POLITICAL PARTIES A NEAR NO-SHOW ON PROVINCIAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001297 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES A NEAR NO-SHOW ON PROVINCIAL COUNCIL BALLOTS REF: KABUL 1224 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Some 88 percent of the more than 3,300 candidates who registered for this summer's provincial council elections chose to identify as independent candidates rather than associate with one of Afghanistan's 100-plus political parties. The near no-show by political parties on the ballots reveals their weak status in Afghanistan vis-a-vis the traditional power centers of tribal elders and mujahideen networks. Political party identification was strongest in the north, but not across the board. Only a handful of the 32 parties that did register candidates appear to have made a multi-province organized effort to prepare for the election, despite four years to learn from the 2005 elections, when political parties suffered disappointing results in provincial council and parliamentary elections. End Summary. Candidates Prefer Independent Label -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Some 2,925 of the 3,328 candidates (88 percent) who appear on the preliminary ballots for Afghanistan's 34 provincial council elections registered as independents (reftel). Khost, Nuristan, Panjshir, Uruzgan, and Zabol will have no political party candidates on their ballots. Balkh has the highest rate of party identification with 61 of its 142 candidates (43 percent) registering with their organization's name on the ballot. The Uzbek-majority Junbesh-e-Milli led the 32 parties that did register candidates with 82 nominees. Mujahideen-era parties Wahdat-e-Mardum (52),Jamiat-e-Milli (48),Wahdat-e-Milli (44),and Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (41) had the next highest number of candidates. The Afghan Republican Party, with 13, had the most candidates among new democratic parties. Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA),which registered candidates in 14 provinces, is the most geographically diverse party. ¶3. (SBU) Political party leaders have long complained that Afghanistan's history and electoral system disadvantage political parties. Many Afghans associate parties with the unpopular Soviet era, and are especially suspicious of those that use "democratic" in their names. Moreover, the Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used to elect provincial council members and Parliament's Lower House from multi-member constituencies (the provinces themselves) does not reward party membership. ¶4. (SBU) However, more than 100 political parties have registered with the Ministry of Justice since 2004, and attendance at party rallies in major cities can be significant. Several parties have offices in numerous provinces, while major parties like HIA boast of dozens of district- and provincial-level shuras reporting to a central party structure. HIA Chairman Abdul Hadi Arghandewal contends that many of the so-called independent candidates registered in southern and eastern provinces are HIA members or sympathizers who chose not to publicly identify with the party so as not to draw retribution from HIA's rivals. Flaws in the System -------------- ¶5. (SBU) This stunningly low registration effort by democratic groups is a severe blow to Afghanistan's attempts to develop a political party system. Some fault lies with the parties themselves, who failed to take advantage of only perfunctory registration requirements and had several years to plan their campaigns. Traditional Afghan misgivings about political parties, especially in the south, may also stand in the way of greater acceptance. President Karzai's rejection of political parties has set the tone for most major political leaders to downplay the importance of parties. But the sheer number of parties demonstrates a growing interest by many Afghans to participate in party development, and we believe most Afghans are willing to experiment with political parties in order to achieve a more transparent government, rather than continue to elect so-called independent representatives who sell their votes and influence to the highest bidder. ¶6. (SBU) However, the present electoral system does not reward political party membership and will continue to hinder democracy's development here. With huge candidate fields and the SNTV, provincial councils and Parliament are rife with independent candidates who often received less than 1 percent of the popular vote. Warlords, drug dealers, and other unsavory characters win legitimacy for their political careers even if rejected by the vast majority of the population. The current system is an obstacle to the KABUL 00001297 002 OF 003 formation of a healthy, competitive opposition to the government, while laws better regulating the electoral system and political parties lay dormant in Parliament. Without political parties to serve as the nucleus of collective politics, voters will be hard pressed to hold incumbents accountable and empower local councils or the national Parliament to carry out effective oversight of the executive branch. Some Parties Attempt to Game the System ... -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Three parties ) Junbesh, HIA, and the Republicans ) came through on promises to organize "realistic" strategies to win seats on the councils. Junbesh Deputy Chairman Faizullah Zaki told PolOff the party organized candidates in four of its six strongest provinces in the north, vetting hopefuls and choosing nominees based on their regional appeal. Junbesh will instruct its supporters to vote for the candidate assigned to their district or village, creating de-facto single-member constituencies and maximizing the number of candidates they can elect. Provincial party chairmen in two provinces were unable to orchestrate such "invisible primaries" and allowed more Junbesh candidates to register than there are seats on the councils, likely ensuring that the party will win fewer seats than its proportion of the popular vote would suggest. ¶8. (SBU) HIA and the Republicans have adapted a similar strategy, though their support is spread thinner and wider than Junbesh's concentrated support among Uzbeks and Turkmen in the north. HIA has 41 candidates on the ballot in 14 provinces, but is only trying for a majority of seats in Nangarhar. Elsewhere, HIA hopes to win two seats and convert independent winners into party members after the new councils form. Republican Party Chairman Sebghatullah Sanjar admits to running a disorganized effort in the 2005 provincial council and parliamentary elections, overestimating the party's strength and refusing to merge efforts with similarly minded parties (the party subsequently failed to win any seats). This time around, the Republicans are hoping to win seats in just a handful of provinces, usually by running only one male and one female candidate. ¶9. (SBU) Hazara-populated provinces look to have the most competitive elections, with Wahdat-e-Mardum, Wahdat-e-Milli, Wahdat-e-Millat, Harakat, Eqtadar-e-Milli, and Ensejam-e-Milli all registering multiple candidates in Bamyan, Daikundi, Ghazni, Wardak, and other provinces. For the most part, these parties clamped down on supporters excessively registering as candidates and are running in one of the few regions where party identification can be a definite advantage, due to the competitive rivalry among various Hazara mujahideen commanders. ... While Others Fail to Understand the Game -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Most parties significantly underperformed on their promises to register large, pan-regional candidate fields. The Tajik-majority Jamiat party, one of the country's largest and oldest political organizations, failed to register any candidates in strongholds like Panjshir, Badakhshan (home province of party chairman and former president Burhanuddin Rabbani),and Herat. However, the party did register 28 candidates in Balkh, whose council only has 19 seats. Candidates probably vied for the favor of local Jamiat powerbroker Gov. Mohammed Noor Atta, with several registering as Jamiat members without the consent of any provincial party structure. According to election regulations, candidates may declare party affiliation on the ballot without confirmation from the party that the candidate is indeed a party nominee. ¶11. (SBU) Other supposedly influential political parties failed to put candidates on the ballots. Pashtun-nationalist party Afghan Millat registered just 12 candidates, and Tanzim Dawat-e-Islami, founded by former warlord Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, enlisted only nine. Leaders of those two parties had said earlier this year that they would nominate a robust field for this summer's campaign. Candidates may have chosen not to associate with parties that have strong ethnic identities in order to improve their chances of serving in the Upper House. Each provincial council selects one member to serve in the Upper House every four years ) councils in ethnically diverse provinces have typically promoted members who do not have strong ethnic identities. New Democratic Parties Falter -------------- KABUL 00001297 003 OF 003 ¶12. (SBU) Other than the Republican Party, no new democratic organization fielded more than one candidate. Many democratic leaders had earlier vowed to improve on their dismal performance in 2005, when they suffered nation-wide defeats. After this year's May 8 registration deadline passed with minimal democratic party candidates registered, PolOff pressed democratic leaders to explain their failure to get on the ballot. Some party chiefs complained that it was too difficult to orchestrate registration efforts in distant provinces from Kabul, even though registration requirements for council candidates only called for 200 voter signatures and a nominal fee. Other party leaders claimed they did not have sufficient support from Western countries to balance the financial aid mujahideen parties receive from foreign governments. ¶13. (SBU) Only one pro-democratic party leader put the blame on the parties themselves, saying that a dozen or more organizations had wasted the last four years with "frivolous coalitions" that only provoked discussions, and never promoted merging efforts and supporting single candidates. Instead, minor party leaders' egos blocked efforts to combine party structures and create a unified pro-democracy, reformist party. This party leader guessed most democratic organizations had fewer than 100 active members each and would never be able to win elections on their own. EIKENBERRY