PRIME MINISTER FAYYAD ON GOI ROADMAP REQUIREMENT

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 002007 SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, SEMEP AND IPA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: PINS PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL IS SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER FAYYAD ON GOI ROADMAP REQUIREMENT TO RESTORE THE PRE-SECOND INTIFADA STATUS QUO ANTE Classified By: Consul General Daniel Rubinstein for reason 1.4 (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. In a November 3 meeting, Prime Minister Fayyad outlined specific GOI actions that would, in his view, fulfill the GOI's Roadmap obligation to restore the situation on the ground that existed before the Second Intifada began. Fayyad acknowledged that the IDF had redeployed outside of major West Bank population centers, but asserted that that returned the situation on the ground only to where it stood only before the IDF's "Operation Defensive Shield" in 2002. A full halt to incursions is required to restore the status quo ante, he said, adding that a GOI public statement to that effect would bolster the Palestinian Authority (PA). Finally, Fayyad said IDF approval for PA security force (PASF) deployments into rural areas outside Area A is essential to addressing key remaining areas of lawlessness in the West Bank. End Summary. ¶2. (S) In a November 3 meeting, Fayyad provided Post with a lengthy explanation of how the PA defines the GOI's Roadmap commitment to restore the situation that existed on the ground prior to the Second Intifada. Fayyad said that between the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000 and Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 (when the IDF entered Area A -- i.e., major West Bank population centers),the situation took an initial turn for the worse. "It was not uncommon to see tanks in downtown Ramallah," he said, adding that he had once nearly run into a tank in his car on his way home from the PA President's office. While the IDF has since withdrawn their fixed positions outside of Area A, this represented a return to the situation that existed before "Defensive Shield," but not a return to the status quo ante called for in the Roadmap. ¶3. (C) The difference between September 2000 and now, Fayyad continued, is the issue of IDF incursions. "Just as the police in the U.S. cannot cross state lines, that is how it used to be," he said. Fayyad went on to express frustration that the IDF acknowledged gains in PASF performance in these areas, but had not adjusted its posture on the ground as a result. He also criticized IDF restrictions on PASF activities during evening hours. "They must also allow us to undertake 'incursions' in our own areas," he added sarcastically. "Without a stop to incursions, our two-year (statebuilding) plan will become a twenty-year plan," he claimed, citing what he described as the politically damaging impact of incursions on the PA. In response to a question, Fayyad clarified that he sought not only a change in IDF behavior on the ground to end incursions, but also a public GOI statement to that effect. ¶4. (C) Fayyad said that, in his view, PASF responsibilities needed to extend even beyond Area A municipal boundaries in order to fully establish law and order. He noted many rural areas just outside of West Bank cities were neither secured by the IDF nor PA security forces. "Even the Israelis will tell you that the problems now are in areas in which we are not present - villages in Area C," he added, in reference to areas where the IDF exercises full security and political control. "How can we secure a village with six thousand people if there is no police station?" he asked. ¶5. (C) Finally, Fayyad said the PA needed to undertake other activities in Area C in order to successfully fulfill its own Roadmap obligations. He noted the Minister of Religious Affairs could not at present extend his campaign to unify sermons (i.e., to address incitement) in Area C mosques. Likewise, the PA Finance Ministry is unable to collect tax revenue, he noted. RUBINSTEIN