ISRAELI PROCEDURES AT USG-REFURBISHED JALAMEH

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 001966 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NEA FOR IPA AND FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR ALSO FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/OFM, AND L E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ODIP KREC KTIA ASEC EAID KWBG PREL IS US SUBJECT: ISRAELI PROCEDURES AT USG-REFURBISHED JALAMEH CROSSING, GATEWAY TO NORTHERN WEST BANK, HINDERING USG MOTORCADES ¶1. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Tel Aviv. An action request for the Department is in para 16. Summary -------------- ¶2. (SBU) While new GOI personnel at the Jalameh crossing, north of Jenin in the West Bank, claim to be applying long-established standard procedures, their actions are preventing USG personnel from using the crossing to exit the West Bank. On three occasions since October 14, U.S. diplomats have been detained at Jalameh, on the basis of requirements not applied at any other checkpoint in the West Bank. ConGen Jerusalem and Embassy Tel Aviv have intensively lobbied GOI security contacts for a solution, but the current GOI position would require unacceptable compromises on our own security procedures for crossing West Bank checkpoints. The unavailability of the Jalameh crossing makes Jenin a farther-away, harder-to-reach destination for USG personnel, and obstructs our ability to support high-priority initiatives in security, rule of law, and economic development in the northern West Bank. It also has significant implications for our ability to exit the West Bank quickly. The Jalameh crossing was recently upgraded by USAID in coordination with the GOI at a cost of USD 1.75 million. End summary. Strike One at Jalameh -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The GOI's Crossing Points Authority assumed control of the Jalameh crossing from the IDF in October 2009. On October 14, a ConGen motorcade attempted to cross it for the first time since the handover. The motorcade was allowed through the crossing from "Green Line" Israel to the West Bank, en route to Jenin, after a delay. Returning from Jenin en route to Jerusalem later that day, it was denied passage altogether. Crossing operators demanded that USG locally-employed staff (LES) passengers exit the vehicles and submit to security screening. They further demanded that official American passengers hand over their diplomatic passports for inspection. Neither of these demands are part of post's standard operating procedures for crossing Israeli checkpoints within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Israel, or between the West Bank and Jerusalem, and ConGen personnel declined to comply. ¶4. (SBU) Motorcade personnel contacted the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Jerusalem, who advised them to adhere to standard operating procedures and not to open their vehicles' doors or windows. Jerusalem's RSO engaged IDF contacts, who claimed that the Jalemeh crossing operators' demands were in line with official procedures for all West Bank checkpoints. This IDF claim is contrary to post's long-accumulated experience at checkpoints throughout the West Bank, including at Jalameh prior to October 14. ¶5. (SBU) Alerted by Jerusalem,s RSO to the impasse at the Jalameh crossing, Embassy Tel Aviv's RSO likewise engaged Israeli contacts and urged their cooperation in facilitating the ConGen motorcade's passage. While the IDF did send an officer to the crossing, the officer only reiterated the demands of the crossing's operators, who then laid spike strips behind the lead vehicle, preventing it from reversing away from the checkpoint back into the West Bank. After 75 more minutes, with Jerusalem's and Tel Aviv's RSOs continuing to work their contacts, crossing operators removed the spike strips and directed the vehicle back to the West Bank. The motorcade eventually transited the Shave Shamron crossing near Nablus, following standard checkpoint crossing procedures without incident. Strike Two... -------------- ¶6. (SBU) On October 20, another ConGen motorcade to Jenin was detained on its return trip to Jerusalem through the Jalameh crossing. As on October 14, when the lead vehicle entered the checkpoint, crossing operators demanded that official American passengers hand over their diplomatic passports and that LES passengers exit the vehicles for screening. They again placed spike strips behind the vehicle to prevent it from reversing out of the checkpoint. RSO Jerusalem and RSO Tel Aviv both engaged Israeli security contacts and urged them to allow the motorcade to cross. The response from Israeli authorities, in short, was that the Jalameh crossing operators were following long-established procedures. ¶7. (SBU) At the direction of RSO Jerusalem, personnel in the motorcade displayed their photo identification through the armored vehicle windows but refused to comply with further demands. The crossing operators eventually responded by ignoring the motorcade, leaving it pinned inside the checkpoint for three hours while RSO Jerusalem and RSO Tel Aviv pressed their respective contacts for assistance. ¶8. (SBU) Just before 5:00 p.m. local time, the crossing's operators began to close it for the day. When it became clear that the motorcade and its passengers might be left trapped in the crossing overnight, RSO Jerusalem conveyed through their IDF contacts that the motorcade would reverse out of the checkpoint if the spike strips were removed and the barriers dropped. At approximately 5:20 p.m. local time, the crossing operators removed the spike strips and dropped the barrier, allowing the motorcade back into the West Bank. The motorcade safely reached the Shave Shamron crossing well after dark and crossed the checkpoint following standard checkpoint procedures without incident. Strike Three... -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On October 22, a third ConGen motorcade attempted to cross into "Green Line" Israel at the Jalameh crossing en route from Jenin to Jerusalem. Crossing operators again refused passage and detained the vehicles at the crossing. Based on the experience of the previous two motorcades on October 14 and October 20, post decided to avoid another prolonged standoff. The vehicles reversed away from the checkpoint after waiting 45 minutes, then returned to Jerusalem through the Hizma crossing following standard checkpoint procedures without incident. ¶10. (SBU) In all three cases, the convoys' information, including the number of passengers and the vehicle license plate numbers, had been provided to the GOI in advance. Context -------------- ¶11. (SBU) It has been a long-established post security practice not to open armored vehicle doors or windows at checkpoints within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Israel, and between the West Bank and Jerusalem. With the current exception of Jalameh, Israeli crossing operators (whether IDF or civilians) routinely identify passengers by examining their identity cards or passports, which the passengers press to their vehicle,s closed window. ConGen motorcades continue to adhere to this standard procedure at all other West Bank checkpoints without difficulties. (ConGen personnel routinely exit the West Bank through Israeli checkpoints without displaying any identification at all.) Post strongly believes that a "closed door" procedure serves a practical security purpose by physically separating two sets of armed individuals -- the Israeli crossing operators and the U.S. protective security personnel -- in the event that a misunderstanding leads to raised tensions. ¶12. (SBU) In addition, Israeli authorities have never proposed or attempted to apply special requirements on LES accompanying official Americans in ConGen motorcades at any West Bank crossings, with the recent exception of Jalameh. Post has serious reservations about this demand for reasons described in para 11, as doing so would necessitate opening vehicle doors to allow LES passengers to exit for searching. It also would have the practical implication of leaving USG protectees in a vehicle without a driver, should an emergency situation arise. ¶13. (SBU) Finally, post is concerned that granting this concession would put us on a slippery slope, leading to situations where crossing operators demand that all passengers, LES and official Americans alike, exit the vehicle, that all passengers be subject to search, that crossing operators enter the vehicle, and so on. Why Jalameh matters -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The USG has placed a priority on supporting development and expanding security and rule of law in Jenin and the surrounding northern West Bank. USAID has 33 ongoing activities in the Jenin Governorate, and Jenin is often trumpeted as a success story of West Bank economic development. Many ConGen elements, including our INL, Political and Economic Sections, as well as USSC and high-level visitors from Washington, regularly travel to Jenin to meet key stakeholders and monitor ongoing projects. While alternate routes to Jenin that avoid the Jalameh crossing do exist, they take significantly longer on poor-quality roads, and would complicate an evacuation in the case of an emergency. ¶15. (U) USG efforts in the northern West Bank have included the Jalameh crossing itself. On October 1, USAID completed a USD 1.75 million upgrade to the crossing to allow private vehicles to pass through, with the goal of increasing economic activity in the area. ¶16. (U) Action request for the Department: Post requests guidance on this issue. RUBINSTEIN