SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LANGEVIN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001321

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, H
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LANGEVIN


1. (SBU) Congressmen: We warmly welcome your visit to
Afghanistan


2. (SBU) The government and the public here have welcomed the
United States' new strategic purpose to defeat al Qaeda and
its supporters and to prevent their return to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. To accomplish this, President Obama's strategy
rests on three operational lines: strengthening security,
building access to justice and broader governance capacity at
both the national and local levels, and developing the
economy. To meet these challenges, we are expanding the U.S.
military presence (both to protect the Afghan people and to
train Afghan security forces to assume that full burden in
future),and the number of U.S. civilians working in a range
of disciplines throughout Afghanistan, with concentration in
the most sensitive Southern and Eastern regions. The most
immediate political objective, which we share with the
Afghans and our Coalition partners, is to ensure the
legitimacy and transparency of the August 20 presidential and
provincial council elections.

Elections
--------------


3. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything
political here. Presidential candidate registration closed
May 8, and at least 44 candidates turned in completed
registration forms. President Karzai appears to hold a
significant advantage over his nearest competitors:
ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, ex-Finance Minister
Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of the Lower House Mirwais
Yaseni. In the end, only those three of the half-dozen
rumored top-tier challengers registered, alongside relatively
obscure running mates, signaling a lack of broad-based
support for their campaigns among Afghanistan's political
powerbrokers. Other registered candidates of note include
two women who are as unknown nationally as the other
candidates. Karzai is confident that he will win
re-election.


4. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, both Karzai and opposition
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a
level playing field and free and transparent elections. The
Independent Election Commission (IEC),with strong
international backing and technical support from UNDP, has
worked to even the odds somewhat and to foster at least
theoretical opportunity for real competition. The IEC
resisted Karzai's ploys to advance the election date to
Spring 2009, which would have cut off the opposition's
nascent attempts at organization. It issued a decree in May
spelling out government officials' duty of impartiality. A
key part of its mission is to ensure that government media
provide equal access to candidates. The IEC will fund some
$2 million in private air time for candidates - money that
comes from our $40 million contribution to the $224 million
election budget. We are stepping up our own voter education
work with women, youth, media, and other civil society
groups, adding an extra $700,000 in State Department
democracy program funding in May. We and others in the
international community are pressing the government to issue
its own Hatch Act-like regulations, and urging it to finalize
a media law strengthening protections for freedom of
expression, including in political campaigns.

Complex Security Situation
--------------


5. (SBU) The Afghan people and their government regard
civilian casualties resulting from coalition operations as
the most sensitive security issue. You will arrive following
a recent joint Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and
Coalition investigation, examining events surrounding a
complex series of Taliban attacks on civilians, ANSF and
Coalition forces in Farah province. The joint investigation
team has confirmed that some number of civilians were killed
in the course of the fighting, but has been unable to
determine with certainty which of those casualties were
Taliban fighters and which were non-combatants. The
challenge of how to balance security operations and
non-combatant protection continues. ISAF Commander General
McKiernan directed in December substantial changes to
coalition tactics, techniques and procedures to minimize
civilian casualties. If confirmed by the Senate, General
Stanley McChrystal will succeed General McKiernan as
Commander of U.S. Forces and of ISAF (International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan).


6. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel
for at least several years. There are about 80,000 Afghan
army, about 87,000 Afghan police, and about 58,000

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international military personnel to maintain security. The
Afghan army is growing by more than 2,500 personnel per month
and should reach 134,000 in 2011. U.S forces are expected to
top 68,000 in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S.
international forces in Afghanistan. We are working with
Interior Minister Atmar to accelerate police reform and
training, reduce corruption, and create vetted, specialized
police units.

Developing Governance Abilities
--------------


7. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic
corruption, poverty, criminality, insurgency and ethno-tribal
politics, all exacerbated by three decades of war and misrule
since the Russian invasion of 1979. Electoral dynamics are
further complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make
expedient decisions on one hand, but also to appoint
top-flight leaders like Minister Atmar to deliver police
services. Nonetheless, rapid transformation is underway in
Afghanistan and there is much to work with. Atmar is only
one among a solid group of impressively capable and clean
technocratic leaders. What the state and civil society lack
in broad institutional capacity is offset by the striking
dedication, energy and patriotism of many Afghans, including
many who have returned from comfortable lives abroad to
rebuild their country. The energy and ambition of Afghan
youth are particularly striking at the burgeoning university
campuses.


8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside
the increases in U.S. military personnel. New positions in
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-09 supplemental
request from all agencies would total 421. There are many
more positions with separate funding mechanisms. Of the 421,
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul.
The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, phased
in coordination with arrival of military units and
establishment of safer operating environments. The new
civilians will join various State Department and USAID
elements, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the
FBI (Legal Attache),the Departments of Agriculture,
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS),Transportation (DOT),and
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC),as well as the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).


9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on Afghans creating a
merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and building its
capacity to deliver services to the public. Strong
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health,
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, and
Counternarcotics. Interior and Agriculture stand out among
ministries for strong leadership. We also work effectively
with the other ministries, although mixed agendas or a legacy
of weakness slow progress. For instance, the Supreme Court
and the Ministry of Justice suffer from the acute lack of
qualified professionals, a legal system that combines
elements of Sharia, tribal, and Western law, and a lack of
national consensus on the way forward.


10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts
aim to strengthen local government at all levels, through
Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming civilian
increase) District Support Teams. We work with traditional
leadership structures as well as those who gained power
through force or wealth during the days of conflict, but who
have proven ready to cooperate with constitutional government
and rule of law. Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak
connections between the capital and provinces, long-standing
personal, ethnic, and tribal rivalries and distrust, and the
presence of insurgents or criminals complicate our task. The
goal is to support and help develop responsive, reliable
leadership in local communities, reciprocally bound to the
capital.

Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation
--------------


11. (SBU) President Obama stated U.S. policy on
reconciliation March 27: "There will be no peace without
reconciliation among former enemies... That's why we will
work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and
international partners to have a reconciliation process in
every province." Afghans broadly welcomed that U.S. policy.
Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent

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leaders remains controversial. Many welcome the possibility
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear
an intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their
interests. So far, government reconciliation efforts have
been premised on respect for the constitution. Although the
Fall 2008 Saudi attempt to begin talks generated much
interest, it has yielded no visible progress. Karzai credits
Egypt's Sheikh al-Azhar with a substantial helpful role, and
hopes for further support from al-Azhar for the
reconciliation process.

Economy
--------------


12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10. Governor Fitrat
leads the Central Bank well. Inflation is virtually flat,
and the Afghan currency is stable. The pre-election period
is not conducive to implementing economic reforms to support
private sector development. That said, relatively young,
dynamic and reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and
Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the business
climate. Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and
strengthen fiscal sustainability so that it can reduce
dependence on foreign aid over time. It remains one of the
poorest countries in the world and far from meeting this goal.


13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government,
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper
transparency and accountability. Our motto is: "Afghan
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability." The
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation. U.S. assistance
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade,
and expand farm credit opportunities. We are also
encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for example to enable
transshipment of Afghan agricultural exports across Pakistan
to the massive Indian market.

Human Rights Work Ahead
--------------


14. (SBU) Civil society activists and the Ministry of
Women's Affairs drafted a progressive domestic violence bill,
currently under review by the Ministry of Justice. More
generally, a thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative
society. Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human
rights record remain poor, including violence and
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of
free speech. In the face of powerful conservative religious
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly
women's rights.


15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile cases
involving freedom of religious expression. In October 2008,
the Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction
and 20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez
Kambakhsh, for distributing an article over the internet
about women's rights that allegedly defamed Islam. The
international community is pushing for a presidential pardon,
and we would ask you to do the same with Karzai. Also, Ghows
Zalmai and Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year
sentences, handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February,
for publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the
Koran that did not include the original Arabic text - an act
considered sacrilegious by extremely doctrinaire Muslims.


16. (SBU) In March President Karzai signed a Shia Family Law
with provisions that would violate women's constitutional
guarantee to equal rights. Pressure from the USG, the
international community, and Afghan human rights activists
has blocked its enactment, pending a constitutional review by
the Ministry of Justice. We continue to raise our concerns
with the law and our expectation of a transparent review
process inclusive of women and civil society.

Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South

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17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south,
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency
have become mutually sustaining. To support the Government
of Afghanistan and local people in confronting it, we have
organized a civilian-military Combined Joint Inter-Agency
Task Force (CJIATF) with U.K. and Canadian participation.
Its anti-narcotics operations invariably occur with
substantial Afghan police and/or participation, as we aim to
build Afghan security force capacities in counternarcotics
(CN) as well as counter-insurgency (COIN). CJIATF has begun
comprehensive counter-narcotics planning for 2009-2010
combining the full range of civilian and military resources.
We are now increasing our focus on boosting licit
agriculture, improving local governance, and increasing
interdiction of drug traffickers to disrupt the link between
narcotics trafficking and the insurgency. We will continue
poppy eradication efforts, but will shift emphasis and
resources more towards the former objectives.


18. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains extensive, and costly
eradication efforts can yield mixed results in COIN terms.
Hence we are de-emphasizing eradication while increasing
interdiction efforts via CJIATF and providing alter nations
rural livelihoods through agricultural development.
Nevertheless, there is some promising news. Poppy
cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first
reduction since 2005. Just as notably, poppy-free provinces
grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all provinces.
Governors in three formerly major poppy cultivating provinces
- Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar - have succeeded in
eliminating or nearly eliminating poppy cultivation. Poppy
cultivation has died away by itself in other parts of the
north and east of the country. This year, Helmand Governor
Gulabuddin Mangal, whose province produces more than half of
Afghanistan's opium poppy, conducted a comprehensive
multi-season campaign against poppy cultivation in a
100-square mile area of central Helmand. Mangal's campaign
combined public information, agricultural assistance, and law
enforcement, including eradication by Afghan police with
force protection from the Afghan army. The UN Office for
Drugs and Crime believes poppy cultivation has dropped
substantially in Helmand and predicts more poppy-free
provinces in other parts of the country.

International Community and Afghanistan
--------------


19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the
international community are uneven. The UN presence is
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment
from New York. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and
Special Representative Holbrooke have rallied world attention
and increased resources for the Afghan-Pakistan complex of
threats to regional stability. International support is
holding as demonstrated at recent conferences, including the
March 31 Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August
elections.
EIKENBERRY