Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL1421
2009-06-06 07:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO
VZCZCXRO2278 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #1421/01 1570705 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 060705Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9254 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001421
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO
DEVELOP POLICING
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001421
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO
DEVELOP POLICING
1. (SBU) Summary: To address police deficiencies in Logar
and Wardak provinces, the 3rd Brigade 10th Mountain Division
(3/10) is working with national police and the local police
chiefs to implement both a bottom-up and top-down police
development strategy. Through a series of inspection tours
and a provincial summits the 3/10 has worked with the Afghans
to bring together national, provincial and district police
leadership to collectively address habitual police problems
in the two provinces. In the long run, however, improvements
in the Afghan National Police (ANP) will require sustained
mentoring, a recognized form of accountability, and other
measures specifically focused on reinforcing the entire chain
of command at the national, provincial and district levels.
End Summary.
Series of Police Inspections in Logar and Wardak
-------------- ---
2. (SBU) Prior to its deployment in December 2008, the
3/10 determined to prioritize police development. Prior to
the 3/10's arrival, limited Coalition Force presence did not
permit for extensive interaction with the police. Upon its
arrival, the 3/10 began to implement both a bottom-up and
top-down strategy by bringing together national, provincial
and district police leadership to collectively address
habitual police problems in their area of operations. From
the bottom, the 3/10 sought to duplicate the Afghan National
Army (ANA) training system, to include strong and sustained
mentoring and accountability. From the top, the 3/10 brigade
commander and the provincial police chief carried out a
series of police inspections in each of the districts.
(Comment: Prior to this, neither of the provincial police
chiefs had visited a number of their districts in more than a
year.)
3. (SBU) Questions raised during the district inspections
included personnel and equipment accountability, patrol
schedules, authority to hire and fire, Afghan National Civil
Order Police (ANCOP) command and control, and insufficient
tashkiel (NCO policemen) allocation. The most common
problems centered on logistics, specifically fuel
distribution, barrier materials and vehicle maintenance.
Blame for these problems was placed across the board but
usually on whomever was not present, particularly the
national leadership.
Logar-Wardak Police Summit
--------------
4. (SBU) Recognizing that the police would continue to
pass the buck and continuously blame others for their
problems, a plan was conceived to bring decision makers
across the national, provincial and district level is
together in one room for a "police summit." Deputy Minister
of Interior LTG Mangal agreed to chair the meeting, which was
held on May 19 at FOB Shank. Logar and Wardak provincial
chiefs of police and most of the district police chiefs
attended the meeting. (Comment: Also invited to attend were
Deputy Minister of Interior for Administration and Supply,
LTG Haydir Basir and the regional commander, MG Alimi
Khoistani, but they failed to show. Minister of Interior
Atmar commented after the summit that he was disappointed
that neither attended.) The meeting marked the first time
that national, provincial and district police leadership came
together to collectively interact with one another and
address policing issues in Logar and Wardak. For police at
the district level it provided the novel experience of
interacting with their national leadership.
5. (SBU) The role played by 3/10 during the summit was
limited to the brigade commander highlighting commonly held
problems raised during the inspection tours as a series of
questions to spur discussion and debate among all of the
police present. While solutions were not reached on most of
the problems discussed, the summit served as a forum in which
the parties could better understand the Afghan process and
forge a sustained Afghan solution. The discussions, many
times uninterrupted by translators, allowed for candid and
constructive conversation. For example, while the Logar
provincial police chief gave a rosy perspective of the
province, some of the district chiefs were brutally candid
and realistic in their comments, saying directly to the
deputy minister, "That is not how things really are since we
can't get what we need," and "We are stationed in a school
and don't want to be there."
6. (SBU) Furthermore, while all police participants
understood how police officers and tashkiel were hired, not
KABUL 00001421 002 OF 002
all understood who has hiring and firing authority, nor did
they all initially understand basic questions such as whether
ANCOP report to provincial police chiefs or to Kabul.
(Comment: ANCOP answer to the provincial chief of police. End
Comment.) Commenting that he felt like he was "on the witness
stand" for much of the meeting, LTG Mangal was nonetheless
constructive and listened to all of the chiefs' comments. He
acknowledged that the MOI is severely deficient in a number
of areas but said he would directly involve himself in
addressing their issues, particularly fuel shortages. While
he promised to review resources, he also encouraged the
district chiefs to be creative and try to find a resolution
themselves. As a means of maintaining a focus on the issues
discussed, Mangal recommended a follow on meeting on August
10, before the elections.
Comment
--------------
7. (SBU) The police in Logar and Wardak have a long road
ahead of them to reach adequate self sustained capabilities,
let alone to achieve operational effectiveness on par with
the Afghan army. A series of inspections or police summits
are not enough to fix the problems. These efforts will also
need to be complemented with prolonged mentoring, a
recognized form of accountability, and other measures that
specifically focus on reinforcing the entire chain of command
at the national, provincial and district levels.
EIKENBERRY
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO
DEVELOP POLICING
1. (SBU) Summary: To address police deficiencies in Logar
and Wardak provinces, the 3rd Brigade 10th Mountain Division
(3/10) is working with national police and the local police
chiefs to implement both a bottom-up and top-down police
development strategy. Through a series of inspection tours
and a provincial summits the 3/10 has worked with the Afghans
to bring together national, provincial and district police
leadership to collectively address habitual police problems
in the two provinces. In the long run, however, improvements
in the Afghan National Police (ANP) will require sustained
mentoring, a recognized form of accountability, and other
measures specifically focused on reinforcing the entire chain
of command at the national, provincial and district levels.
End Summary.
Series of Police Inspections in Logar and Wardak
-------------- ---
2. (SBU) Prior to its deployment in December 2008, the
3/10 determined to prioritize police development. Prior to
the 3/10's arrival, limited Coalition Force presence did not
permit for extensive interaction with the police. Upon its
arrival, the 3/10 began to implement both a bottom-up and
top-down strategy by bringing together national, provincial
and district police leadership to collectively address
habitual police problems in their area of operations. From
the bottom, the 3/10 sought to duplicate the Afghan National
Army (ANA) training system, to include strong and sustained
mentoring and accountability. From the top, the 3/10 brigade
commander and the provincial police chief carried out a
series of police inspections in each of the districts.
(Comment: Prior to this, neither of the provincial police
chiefs had visited a number of their districts in more than a
year.)
3. (SBU) Questions raised during the district inspections
included personnel and equipment accountability, patrol
schedules, authority to hire and fire, Afghan National Civil
Order Police (ANCOP) command and control, and insufficient
tashkiel (NCO policemen) allocation. The most common
problems centered on logistics, specifically fuel
distribution, barrier materials and vehicle maintenance.
Blame for these problems was placed across the board but
usually on whomever was not present, particularly the
national leadership.
Logar-Wardak Police Summit
--------------
4. (SBU) Recognizing that the police would continue to
pass the buck and continuously blame others for their
problems, a plan was conceived to bring decision makers
across the national, provincial and district level is
together in one room for a "police summit." Deputy Minister
of Interior LTG Mangal agreed to chair the meeting, which was
held on May 19 at FOB Shank. Logar and Wardak provincial
chiefs of police and most of the district police chiefs
attended the meeting. (Comment: Also invited to attend were
Deputy Minister of Interior for Administration and Supply,
LTG Haydir Basir and the regional commander, MG Alimi
Khoistani, but they failed to show. Minister of Interior
Atmar commented after the summit that he was disappointed
that neither attended.) The meeting marked the first time
that national, provincial and district police leadership came
together to collectively interact with one another and
address policing issues in Logar and Wardak. For police at
the district level it provided the novel experience of
interacting with their national leadership.
5. (SBU) The role played by 3/10 during the summit was
limited to the brigade commander highlighting commonly held
problems raised during the inspection tours as a series of
questions to spur discussion and debate among all of the
police present. While solutions were not reached on most of
the problems discussed, the summit served as a forum in which
the parties could better understand the Afghan process and
forge a sustained Afghan solution. The discussions, many
times uninterrupted by translators, allowed for candid and
constructive conversation. For example, while the Logar
provincial police chief gave a rosy perspective of the
province, some of the district chiefs were brutally candid
and realistic in their comments, saying directly to the
deputy minister, "That is not how things really are since we
can't get what we need," and "We are stationed in a school
and don't want to be there."
6. (SBU) Furthermore, while all police participants
understood how police officers and tashkiel were hired, not
KABUL 00001421 002 OF 002
all understood who has hiring and firing authority, nor did
they all initially understand basic questions such as whether
ANCOP report to provincial police chiefs or to Kabul.
(Comment: ANCOP answer to the provincial chief of police. End
Comment.) Commenting that he felt like he was "on the witness
stand" for much of the meeting, LTG Mangal was nonetheless
constructive and listened to all of the chiefs' comments. He
acknowledged that the MOI is severely deficient in a number
of areas but said he would directly involve himself in
addressing their issues, particularly fuel shortages. While
he promised to review resources, he also encouraged the
district chiefs to be creative and try to find a resolution
themselves. As a means of maintaining a focus on the issues
discussed, Mangal recommended a follow on meeting on August
10, before the elections.
Comment
--------------
7. (SBU) The police in Logar and Wardak have a long road
ahead of them to reach adequate self sustained capabilities,
let alone to achieve operational effectiveness on par with
the Afghan army. A series of inspections or police summits
are not enough to fix the problems. These efforts will also
need to be complemented with prolonged mentoring, a
recognized form of accountability, and other measures that
specifically focus on reinforcing the entire chain of command
at the national, provincial and district levels.
EIKENBERRY