has spearheaded both Karzai's agenda in Parliament and the Palace's outreach to mujahideen leaders. Sayyaf's ability to bring out the vote in a popular election may be waning, but he has been key to Karzai's outreach to jihadi leaders like Marshall Fahim Khan and Pir Gailani. Sayyaf will also provide organizational support to Karzai's campaign through his Dawat-e-Islami political party, a collection of mostly mid-level Pashtun commanders who served under Sayyaf in the 1990s. ¶4. (C) In the south, Kandahar's Ahmed Wali Karzai (Karzai's half-brother),Helmand's Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, and Uruzgan's Jan Mohammed Khan are the muscle behind Karzai's 
strategy to win large blocks of votes from the southern provinces. Karzai took more than 90 percent of the vote in many districts in these three provinces in 2004, due in part to efforts by AWK and others to line up support from tribal elders, who in turn amassed votes from their communities. SMA and JMK, both eager to regain governor posts in their respective provinces (despite opposition from the international community here),have met frequently with tribal elders to mobilize support for Karzai. Absent the formal positions within the system they held in 2004, the jury is still out on whether SMA and JMK can deliver as they did in 2004. AWK, who leads Kandahar's provincial council, has organized similar efforts and, according to some, has helped strong-arm other Pashtun candidates out of the race. ¶5. (C) Nangarhar Gov. Gul Aga Sherzai now looks to throw his considerable popular support behind Karzai, after once threatening to quit the government after Karzai pushed him out of the presidential race. Opposition presidential candidates claim that Sherzai recently directed Nangarhar officials to back Karzai and disrupt campaign activities by other candidates. Sherzai's appeal extends beyond Nangarhar to his home province of Kandahar, to his fellow Barakzai tribal elders, and to the streets of Kabul, where he enjoys a reputation as a leader who gets results. Leaning Toward Karzai -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Moderate mujahideen leader Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani looks now to be in the Karzai camp, despite leading efforts earlier this year to merge opposition efforts behind a unity candidate. Gailani, patriarch of a Sufi Arab family that has intermarried with Pashtuns for three generations, holds some sway in the Loya Paktia area. Others openly mock the modern family's mystical religious credentials and patrician values. Still, the family maintains considerable finances, has several members serving in Parliament and other government positions, and can mobilize modest popular support. ¶7. (SBU) Former Finance Minister Anwarulhaq Ahadi withdrew from the presidential race under heavy pressure from his father-in-law, Pir Gailani. Ahadi himself has little popular KABUL 00001468 002 OF 002 appeal, though he heads the Pashtun nationalist Afghan Millat political party, which has strong representation in Kabul, eastern provinces, and larger cities with Pashtun populations. With Ahadi out of the race, other party leaders such as Jelani Popal and Hanif Atmar are now free to direct Afghan Millat's resources to serve Karzai's re-election campaign. ¶8. (SBU) Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) Chairman Abdul Hadi Arghandewal had earlier vowed not to endorse Karzai. With the president's re-election looking likely, Arghandewal now feels it is in the party's interests to join the winning side. Arghandewal enjoys stronger support among HIA's executive committee and regional leaders than from the party's grassroots. Still, most HIA leaders credit him for guiding the party from the wilderness into the mainstream of Afghan politics, at times even using his personal savings to keep HIA afloat. Arghandewal brags HIA's support would ensure Karzai a first-round victory. He would need to endorse Karzai well ahead of the election in order to extract promises of political appointments for HIA members. ¶9. (SBU) Mustapha Zahir, grandson of the last king of Afghanistan, will support Karzai's re-election. UF leaders had courted Zahir to run as UF nominee Abdullah Abdullah's 1st Vice President running mate, but Zahir ultimately declined. He and other royalists maintain influence in Pashtun and other communities, though have yet to test their popular support at the ballot box. Other royal family members have dabbled in politics with minimal impact: Humayoun Asifi, the king's brother-in-law, briefly ran for president in 2004 and is now Abdullah's running mate, while Prince Ali Seraj, the king's nephew, dropped his own presidential campaign earlier this year. Karzai's Rivals -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Karzai's support in Parliament comes mainly from Pashtuns, though several individual Pashtun MPs stand out as fierce critics. Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni has launched his own presidential campaign, while MPs like Naim Farahi and Dawood Sultanzoi regularly criticize Karzai in local media. Yaseni has been slow to attract significant endorsements from other Pashtun MPs, and other Karzai critics in Parliament have not sided with an alternative candidate. Pashtun MPs have not yet mobilized supporters from their own 2005 elections to back Karzai, Abdullah, Yaseni, Ashraf Ghani, or another candidate. Karzai may turn to MPs with strong tribal connections to do this, but few presidential candidates are actively courting urban Pashtun MPs' support. Wildcards -------------- ¶11. (C) US citizens Ali Ahmad Jalali and Zalmay Khalilzad both declined to enter the presidential race and have yet to announce support for another candidate. The Palace believed these two were the most capable opposition candidates, due in part to their citizenship offering the appearance of US backing. Although both men are out of the race and unlikely to formally join another ticket, either could significantly boost a campaign with their endorsement. ¶12. (C) Hezb-e-Islami founder Gulbuddin Hekmatyar remains a popular figure in northern Pashtun pockets and in some eastern provinces, despite a decades-long record of war and destruction. Any attempt by Hekmatyar to influence the election's outcome would spark outrage by non-Pashtuns. Karzai earlier this year appeared open to considering reconciliation with the HIG leader. But with Karzai's re-election looking likely and his campaign already facing international criticism for nominating Fahim to the 1st Vice Presidency, Karzai has less reason to entertain a HIG rapprochement. Although looking less likely to occur, a Hekmatyar endorsement would boost Karzai's support in rural Pashtun communities and only anger non-Pashtuns unlikely to vote for him anyway. EIKENBERRY