AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE IS TAKING ROOT IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001425 SIPDIS STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A STATE PASS USAID E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE IS TAKING ROOT IN WARDAK'S JALREZ PROVINCE REF: A. KABUL 937 ¶B. KABUL 1016 Classified By: PRT-Sub National Governance Counselor Valerie C. Fowler for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The positive development of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) in the Jalraz district of Wardak Province demonstrates how the AP3 might successfully be adapted to build local support and responsibility for security. The program still faces a myriad of challenges, though, from insurgents, lack of ANP professionalism and support, GIRoA,s ability to sustain the AP3 requirements, acceptance of the program by local tribal and community leaders, and the ability of the U.S. to direct sufficient assets to the effort to fill GIRoA systemic inadequacies. A key test will come as the U.S. begins to transition the responsibilities for support of the Jalraz guardians from Special Forces to the Task Force commander and as we work with local Afghans to increase the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) in the heavily Pashtun districts of Nerkh and Seyyedabad. A broadening of the AP3 beyond Wardak will be time-consuming and resource intensive, but evolving this effort alongside ANP training could pay long-term benefits if applied in some key strategic areas. Jalraz District Demonstrating the AP3 Benefits -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The AP3 is off to a good start in Jalraz District of Wardak Province just two months after the initial class of 195 APPF guardians was reintroduced to its villages on March ¶31. There have not been overt challenges by insurgents to the APPF in Jalraz. The program has put unemployed young men to work, and provided a disincentive for insurgent targeting because the men in the APPF are from local families. That tie to the community appears to be paying dividends where security has improved appreciably. The district is divided into five sub-zones (or &howzas8). Four of the five sub-zones have seen an improvement in security; the one exception is a heavily Pashtun area with stronger ties to the insurgency. ¶3. (S) Getting beyond the more diverse tribal district of Jalrez into the more heavily Pashtun areas of Wardak province will be the next big hurdle for the program. With the positive developments in Jalraz, the insurgents have been pushed more deeply into neighboring Nerkh District, where APPF recruitment has been more challenging. Special Forces have seen senior Taliban leadership ) particularly from the Quetta shura ) seeking to undermine the AP3 as the program begins to take away their leverage over locals. An influx of foreign fighters and of guns via the Kuchi migration (reftel A) reportedly are part of Taliban effort to stop the growth of the AP3 into their strongholds in Nerkh and Seyyedabad. ¶4. (C) Seventy-nine recruits were trained in the second AP3 class that graduated on May 14, with just 19 guardians hailing from Nerkh (bringing the APPF to a total of 58 guardians from Nerkh). Originally, 200 recruits from Nerkh were slated to join the course but pulled out of the program as a result of intense insurgent intimidation. The new graduates are being sent to man ten checkpoints throughout Maydan Shahr and Nerkh districts. Work is underway now to conduct clearing operations and recruit district locals into the third AP3 class. Getting it Right in Wardak: A Program That Can,t be Rushed -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The gains in Jalraz reflect the pain-staking, often slow, work that accompanies public embrace of the program. The program is designed and run by the Afghan Government (GIRoA); as a result, any progress is reliant on the Ministry of Interior (MoI),the Provincial Governor, and local elders and leaders. The readiness of GIRoA and local leadership to move forward is a key limiting factor to the pace of the program in each province and district. A hallmark of the AP3 program is the local Afghan role in recruiting and vetting APPF Candidates. The selection of recruits places the onus on local tribal and community leaders to identify prospective guardians, and through that process of hand-picking recruits puts responsibility on the local leaders for their own security. ¶6. (C) While the program relies on Afghan leadership, its successful evolution requires a significant U.S. investment in the program. The Nerkh recruitment experience has KABUL 00001425 002 OF 003 demonstrated the importance of undertaking well-timed clear and hold operations prior to recruitment in order to give the population a sense of security before they put forward APPF candidates. Additionally, the Operational Detachment &A8 (ODA) ) a U.S. Special Forces team (12 personnel) ) has been instrumental to the development of the program. Thus, establishing a synchronized relationship between the Special Forces implementing the AP3 and the battle space commander undertaking the kinetic activities to support the program, in concert with broader requirements, is essential to the AP3 success. Civilians have an important role. Significant planning must go into well-timed kinetic operations, the disbursement of appropriate development projects through CERP or USAID projects, and governance work by Special Forces, as well as State and USAID PRT officers where applicable. ANP: A Potential Weak Link -------------- ¶7. (C) Following introduction of the APPF in Jalraz, the district saw a decline in ANP corruption as it become more difficult in the face of the APPF patrols for the ANP to set up illegal checkpoints used to collect fees from the local population. Additionally, the APPF was a more capable and better trained force than the ANP. As a result, the ANP Focused District Development (FDD) training was expedited for the police in Jalrez, allowing them to be retrained and refitted with new equipment. ANCOP, a substitute police force, have served while the Jalrez police have been in training. The newly-trained ANP are scheduled to return to the district in mid-June 2009. Current planning includes a 32 week mentorship program for the returning ANP, which will include building the relationship between the ANP and the APPF. The AP3 will not succeed without a parallel increase in ANP professionalism and an understanding by the ANP that the APPF is not a threat to its role and pay scales. These factors are a significant challenge to Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A),the US DoD Command charged with developing logistical and administrative capabilities of the Afghan National Police. ¶8. (C) To that end, consistent payment of salaries remains a key vulnerability of the AP3 (as well as the ANP). Steps have been taken to assist the MoI to assure the payments are fair and regular, but the AP3 is only budgeted for the next 18 months. AP3 members are currently being paid with MoI funds; however, Minister Atmar expects that the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA) will soon assume the responsibility and reimburse the MoI. This has caused concern in the international community, which remains divided over whether to use the LOFTA for the AP3. Supporting a Successful Transition -------------- ¶9. (C) The GIRoA has established three guidelines to measure the success of the AP3: a decrease in violence in the program,s area of operation; increased funding for Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects in Wardak; and the overall satisfaction of the village elders with the program in their areas. From this measurement, the Jalraz experience is achieving the GIRoA goals. ¶10. (C) However, the metrics for transitioning to a sustainable program, beginning with transition from Special Forces mentorship to the Task Force commander, is also important to evolving the program district-by-district. In addition to some subjective conditions, there are several objective conditions for this transition, to include: the APPF and ANP can carry out sustained, coordinated foot patrols; the security environment has truly changed consistent with COIN principles; and the ANP is providing sustained logistical support to the APPF. To help meet these conditions, Special Forces and the Task Force commander are working with the Wardak Chief of Police to develop tactical response procedures, basic logistical support and regularized logging of APPF and ANP activities. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The AP3 represents more of a change of Afghan policy than a popular uprising ) having locals responsible for security is a significant softening of the current police policy of having only "outsiders" provide security in an effort to ensure a reduction in factionalism. The APPF was compared by one individual associated with the program as the local beat cop and the ANP as the State or Highway Police. KABUL 00001425 003 OF 003 While this may not be exactly how the program evolves, the concept makes sense as it seeks to place greater responsibility on the local population for their own security while still maintaining a strong national face on Afghan security. The real test for AP3 will occur as the program progresses into the more heavily Pashtun-populated areas, i.e. Seyyedabad, Chak, etc. If the Pashtuns do not make up a majority of the force, there will be problems. What works in Jalraz will need to be adapted for Seyyedabad; and what works in Wardak Province may not necessarily work in Helmand Province, for example. ¶12. (C) If the program is to be evolved beyond the test-bed of Wardak Province, those responsible for the program will need to consider several factors, to include: local government ownership; U.S. military fire-power in the form of a flexible battle space owner and sufficient special operating forces (Special Forces, PSYOP and Civil Affairs Teams); and adequate civilian support for governance, mentoring, and development. A commitment by the United States to undertake the slow and pain-staking process of working with provincial and district leaders to build support for the program will need to be spelled out with clear requirements and resources so the necessary elements that have made the Jalraz experience succeed are in place. Should the effort succeed in the tougher Nerkh and Fayyad Abad districts, it will be worth broadening the program to key strategic points along key routes that connect the major commercial and political centers. EIKENBERRY