Resourcing a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001208 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INL/AP STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD COMISAF FOR POLAD SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER SUBJECT: Resourcing a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics Strategy REF: KABUL 1064 ¶1. Summary: The U.S. Embassy hosted a one-day workshop on counter-narcotics (CN) to elaborate an overall US and UK action plan to disrupt the nexus of insurgents-narcotics-criminality-corruption and support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in its counter-drug efforts. Aiming to support and develop Afghan leadership wherever possible and to build the counter-narcotics coalition beyond the U.S. and UK, workshop participants proposed adopting the eight pillars of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (ANDCS) as an overall construct. The eight pillars identified in the GIROA strategy are: 1) Alternative Livelihoods; 2) Building Institutions; 3) Public Awareness; 4) Interdiction and Law Enforcement; 5) Justice Sector reform; 6) Elimination and Eradication; 7) Drug Demand Reduction and Treatment of Drug Addicts; and 8) International and Regional Cooperation. ¶2. We also identified specific resource and authority requirements, including: - Alternative and agricultural development funds; - Transition initiative funds; - Resources and personnel to stand up the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF); - Establishment of a comprehensive "nexus" database; - Additional personnel to address the broad illicit finance problem-set; - Funding for USDA field officers; - Expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); - Expansion of coalition training programs on evidence collection; - Additional ANSF capacity for effective partnering; and - Lodging, transportation, and a Washington office to support the deployment of additional USG civilians to the field, including those without substantial direct participation in the broader CN effort. End Summary. Counter-Narcotics Workshop -------------- ¶3. On April 29, 2009, the U.S. Embassy hosted an interagency, civil-military US-UK workshop on counter-narcotics. Forty participants, drawn from over 25 U.S., ISAF, and UK structures and offices, discussed overall CN goals for one, three, and five years, campaign synchronization, resource requirements, and steps to establish a flexible USG interagency (and ultimately international) organizational architecture for unity of effort against the nexus of 
narco-trafficking, terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The desired result is the fusion of civilian capabilities -- in economics, diplomacy, public communications, intelligence and law enforcement -- with military resources and operational capabilities. Adopting the 8-Pillar International and GIRoA Construct -------------- ¶4. Given the policy intent to build up the coalition of nations comprehensively supporting GIRoA counter-drug efforts, participants discussed and accepted the value of transitioning to the 8-pillar Afghan National Drug Control Policy (ANDCP) construct to organize the plan. The Joint Coordination Monitoring Board's (JCMB) endorsement of the Afghan policy on April 19 confirms the international community's broad acceptance of the ANDCP. ¶5. The 8-pillar approach adds three pillars - international and regional cooperation, institution building, and demand reduction - to the existing 5-pillar U.S. approach - public awareness, alternative livelihoods, interdiction (called "law enforcement" under the 8-pillars),justice sector reform (called "criminal justice" under the 8-pillars),and elimination/eradication (in support of governance/stability objectives, the shift to licit economy, and support for interdiction operations). ¶6. Switching to the 8-pillar construct will make coordination easier (existing GIRoA, UN, and coalition coordination structures are already based on the construct) and diminish the political inhibitions of prospective international partners who shun military leadership of inherently civilian programs and operations. This change also provides a foundation for additional diplomatic efforts to pull more coalition civilian resources (in law enforcement, diplomacy, economics and intelligence) into the CN effort. Adding KABUL 00001208 002 OF 003 the regional and international cooperation pillar recognizes the critical importance of the role of Pakistan, among others, in coalition CN efforts in Afghanistan. While elimination/eradication of opium poppy, particularly governor-led efforts, remains a pillar of the Afghan approach, we will de-emphasize activities in this area and closely coordinate residual eradication programs to support interdiction operations, in addition to other governance and stability objectives including providing disincentives to future cultivation. The aim is a CN effort that will directly support the COIN effort, or at least avoid fratricidal effects of CN on COIN. Resource Requirements -------------- ¶6. Participants identified USG resource requirements for implementation of the CN action plan, while continuing conversations with other key donors on their participation. These requirements are grouped and summarized below. ¶7. Program funding: ten-fold increase in Alternative and Agricultural Development funds (currently in consideration for FY2009 supplemental request); $350 million additional Transition Initiatives funds over the next three years; and Commander 's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and USAID funding for core enabling economic infrastructure (roads, power, water); as well as continuing support for the "Good Performers Initiative, " including increased international donor contributions in response to UNAMA/GIROA appeals. ¶8. Personnel: 45+ interagency personnel for the CJIATF (reftel) (including DEA, DOS/INL, OGA, NSA, NGA, Treasury, and 5 IOCC analysts); up to 40 USDA positions across Afghanistan to support agriculture development; specific technical experts in agriculture to support planning and program implementation; three additional U.S. Department of Justice attorneys to provide increased support to CN police investigators, prosecutors and judges of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force, and to assist with improvement of CN and other criminal justice-related legislation; additional counternarcotics and rule of law efforts at the provincial level to support PRT and task force operations; U.S. Marshals Service personnel and programs to establish capacity to provide personal protection for CJTF judges and prosecutors, court security, witness protection, and operations for the apprehension of fugitives; as well as ten additional analysts and financial experts supporting "soft" intelligence on power-brokers, agricultural potential, economic and financial underpinnings of the Afghan economy, and financial flows in Afghanistan and the broader region. ¶9. Establishment of an intelligence fusion system: $12 million to establish initial operating capability of the CJIATF as well as funding for a searchable "nexus" database and other appropriate information management tools. ¶10. Training and partnering: Establishment of a MOI/MOD joint Security Assistance Force (SAF) to deploy to secure areas; support to GIRoA to fill existing tashkeel (ANSF, especially Counter-Narcotics Police Afghanistan (CNPA) and the new Security Assistance Force) and expand these capabilities (with proportional growth in mentor/partner programs, such as PMTs); funding, training, and support for the CNPA to transport prisoners from the outer provinces to Kabul; doubling ANP/ABP quantity and capacity into border areas of Southern Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimruz; funding and personnel to conduct GIRoA (CNPA and other law enforcement and ministry personnel) training to improve operations, intelligence reporting, and evidence collection; training for ISAF personnel on CN evidence collection and preservation; additional funding to conduct CN criminal justice training for officers, prosecutors and judges of the CJTF and nationwide; support for proactive CJTF investigations into CN/corruption cases; and support to the Afghan national penal system by improving prison construction/renovation as well as enhanced training for corrections sector officials. ¶11. Civilian field support: lodging and transportation (air and road) assets for field civilian personnel; establishment of a field support office in Washington to assist in recruiting and training highly qualified individuals, not only for our CN programs but also across the full range of increased USG civilian-led development, governance, and security programs. Authority Requirements KABUL 00001208 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. Participants identified the requirement for expansion of law enforcement reporting policies to allow dissemination to military intelligence analysts, expansion of the Interagency Operations Coordination Cell (IOCC) mandate to support the CJIATF, and additional flexibility in USAID contracting requirements to enable close planning and implementation synchronization with military operations in the clear-hold-build construct. Preconditions for Success -------------- ¶13. Underpinning the CN strategy are several key dynamics and requirements including: road security for commercial truck transport to and from major centers of production and border crossing points to enable competitive alternatives to poppy; a much better intelligence-driven understanding of the nexus of poppy cultivation and the opium trade to the insurgency; additional political will and capability on the part of GIRoA to aggressively and successfully prosecute politically connected individuals; the need to anticipate and mitigate the "balloon effect" of poppy transitioning to other provinces as the main effort of security and CN efforts proceed in Helmand province; and the need to establish clear connections among USG, GIRoA, and third-country organizations working on all components of this complicated problem to maintain unity of effort. EIKENBERRY