DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW AND KARZAI ACKNOWLEDGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001041

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW AND KARZAI ACKNOWLEDGE
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN PAKISTAN, DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF
U.S.STRAGEGY.

Classified By: Political Counselor Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In his April 2 meeting with D/S Lew, Karzai
reaffirmed his confidence that President Zardari's view on
the insurgency problem was in line with Afghanistan's, but
continued to express distrust of the motivations of the
Pakistan army and ISI. Karzai pledged to cooperate with the
U.S. to improve oversight and efficiencies of our
assistance activities in Afghanistan. He directed Chief of
Staff Daudzai to work with the Charge d'Affaires to make
progress on securing land to permit the Embassy to expand.


2. (U) Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources Jacob Lew met with President Karzai in Kabul,
April 2. Lew was accompanied by newly-arrived Charge Frank
Ricciardone, DCM Chris Dell, USAID Head of the
Afghanistan/Pakistan Task Force Jim Bever, and Chief of
Staff Piper Campbell.

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Pakistan - Extremist threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan
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3. (C) Karzai opened with a positive assessment of the
just-completed April 1 Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey
trilateral in Ankara. Karzai characterized Zardari's views
as being in line with Afghanistan, while Army Chief Kayani
and ISI Director General Pasha exhibited very tense
behavior. Zardari declared that extremism was a problem in
Pakistan. Karzai believed Pakistan's army and ISI
recognized Pakistan could be in danger, but they were still
in the gear of supporting the Taliban and extremism.


4. (SBU) Deputy Secretary Lew noted that the journey ahead
would be significant: to work on Pakistan and in
Afghanistan in order to address the challenges faced by
both countries. The Deputy shared a few observations from
his Islamabad meetings: the enormous potential of the
Pakistani people; the need to create jobs for a rapidly
growing population, and a pre-occupation with
Pakistan-India relations. It was very clear to him,
however, that the Lahore attack had focused government
attention. Karzai opined that this was a Pakistani
recognition of the danger of allowing extremists to
operate; Pakistan does not need to shift resources but
needs to change its philosophy away from supporting
extremism.


5. (C) Karzai noted Baitullah Mehsud's recent threat to
carry attacks to the United States. Karzai suggested that
Mehsud may have been angered by an announced bounty, or
about the results of the strategic review. Karzai
concluded, however, that the most important thing was
for the Government of Pakistan to find ways to stop
extremists from operating across their border - and
for the U.S. to push on that.
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US assistance to Afghanistan
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6. (C) As he had in his March 31 meeting with Secretary
Clinton, Karzai raised the idea of a U.S.-Afghan working
group. He suggested there could be subgroups to focus on
military issues, reconstruction, and delivery of
assistance. Karzai asked about newspaper articles
detailing a UN investigation against ex-officials from
UNOPS. He said the organization was "known for years to
be corrupt" and asked how much U.S. money had been lost.
USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Bever assured Karzai
that a full investigation was being conducted and criminal
proceedings launched. Lew used this example to stress the
new Administration's careful attention to how contractors
are used, noting that oversight is key. He said the USG
and Afghanistan could not sustain a situation where such
stories created the impression among our publics that
corruption was not addressed seriously and immediately.


7. (SBU) Lew noted that the U.S. Special Inspector General
(SIGAR) would deploy additional staff to Afghanistan. The
Department did not view its relationship with SIGAR as
adversarial, as all parts of the USG want to do assistance
right. Karzai pledged to take full responsibility on the
Afghan side, noting that Afghanistan has benefitted
tremendously from reconstruction. Karzai also suggested
someone should look into World Food Program activities in
Afghanistan, citing rumors of bad wheat distribution.

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Embassy land acquisition
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8. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary told Karzai that as the
Embassy's planned expansion proceeded, we would need to
bring in the right people quickly. The embassy compound
was constrained for space and the Embassy needed to acquire


land. Karzai told Lew that Ambassador Wood had spoken to
him before and that Karzai had instructed the Defense
Ministry to follow his (Karzai's) agreement. The Defense
Ministry did not want to provide all the land, to which
Karzai had heard the Embassy agreed. (NOTE: The Embassy
had not agreed).


9. (SBU) Karzai added that the Government would give the
Embassy the entire adjoining Health Ministry land. Karzai
concurred with a proposal to move the Ministry out of town
to a new building, with the USG constructing the new site
as part of a health capacity building project. Karzai
urged that the U.S. support an attractive, modern design
but opined that the project would be faster and less
expensive if built by Afghan contractors. Karzai asked
Palace Chief of Staff Daudzai to follow up, and told
Ambassador Ricciardone to work with Daudzai to help acquire
the land the Embassy wanted. Karzai stated it would be in
Afghanistan's interest.
RICCIARDONE