NASER AL-QIDWA ON FATAH, PALESTINIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001652

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PREF PTER PGOV KWBG KPAL KUNR IS EG
SUBJECT: NASER AL-QIDWA ON FATAH, PALESTINIAN
RECONCILIATON, NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNRWA 60TH ANNIVERSARY

REF: JERUSALEM 1630

Classified By: CG Daniel Rubinstein for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. Newly-elected FCC member Nasir al Qidwa said
Fatah's abilities to overcome internal rivalries will
determine whether it ultimately emerges stronger after its
recent Congress in Bethlehem. He is skeptical that Fatah is
prepared for new elections, despite favorable polls, and
believes factional reconciliation must come first. Al Qidwa
advocated a two-phased approach to reintegrating Hamas into
the Palestinian political landscape. In the first phase, he
said, Fatah should offer limited enticements to Hamas, in
return for commitments to nonviolence and restoring
Palestinian unity. Acceptance of the Quartet principles
would remain the precondition for full participation in the
government. If Hamas refuses this offer, he said, Fatah will
be in a stronger position to move into elections. On
negotiations, he urged that if the USG cannot achieve a
settlement freeze, it should instead seek a UNSCR reiterating
the illegality of settlements. Finally, the CG briefed al
Qidwa on USG concerns over the UNRWA 60th anniversary event.
End summary.


2. (C) In an introductory call with the Consul General on
September 10, newly-elected FCC member Nasir al Qidwa said
the success of Fatah's rebuilding project depends on two
variables: its ability to overcome internal rivalries, and
the new leadership's ability to establish a productive
relationship with Abu Mazen. At this point, the new FCC
meets daily, but "we are just getting to know each other and
exploring our thinking," he added.


3. (C) Al Qidwa was critical of Egypt's role in factional
reconciliation talks. He said the latest Egyptian proposal
(reftel) focuses on practical bridging formulas, such as a
"joint committee" to oversee the government before elections,
but ignores the more important political differences between
the factions. "We tried this in Mecca, and it didn't work,"
he said, noting any governing arrangement formed on an
unclear political platform is "a ridiculous idea."

Don't Believe the Polls
--------------


4. (C) Al Qidwa said he was less confident than others in
Fatah that a rush to elections was the best alternative. In
his view, polling accurately reflects a stronger base of
support for Fatah than Hamas. However, these figures ignore
large numbers of undecided voters, and it remains to be seen
whether Fatah can improve its organizational capacity in time
to attract their support. Al Qidwa said the "decisive"
factor would be whether Fatah can revive the promise of a
negotiated two-state solution. "That is up to President
Obama," he noted.

An Alternate Approach to Co-Opting Hamas
--------------


5. (C) Instead of a rush to elections, Al Qidwa said, Fatah
should consider a two-phased approach to reconciliation.
First, Fatah should focus on building a consensus on the
"basic principles of a united political system." Al Qidwa
defined these principles as (1) the establishment of a
Palestinian state on the 1967 borders; (2) a "real commitment
to democracy and all that it entails, such as political
pluralism," (3) the unity of the Palestinian people and their
territory; and (4) compliance with international humanitarian
law, particularly injunctions against (Palestinian) violence
targeting (Israeli) civilians.


6. (C) Al Qidwa acknowledged these principles fell short of
the Quartet's own, and would therefore not be enough for
Hamas to participate in the PA government. However,
incremental incentives could be offered in return, such as
participation in PA administrative bodies or the Palestinian
Legislative Council. Arab governments would support these
principles "from the heart," as opposed to the Quartet
principles, which they support only in response to
international pressure, he claimed.


7. (C) An incremental approach could lay the groundwork for
Hamas to peacefully exit from power, al Qidwa asserted. "We
would effectively be moving to a Turkish model," he said,
adding, "by establishing the principle that (Hamas) must be
willing to cede power." Al Qidwa gave his strategy less than
a fifty-fifty chance of success. If it failed, Fatah would
be in a better position to call for new Palestinian

JERUSALEM 00001652 002 OF 002


elections, since Hamas would be viewed as obstructionist.
(Comment: Al Qidwa's thinking represents the most
accommodationist line we have heard from the new FCC; most of
his counterparts advocate reconciliation through new
elections or even more hard-line views.)

If No Freeze, Call For A UNSCR On Settlements
--------------


8. (C) On the peace process, al Qidwa said President Obama
deserves credit for convincing Arabs at least to hear the USG
out on its approach. "But we cannot help but worry, or ask
ourselves, 'is this for real?' The Administration put its
finger on the right issue - colonization of the land.
Without a (freeze),there will be no two-state solution." He
went on to note that "a freeze is far more important for me
than any USG statement, even one with more advanced political
language." Only an end to settlement activity can alter
dynamics on the ground, he added.


9. (C) Al Qidwa predicted the Administration would face
difficulties in "remaining faithful" to its settlement
policy, and may ultimately have to come up with an
alternative. A settlement freeze is not an end in itself, he
noted, but a prerequisite for launching successful
negotiations. There is no point in negotiating checkpoint
removal, for example, if the settlements they are designed to
protect remain in place, al Qidwa said. Therefore, if a true
freeze cannot be achieved, the USG should call for a UN
Security Council Resolution that reconfirms the illegality of
settlements. "The intention is not to punish (the GOI),but
to change the political dynamic (in Israel)," he said.
Simply suggesting the USG might consider a resolution could
affect Israeli behavior, he added.

Palestinians and the UN
--------------


10. (C) Turning to the UN, al Qidwa asked for an update on
preparations for UNRWA's 60th anniversary. The Consul
General said the USG had been deeply disappointed by the Arab
Group's reversion to a business-as-usual approach. He said
we were encouraging all involved to review the role their UN
missions had played at the September 8 Steering Committee
meeting, and to reconsider their objections in advance of the
planned event. Al Qidwa said he did not see a principled
reason to object to a GOI speaking role at any UN forum, but
admitted to being uninformed on the Palestinian Observer
Mission's actual positions.

RUBINSTEIN