HAMAS SEIZES CONTROL OF AL AQSA UNIVERSITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001799 NOFORN SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/IPA; NSC FOR KUMAR; TREASURY FOR KNOWLES; DEPT PASS TO USAID FOR BORODIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019 TAGS: PTER PHUM KPAL KWBG KISL KWMN SCUL SUBJECT: HAMAS SEIZES CONTROL OF AL AQSA UNIVERSITY Classified By: CG Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. HAMAS authorities seized control of Al Aqsa University in Gaza on October 7 by ousting the university's president after he departed Gaza for the West Bank. This move follows continuing pressure by the HAMAS "government" to extend its control over Al Aqsa and other civil society institutions. End summary. Taking Over -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 7, the HAMAS "Ministry of Education" (MoE) sent a letter to Al Aqsa University President Ali Abu Zahri, who was then in the West Bank, dismissing him from his post. Ali Abu Shahla, a member of the public university's board of trustees, told Econoff that the HAMAS MoE appointed a three-person council to run the university: two members of Hamas and one of Fatah, who declined the position because council decisions would be determined by the majority (Hamas) vote. On the same day, the Palestinian Authority (PA) MoE issued a press release, declaring the closure of the university. ¶3. (C) Since the end of 2008, Al Aqsa University has been under increasing pressure from HAMAS to meet its demands for greater influence within the institution, particularly in the days leading up to the takeover. Yaser Alwadeya, a Gazan businessman who has mediated between HAMAS and the university, told EconOff that the HAMAS MoE and Abu Zuhri agreed in December 2008 to install five HAMAS members on the 15-member Faculty Committee, which determines the university's curriculum. HAMAS has since demanded 30 scholarships for HAMAS students and 52 faculty positions, among other demands, but the university refused. Most recently, according to AbuShahla, HAMAS demanded that the university install five additional members on the Faculty Committee, to constitute a majority and shape the curriculum. ¶4. (C) According to AbuShahla, HAMAS intensified its pressure on the university this month by organizing protests at Al Aqsa and preventing new students from registering. Without registration, the university would lose the revenue from students' tuition. AbuShahla said that HAMAS executed a well-designed plan, including giving unexpected permission to Abu Zahri on October 6 to depart Gaza with a delegation to the West Bank and Cairo. Abu Shahla also linked the takeover with the day's large demonstrations in Gaza against PA President Mahmoud Abbas over the Goldstone report controversy. ¶5. (C) The Assistant Deputy Minister of the PA MoE, Basri Saleh, told USAID staff that he expects 50 percent of students, staff and faculty will ignore the closure decision. Saleh also said that the PA MoE will consider punitive measure for the PA staff who violate the closure decision, and he questioned Hamas's ability to pay staff salaries in full. Note: Last year, a boycott of the Gazan public schools by PA teachers resulted in their replacement by HAMAS appointments, and the extension of HAMAS control in the school system, although some PA employees did return to their former positions when HAMAS came under criticism for politicizing the education system. End note. Finances -------------- ¶6. (C) Following the PA's "closure" of Al Aqsa, the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA) acted to freeze the university's bank accounts. According to the PMA, the PA Attorney General's office sent a court order to freeze the bank accounts of Al Aqsa University, and the PMA has acted to implement the order. A Continuing Pattern -------------- ¶7. (C) Since the beginning of the year, HAMAS has attempted to extend its control over a range of civil society organizations. In September, the HAMAS MoE threatened to revoke the recognition of Al Azhar University, a private institution, prior to student registration for the academic year, if its demands were not met for information on university activities, faculty and students. Alwadeya told Econoff that HAMAS authorities also demanded 30 scholarships and some faculty positions, which the university refused. Alwadeya intervened and provided publicly available JERUSALEM 00001799 002 OF 002 information to the MoE, which diffused the situation. ¶8. (SBU) HAMAS has also applied increasing pressure on international NGOs to register, coordinate, and share information. While NGOs initially refused, most organizations eventually passed to the HAMAS "authorities" a copy of their registration with the PA, other publicly available information, and basic administrative information regarding imported supplies. ¶9. (C) On October 7, Germany's Representative Office to the PA told Econoff that the HAMAS "Ministry of Labor" (MoL) requested information on the six locally employed staff in its technical office in Gaza, including names of employees, positions, qualifications and salaries. The technical office refused to hand over this information, and the HAMAS MoL threatened legal action. While this is the first reported threat of legal action against an office affiliated with a donor government, similar incidents have occurred previously with NGOs. The first reported incident of the HAMAS MoL threatening legal action was on August 30, when MoL officers appeared at the Gaza City office of CHF International and demanded personnel information, threatening legal action if CHF did not comply within five days. CHF only provided general and non-sensitive staff information, without any financial data. A list of Gaza NGOs reported taken over by Hamas follows in para 11. ¶10. (C) Comment: The action against Al Aqsa is the most high-profile HAMAS effort against a Gaza institution this year. The pattern has been one of HAMAS calculating how far it can go in taking control of these institutions (and sometimes recalculating and retreating) without imperiling donor aid or otherwise incurring too high a political price at home. Our contacts uniformly believe that the continuing political fallout over the PA's handing of the Goldstone report contributed to Hamas' decision to act against Al Aqsa now. End Comment. ¶11. (SBU) According to local contacts and the media, HAMAS has taken over the management of the following: -- Society of Social Rehabilitation for the Disabled (Rimal neighborhood, Gaza City); -- Patients' Friends Benevolent Society (Al Shuhada Street, Gaza City); -- Society of Future Builders (Khan Yunis); -- Gulf Education Society (Al Geela Street, Gaza City); -- Palestinian Society for Development and Moderation (central Gaza Strip); -- Mughazi Association for Community Development (Mughazi, central Gaza); -- Society for the Return (Abassan Al Kabira, east of Khan Yunis); -- Palestinian Al Aqsa Society (Abassan Al Kabira); -- Khalil Al Rahman Society (Abassan Al Kabira); -- Huda Development Association; -- Ameera Foundation (Khan Yunis); -- Society for Rural Development (Abassan Al Kabira); -- Association for the Rural Woman (Abassan Al Kabira); -- Al Ajyal Society (Khuza'a, southeast of Khan Yunis); -- Nigada Society (Jabalya); -- Ghras Society of the Development of Generations (Rafah); -- Association of the Martyr Buthaina Hijjo (Rafah); -- Human Developmental Society (Al Qarara, northwest of Khan Yunis); -- Lajee Society (Rafah); -- Walid Society (Khuza'a); -- Ishraqa (northern Gaza). RUBINSTEIN