ABU MAZEN ANNOUNCES HIS DESIRE NOT TO SEEK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 002004 SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR; JOINT STAFF FOR LTGEN SELVA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL KWBG IS SUBJECT: ABU MAZEN ANNOUNCES HIS DESIRE NOT TO SEEK RE-ELECTION REF: A. JERUSALEM 1948 ¶B. 2003 JERUSALEM 2819 Classified By: Consul General Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. In a televised speech the evening of November 5, Abu Mazen announced his desire not to be a candidate in the next Palestinian presidential election. His speech was preceeded by two days of leadership meetings in which he privately briefed participants of his plans, leading senior Fatah and PLO members to try to convince him otherwise. The speech itself focused mainly on the peace process. In it he offered a message to the Israeli government and people, stated his belief that a two-state solution remains possible, and offered eight principles to achieve that goal. Abu Mazen's decision may reflect his desire to shore up his weakened domestic base and shake up the stalemated peace process, a personal decision that it is time to move on, or some combination of these factors. While his true motivations will only become clear over time, for now he retains all four of his leadership roles until elections, which few of our contacts believe will occur on schedule next January. End Summary and Comment. Run-Up To Abu Mazen's Public Announcement -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on the afternoon of November 4, Abu Mazen informed the Fatah Central Committee (FCC) that he did not intend to run in the next Palestinian election. Three participants in that meeting recalled that Abu Mazen first hinted at his desire not to run in an October 23 FCC meeting, but few participants took the statement seriously. In the November 4 session, FCC members tried to persuade Abu Mazen not to repeat his statement publicly or in a session of the PLO Executive Committee (PLO/EC) planned for the following day, where it would be more difficult to control leaks from representatives of factions other than Fatah. ¶3. (C) Following the FCC meeting, several of its members remained behind in the Muqata'a (the presidential compound in Ramallah) to continue pressing the case against an announcement, according to FCC members Azzam al-Ahmed and Tayyib Abdel Rahim. Both told post that in a smaller meeting, Abu Mazen responded that if FCC members continued to press him to remain silent about his intentions, he would consider resigning his position as President of the PA even prior to the holding of elections. These contacts characterized his statement as more of a tactic than a genuine threat, though they noted that Abu Mazen's demeanor was sour throughout the session. ¶4. (C) Al-Ahmed and Abdel Rahim also said in separate conversations that they drafted an FCC statement acknowledging Abu Mazen's desire not to run, but re-asserting Fatah's confidence in Abu Mazen as the "sole candidate" in upcoming elections. According to al-Ahmed, Abu Mazen personally approved the statement; on November 5, leading Palestinian daily al-Quds carried a front-page story quoting the text. Abu Mazen Repeats Message to PLO/EC -------------- ¶5. (C) The following day (November 5),according to several participants, Abu Mazen briefed a midday session of the PLO/EC on the impasse in the peace process, and his view that the only way out is a complete stop to settlement construction, including in Jerusalem. Abu Mazen reportedly criticized Egyptian pressure to enter negotiation on the basis of USG guarantees of Israeli intentions, arguing that previous guarantees regarding settlement construction at the 2007 Annapolis Conference from former Secretary Rice had been ignored. On elections, Abu Mazen encouraged the PLO factions to run a unified list in upcoming elections. ¶6. (C) Abu Mazen then reportedly announced what one participant described as his "bombshell." He repeated his statement that he would not seek re-election, as well as his intention to make a public announcement to that effect later that day. According to PLO Senior Negotiator Sa'eb Erekat, in the ensuing discussion, PLO/EC members urged Abu Mazen to reconsider, and not to "rush into" any public announcement. Members of several factions suggested that Abu Mazen consider alternative "exit strategies," rather than holding national elections. Abu Mazen departed the meeting and returned to JERUSALEM 00002004 002 OF 003 his residence without giving any clear response, Erekat claimed. After the meeting concluded, Secretary General Yasir Abd Rabbo issued a statement on behalf of the PLO/EC rejecting Abu Mazen's statement, and urging him to reconsider the decision. ¶7. (C) In a meeting with the Consul General just before the speech on November 5, PM Fayyad said he had found Abu Mazen in a "bad state of mind" during the PLO/EC meetings earlier that day. He dismissed the practical significance of Abu Mazen's statement, given the low probability of Palestinian elections occurring on schedule in January 2010. (See Ref A for additional reporting on the unlikelihood of elections occurring on schedule.) Fayyad theorized that Abu Mazen's main audience was his domestic base, but he questioned whether the speech would pay off in the long term. Abu Mazen's Speech -------------- ¶8. (U) Later on November 5, Abu Mazen delivered a twenty-minute speech from the Muqata'a in which he announced his "lack of desire to be a candidate in the next presidential elections," as well as a cryptic reference to "other steps I will take in time." Most of the speech was devoted to the peace process. Abu Mazen praised the USG's role, including its stated positions on settlements and Jerusalem, while noting "we were surprised" by the USG's favoring the Israeli position (on settlements). He directly addressed the Israeli government and people with a message that "peace is more important than any political gain to any party, and peace is more important than any government coalition." ¶9. (SBU) In contrast to the more pessimistic language used the day before by his senior negotiator, Abu Mazen said that the two-state solution is "still possible," and he offered eight terms of reference for achieving the goal: ---UN Resolutions on the conflict, and the Roadmap, and the Arab Peace Initiative, and the vision of a two state solution on the basis of UNSCRs 242, 338, and 1515, building on all the progress achieved in negotiations at Camp David, Taba, and Annapolis. ---Borders based on the situation which prevailed before June 4, 1967, and the possibility of conducting land swaps of equivalent value without compromising water rights or geographic contiguity, and connectivity between the West Bank and Gaza. ---East Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine, while ensuring freedom of access to the holy sites. ---A just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as stated in the Arab Peace Initiative, which became part of the Roadmap. ---Illegitimacy of settlements remaining on the territories of the Palestinian state. ---Security arrangements undertaken by a third party on the borders between the states of Palestine and Israel. ---A resolution to the issue of water according to international law, and the right of the Palestinian State to control its water resources, airspace, and all that we possess above and below the ground, and the quest for regional cooperation in the field of water. ---Closing the file of prisoners of freedom, through their complete release. Comment: Strategic or Personal Decision? -------------- ¶10. (S) It is difficult to assess whether Abu Mazen's step is a tactic aimed at shoring up his weakened domestic base, an effort to shake up the stalemated peace process (and the positions of key external actors such as Israel and the USG), or a personal decision that it is time to move on. Even his closest advisors tell us they are unsure. We suspect he was motivated by a combination of these factors. Abu Mazen's domestic position never fully recovered from his decision to support a deferral of the Goldstone report. Aides tell us that he was personally affected by the impact of the subsequent controversy on his family, as well as public and JERUSALEM 00002004 003 OF 003 private criticism by his erstwhile Arab allies. Meanwhile, he has increasingly come to view the FCC and PLO/EC as political lodestones, as new members jockey to prove their nationalist bona fides by pressuring Abu Mazen not to resume negotiations without a settlement freeze that includes East Jerusalem. His frustrations with the GOI - and perhaps with the USG - may play a role. Finally, there is the issue of his health. Reports suggest he was recently diagnosed with a recurrence of prostate cancer. At age 76, it is not inconceivable that he has once again decided it is once again time to move on, as he did in 2003 (Ref B). ¶11. (C) However, several factors suggest to us that Abu Mazen is still calculating his options. With its message to the Israelis and eight-point framework for negotiations, his speech struck us as less a farewell address than a last ditch effort to cling to hope and plant ideas for others' consideration. The careful wording of his decision - expressing his desire not to run again, rather than announcing his resignation (which could have provoked a succession crisis) - may also be significant. Fatah's leaders know (and have told us directly) they have no credible alternative to his leadership at this time. Already, Fatah's leaders have begun to rally around him, through a media campaign and demonstrations of support in the West Bank, suggesting the announcement may strengthen his support in the near term. While his true motivations will only become clear over time, given widespread expectations that elections will be delayed beyond next January, nothing about this announcement changes the fact that he will continue to hold all four of his current leadership roles for the foreseeable future (President of the PA, Chairman of the PLO, "Commander" of Fatah, and President of the "virtual" State of Palestine that Yasir ARAFAT declared in 1988). RUBINSTEIN