Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL1178
2009-05-07 05:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND
how-toVZCZCXRO8227 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #1178 1270507 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 070507Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8792 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001178
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND
UPCOMING TRILATERAL MEETINGS
Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001178
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND
UPCOMING TRILATERAL MEETINGS
Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. During a 4/30 meeting with Foreign Minister
Spanta, the Charge reiterated U.S. impartiality in the
current election cycle. Spanta was not happy with Karzai,s
choice of Marshall Mohammed Fahim but could not offer a
better candidate of his own. The Charge expressed U.S.
disappointment with the Fahim choice. Spanta had encouraged
Karzai to look to a new generation and break from the past.
The Charge and Spanta agreed the two Vice Presidents must be
qualified individuals who had the trust and confidence of the
President. End summary.
2. (C) Charge and FM Spanta discussed election politics at a
meeting at the Foreign Ministry on April 30. After noting
the importance of the personal relationship between the
President and his running mates, Spanta questioned the
tentative selection of Mohammed Fahim. Spanta asserted that
Fahim, then Defense Minister under the interim government
headed by Karzai, was corrupt and untrustworthy. Spanta did
not support Fahim and had told Karzai so. Karzai,s response
was that Fahim &is clean now.8 Either way, Spanta said,
&We cannot have a united country with Fahim as Vice
President.8
3. (C) The Charge repeatedly assured Spanta the U.S. was not
picking favorites or taking sides - the most important factor
was finding the most qualified VP candidates who had earned
Karzai,s trust. Karzai had asked for Spanta,s thoughts on
former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah and current NDS Chief
Amrullah Saleh, but Spanta simply told Karzai to choose
someone in whom he had confidence.
4. (C) The Foreign Minister declared that once Karzai makes
up his mind, he doesn,t change it. Discussions on potential
VP candidates started within the Cabinet 5 to 6 months ago.
Spanta encouraged Karzai to consult outside the Cabinet as
well, while warning that certain constituencies such as civil
society organizations and urban voters would be against the
Fahim choice. Spanta pointed out that Abdullah has his
downsides as well: Pashtuns think he is Tajik and Tajiks
think he is Pashtun, in addition to the fact that he is ¬
clean.8 Other names that came up as potential VP candidates
were former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and former Interior
Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali. But Spanta said that Karzai
needed to &break the circle of forces of the past,8 calling
it a &vicious circle.8 Afghanistan continues to look to
the past for its leaders of the future, and many of those
individuals are corrupt and human rights violators. It,s
time to look for the &young and dynamic.8 The Charge
heartily agreed, saying he had told Karzai exactly the same
thing. Ultimately, though, Spanta said he could offer no
solution to the VP problem.
5. (C) The Charge then passed on a message to the Foreign
Minister from POTUS and the Secretary, noting that choosing
Fahim would have a serious effect on and potential negative
consequences for the bilateral relationship. He asked that
Spanta pass that message to President Karzai.
6. (C) On the topic of other Presidential contenders, Spanta
said he had received a call from Zalmay Khalilzad earlier in
the day. Khalilzad not only told him he would not run
against Karzai in the current election, he said he would
never run against Karzai. Spanta noted that Karzai believed
USG representatives who met with opposition leaders and other
potential Presidential contenders were showing favoritism
through a lack of support for his own reelection. The Charge
stressed that the U.S. did not support any individual
candidate, including Karzai.
7. (C) The last topic concerned protocol on proposed meetings
at the White House between POTUS and Presidents Zardari and
Karzai. Spanta made the point that if the two Presidents
were to meet with POTUS individually, he argued Karzai not
have to wait. Spanta suggested either a joint meeting or
separate meetings at prearranged times. He was concerned
about the perception that Karzai would wait outside while
POTUS met with his Pakistani counterpart.
RICCIARDONE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND
UPCOMING TRILATERAL MEETINGS
Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. During a 4/30 meeting with Foreign Minister
Spanta, the Charge reiterated U.S. impartiality in the
current election cycle. Spanta was not happy with Karzai,s
choice of Marshall Mohammed Fahim but could not offer a
better candidate of his own. The Charge expressed U.S.
disappointment with the Fahim choice. Spanta had encouraged
Karzai to look to a new generation and break from the past.
The Charge and Spanta agreed the two Vice Presidents must be
qualified individuals who had the trust and confidence of the
President. End summary.
2. (C) Charge and FM Spanta discussed election politics at a
meeting at the Foreign Ministry on April 30. After noting
the importance of the personal relationship between the
President and his running mates, Spanta questioned the
tentative selection of Mohammed Fahim. Spanta asserted that
Fahim, then Defense Minister under the interim government
headed by Karzai, was corrupt and untrustworthy. Spanta did
not support Fahim and had told Karzai so. Karzai,s response
was that Fahim &is clean now.8 Either way, Spanta said,
&We cannot have a united country with Fahim as Vice
President.8
3. (C) The Charge repeatedly assured Spanta the U.S. was not
picking favorites or taking sides - the most important factor
was finding the most qualified VP candidates who had earned
Karzai,s trust. Karzai had asked for Spanta,s thoughts on
former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah and current NDS Chief
Amrullah Saleh, but Spanta simply told Karzai to choose
someone in whom he had confidence.
4. (C) The Foreign Minister declared that once Karzai makes
up his mind, he doesn,t change it. Discussions on potential
VP candidates started within the Cabinet 5 to 6 months ago.
Spanta encouraged Karzai to consult outside the Cabinet as
well, while warning that certain constituencies such as civil
society organizations and urban voters would be against the
Fahim choice. Spanta pointed out that Abdullah has his
downsides as well: Pashtuns think he is Tajik and Tajiks
think he is Pashtun, in addition to the fact that he is ¬
clean.8 Other names that came up as potential VP candidates
were former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and former Interior
Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali. But Spanta said that Karzai
needed to &break the circle of forces of the past,8 calling
it a &vicious circle.8 Afghanistan continues to look to
the past for its leaders of the future, and many of those
individuals are corrupt and human rights violators. It,s
time to look for the &young and dynamic.8 The Charge
heartily agreed, saying he had told Karzai exactly the same
thing. Ultimately, though, Spanta said he could offer no
solution to the VP problem.
5. (C) The Charge then passed on a message to the Foreign
Minister from POTUS and the Secretary, noting that choosing
Fahim would have a serious effect on and potential negative
consequences for the bilateral relationship. He asked that
Spanta pass that message to President Karzai.
6. (C) On the topic of other Presidential contenders, Spanta
said he had received a call from Zalmay Khalilzad earlier in
the day. Khalilzad not only told him he would not run
against Karzai in the current election, he said he would
never run against Karzai. Spanta noted that Karzai believed
USG representatives who met with opposition leaders and other
potential Presidential contenders were showing favoritism
through a lack of support for his own reelection. The Charge
stressed that the U.S. did not support any individual
candidate, including Karzai.
7. (C) The last topic concerned protocol on proposed meetings
at the White House between POTUS and Presidents Zardari and
Karzai. Spanta made the point that if the two Presidents
were to meet with POTUS individually, he argued Karzai not
have to wait. Spanta suggested either a joint meeting or
separate meetings at prearranged times. He was concerned
about the perception that Karzai would wait outside while
POTUS met with his Pakistani counterpart.
RICCIARDONE