Afghanistan's USG Civilian Uplift - Defining its structure,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 001093 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, NEA/SCA/EX STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA AGRICULTURE FOR FAS MICHENER NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR HEIDI MEYER CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT APER PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF SUBJECT: Afghanistan's USG Civilian Uplift - Defining its structure, timing, and costs Ref: A) 08 Kabul 2985, B) 08 Kabul 2970, C) 08 Kabul 40 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. To implement the President's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Embassy Kabul requires immediate funding and hiring authority to increase U.S. civilian staff. Our purpose is to build security, governance and development capacity in the Afghan government across all lines of operation at the national and sub-national levels. GIRoA has responded enthusiastically to the planned significant American civilian increase, and has requested more advisors and mentors in specific disciplines. Based on our current projections of U.S. staff requirements in support of U.S. objectives with Afghanistan, we believe we need 421 civilian positions across all agencies under Chief-of-Mission (COM) authority to Mission Afghanistan. This will nearly double the current level of 502 civilian staff. This number assures that the U.S. will continue in addition to contract out substantial program requirements and to fund the best NGO programs. We also assume that other coalition parners will make at least modest contributions of personnel as well as funds. End Summary. ¶2. All agencies acting in Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority should understand that, for maximum effectiveness, for the good order and discipline of the mission, to lower costs, and to minimize waste, fraud and abuse, their civilians must be deployed in accordance NSDD-38 on minimum 12-month assignments. COM will approve shorter, TDY deployments on a limited case-by-case basis only when necessary to accomplish specific short term missions. COM will not approve the use of consecutive short-term TDYs to substitute for permanent staffing requirements. Those agencies who have been staffing permanent requirements via successive TDYs therefore should immediately initiate necessary NSDD-38 requests and identify permanent staff to meet current and future requirements in Afghanistan. -------------- -------------- Civilian Uplift Complements Troop Increases -------------- -------------- ¶3. Additional civilians deployed from Kabul down to the local level across Afghanistan, at every level of planning, dialogue and decision-making, will advance our counterinsurgency goalseven as coalition and Afghan military and police forces move through the "shape" and "clear" phases of counterinsurgency. In the "hold" and "build" phases, governance and development are even more critical to the success of counterinsurgency. Through our existing presence and participation in Task Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),we have begun to establish a shared understanding of USG goals and priorities across military and civilian agencies, using an integrated "board of directors" approach at the country team level. However, true fusion of effort remains to be accomplished from the national down to the local level. The civilian increase will enable such intra-USG unity of effort at all levels and should also expand context and cooperation with host nation local officials and communities, with coalition countries' military and civilian operations and with international NGOs. ¶4. The additional positions will provide action officers and program managers at national and sub-national levels, and across the spectrum of critical skill sets, from rule of law and governance, to agriculture, education and other economic development specialities. We must fill the positions with strong candidates quickly to correspond with the new wave of 17,000 U.S. troops already arriving in Regional Command East (RC-E) and Regional Command South (RC-S) and to achieve effects in advance of the August national election. Securing funding for these positions is of paramount importance. This cable defines the needed staffing levels, skill sets, and hiring time frames for new staff. ¶5. For positions outside Kabul, we have worked with the U.S. military and coalition partners to select locations where the addition of tailored civilian expertise will create transformational effects timed to developments on the ground. Over time, in consultation with coalition partners and GIRoA, we also expect to KABUL 00001093 002 OF 006 deploy some civilians to the north (Mazar-e Sharif) and west (Herat) at American and ISAF-country-operated facilities. The new District Support Teams (DSTs) will reside on existing Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs). The U.S. and ISAF military command do not need to create new platforms and locations for DSTs. ¶6. Military support for security, mobility, and logistics will be a critical component to enable the sharp increase of civilians under COM authority. We factored into our planning the absorptive capacity -- U.S. civilian, military and Afghan -- and requirements needed. Critical to this effort will be flexible hiring mechanisms such as 3161 authority and Limited Non-Career Appointments (LNAs) which will enable us to identify and hire personnel with the right skill sets and experience. We recommend the creation of an inter-agency office in Washington to coordinate field support and personnel deployments across all civilian agencies, much as was ultimately established for Iraq. Some agencies have expressed the need to deconflict hiring mechanisms if this concept is to succeed. -------------- Multi-Agency Effort -------------- ¶7. New positions in Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-08 supplemental request from all agencies would total 421. There are many more positions with separate funding mechanisms. Of the 421, we will fill , totaling seven new positions in Kabul by June 2009. Another 155 will arrive by March 2010. Those hires would be comprised of the following offices and agencies: various State Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the FBI(Legal Attache),Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security (DHS),Department of Transportation (DOT),Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC). We also plan to fill 49 slots in the field by June 2009 and an additional 202 by March 2010. These positions will come from State (including INL),USAID, USDA, and DEA. We are providing charts with continuous updates of agency, position details and numbers to SRAP, SCA/A, and NEA/SCA/EX. -------------- USDA -------------- ¶8. Department of Agriculture (current authorized: 13 positions) has confirmed plans for 43 new employees, 27 of whom are in the supplemental request, comprised of four in Kabul and 39 in the provinces. Of these, one person would be deployed by June 2009 and the remainder would be deployed within three months of funding approval. Employees would be direct USG hires. Of the 43, 6 would be based in Kabul and 37 in other areas of Afghanistan, the heaviest concentration of which will support the main military COIN activity in the south and east, without neglecting the north and west. -------------- HHS/CDC -------------- ¶9. HHS/CDC (new permanent presence) has requested one position for a USG direct hire and has NSDD-38 approval from the Chief of Mission. The position will be located in Kabul. CDC expects this individual to deploy by June 30. CDC hopes to deploy a second person under the supplemental shortly thereafter. --- DHS --- ¶10. DHS (no current authorized positions) confirms it is seeking funding for a new office with 11 direct hire positions in Kabul. The initial group can deploy within 60 days, pending funding approval. The existing Border Management Task Force (BMTF) plans to continue running its border mentor program, which includes two direct hire employees and several contractors deployed throughout Afghanistan. Funding for those BMTF positions, with up to a total of 50 contractors over the next 15 months, is under consideration through Department of Defense funding mechanisms. KABUL 00001093 003.2 OF 006 -------------- DOJ - Legatt, DEA, US Attorneys, US Marshals -------------- ¶11. DOJ plans to increase its civilian presence in Afghanistan in four distinct areas. FBI (Legatt - current authorized: 3 positions) plans to augment its current staff of three in Kabul with 19 additional permanent staff who will arrive this summer. LegAtt understands the new policy in para. 2: no more short term TDYs will be approved except as needed for defined, short-term missions. FBI has completed the NSDD-38 authorizing the hiring of six of these positions but has not resolved the agency's internal issues regarding 12-month assignments versus TDYs. The Criminal Division (current authorized: 6 positions) is planning three new direct hire positions in Kabul (Note: We understand that these positions are not included for funding through the supplemental request. However, DOJ underscores that it needs additional funding to fill these positions immediately . End note.) The U.S. Marshals Service (current authorized: 4 positions) will not add any new positions, but has requested funding for temporary duty premium pay, personal protective gear, tactical equipment, and training to efficiently and effectively conduct its mission. Like FBI, the Marshall's Service heretofore has relied on successive TDYs to staff its 4 permanent positions, and must now identify personnel for 12-month assignments. ¶12. Also under DOJ, the DEA (current authorized: 81 positions) projects it will have a permanent staff of 81 USG direct hires and mistakenly presumed to include an average of 15 temporary duty assignees on the ground by the start of FY2010. Like FBI and the Marshall's service, DEA must revise its plans to limit TDY personnel to the few specific short-term missions that may arise, and initiate NSDD-38 requests for permanent needs. DEA currently has 13 permanent staff in Kabul and anticipates the arrival of the first 24 additional staff by September. DEA is working to confirm housing for these additional staff and currently has enough desks. Once the full complement of staff is on the ground, DEA will deploy five enforcement teams to Kabul, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat. These teams would be housed and work in forward operating bases (FOBs) currently under construction by the Department of Defense. DEA will also work with Afghan investigative law enforcement to set up sensitive investigative counternarcotics units and a national interdiction unit. -------------- Treasury -------------- ¶13. Treasury: Treasury (current authorized: 3 positions) plans to increase its current staff of three to a total of seven permanent positions. New Treasury staff will work in Kabul and provide intermittent support to the field. Personnel in Kabul will work at ministries, creating no new need for individual office space on the Embassy compound. The positions will be filled with personal services contractors (PSCs),to arrive in Kabul soon after funding is received. -------------- Transportation - FAA -------------- ¶14. Secretary of Transportation has proposed to create an Office of Transportation Attache. It would include eight direct hire transportation experts in addition to Federal Aviation Administration contingent. This proposal is currently unfunded, and not part of the pending supplemental request. FAA (current authorized: 3 positions) is actively recruiting for three additional USG direct hire employees to be located in Kabul. FAA expects these positions will be deployed within months after funding is approved. The total proposed DOT contingent of 13, including both DOT and FAA, includes eight DOT and five FAA direct hires. -------------- USAID -------------- ¶15. USAID: USAID (current authorized: 156 positions) is planning 178 new employees, 43 of whom would be located in Kabul, with the remainder employed in the provinces. Staff vacancy announcements KABUL 00001093 004 OF 006 are already posted and ongoing; USAID has identified approximately 50 possible candidates. USAID will use various hiring methods to fill positions and plans to deploy 21 personnel as part of the priority 56 positions (4 to Kabul and 17 to the provinces) by end of June, with the remaining 157 personnel to arrive by September. Employees will be hired under various authorities including direct hire, annuitants, EFMs, PSCs and FS Limited. -------------- State -------------- ¶16. State: We estimate additional Department of State hiring, including a restructured executive office, INL, Diplomatic Security, and consulates in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, will fill a total of 155 new positions in Afghanistan between June 2009 and March 2010. Of the initial June tranche of 34 personnel, 31 will deploy to the provinces. Four of these will be INL rule of law advisors. An additional three people will provide PRT support from Kabul. In addition, Diplomatic Security plans to deploy 31 positions in June, including two officers at each of the new consulates. State, like USAID, plans to use a combination of hiring authorities including FS Officers, limited appointments (LNAs) and temporary hiring authorities in each case, for assignments not less than 12 months. -------------- The Importance of "the Field" -------------- ¶17. While Kabul is the hub of information and decisions for Mission Afghanistan, transformational counterinsurgency success will come in the field. By March 2010, a total of 205 more employees of State, USAID and USDA would be in place throughout the country. To achieve these gains, we propose the greatest personnel increases outside the capital, described in detail in the agency descriptions above. Our proposal adds civilians at the division, brigade, battalion, provincial and district levels - through PRTs, Task Forces, and District Support Teams (described below). By June 2009, we envision an additional 60 State Department, USAID and USDA employees will be deployed beyond Kabul, including 11 State Department employees at each of our new consulates Herat and Mazar-e Sharif. -------------- District Support Teams - Taking Governance to the People -------------- ¶18. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) signaled a shift toward decentralized governance in 2007 by establishing the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), which reports directly to the office of the Presidency. Among IDLG's primary functions is engaging with provincial and district officials to increase their capacity to deliver basic services to their populations. In addition, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) works closely with Community Development Councils. To more directly support the GIRoA effort to build sub-national capacity, we propose a new platform for integrated civ-mil effort, called District Support Teams (DSTs). DSTs would be staffed with a minimum of three civilians each, employing tailored expertise - such as agriculture, urban planning or rule of law - to maximize the civilian contribution to the integrated effort. By tailoring skills sets to the needs in particular key locations, we will be better placed to seize opportunities in governance, development and strategic communications for transformational effect. -------------- Regional Commands South and East - Bringing the Interagency Civilian Increase Together -------------- ¶19. In U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E),our civilian structure is already well-established. We plan to augment our already strong position at division, task force brigade and PRT levels, with additional State and AID officers at the combined joint task force (division) in RC-E. We also plan three pilot DSTs by June 2009, and hope to have a total of 10 DSTs in RC-E by March 2010. ¶20. Civilian-military integration of effort will be critical in KABUL 00001093 005.2 OF 006 Regional Command-South (RC-S) as additional U.S. forces flow into the region. We propose to stand up RC-S DSTs in Garmsir, Spin Boldak and Shah Wal-i Kot by June, with three or four specialized civilian staff on each location's civilian-military team. For maximum effect in advance of the Afghan elections, these DSTs should be created in parallel with the arrival of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the Stryker Brigade this summer. The DST-based civilians would provide mentoring, program management, and expertise on governance, provision of basic services (water, electricity), municipal finance, and rule of law, among other things, and would be LNA or 3161 hires through State, USAID or USDA. Like RC-E, we hope to open a total of 10 DSTs by March 2010 in the south. ¶21. Embassy Kabul has created a detailed civilian 'command and control' chart, which parallels the military hierarchy. A new component of this effort will be the Senior Civilian Representative position based at RC-S headquarters to coordinate USG civilian efforts with senior military and coalition partners. ¶22. In addition to State, AID and USDA personnel, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State INL plan significant increases in training, mentoring and law enforcement efforts in RC-S. These agencies have detailed RC-S plans already in place that have been developed in cooperation with the U.S. and coalition military. ¶23. Working with our international partners in RC-S, especially the Canadians, British and Dutch (reftels A, B, C) will hold another key to our success. Embassy Kabul recommends pursuing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with these countries to detail the life support and security protection our coalition partners will provide for USG employees working from coalition facilities. Many coordinated projects are already in place and should continue, such as border protection infrastructure and staff training being done in partnership with the Canadians at Spin Boldak. We plan to increase the opportunities for partnerships in many other areas as our capabilities increase. -------------- Challenges - Cooperation, Logistics, and Training -------------- ¶24. For positions in Kabul, living quarters and office space (especially CAA space for processing classified information) will be pressed beyond limits in the next three to six months. We'll need supplemental funding to sustain our growth. ¶25. Above all else, the civilian increase will require enhancements in Embassy Kabul's capacity to absorb, process, and deploy large numbers of civilians on their way to the field. Ensuring that incoming civilians receive a robust introduction to the U.S. Mission's vision and approach to the challenges of Afghanistan will strengthen the civilian role as part of our effective civilian-military teams in the field. ¶26. Increasing the civilian presence in Afghanistan will require extensive coordination with U.S. and ISAF military commands at every step of the process. This will require new processes and thinking for both civilians and the military. The U.S. military command has expressed strong support for more civilian capacity deployed throughout Afghanistan. ¶27. As we expand our integrated effort downrange, it will be important to provide common pre-deployment training whenever possible, to link the civilians and the military unit they will be working with in the field. Most of our civilian PRT representatives heading to U.S.-led PRTs already train with the military units with which they will be working. We should work to incorporate as many of the new civilians - from all agencies - as possible into appropriate military training, especially at Camp Atterbury (formerly at Fort Bragg). For our PRT reps serving at PRTs led by our international partners, we are already taking advantage of opportunities for training with coalition forces, and will seek to increase those opportunities. ¶28. At the battalion and company level, civilians will partner with junior military officers who likely have little experience KABUL 00001093 006 OF 006 partnering with civilians. This requires that the roles, responsibilities and functions of the civilian members of these civ-mil teams be clearly articulated to all and captured in military guidance and training. ¶29. The successful execution of a civilian increase in the field will require the resolution of several critical security and logistical issues. The most critical issue will be working with our military colleagues to find security and mobility solutions that allow civilian and military elements to carry out their missions. These solutions will need to include: a) integrating military and civilian missions where possible; b) some re-prioritization of current activities; and c) the allocation of additional security/mobility assets (military and civilian, including air assets). The Embassy will work closely with the military battle space owner in each location to determine additional force protection requirements and availability, and what will be necessary to allow civilians to effectively do their jobs, especially in highly kinetic environments such as RC-E and RC-S. -------------- -------------- Afghan colleagues (LES/FSNs),family members (EFMs) -------------- -------------- ¶30. We will need significant additional Locally Employed Staff (LES/FSNs) as partners in our efforts. Within the next two weeks we expect to complete and report our plans for the number of Afghan colleagues required to help accomplish the tasks before us. We will also need to hire additional family members to round out our American staffing. -------------- Looking Ahead -------------- ¶31. Conditions in Afghanistan change quickly, and the Mission will remain flexible to meet the needs on the ground. The 421 positions described in this cable will give us greater visibility into conditions on the ground, helping us define any future requirements and seize counter-insurgency opportunities to create rapid and meaningful effects. We anticipate that we will shift some positions and locations of our civilian increase to meet evolving demands and opportunities. In addition, we project much larger increases in DEA, SIGAR, PRTs, and other agencies, particularly in RC-S. RICCIARDONE