HAMAS PURSUES THREE-FOLD STRATEGY IN GAZA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001584

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NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/IPA; PRM FOR FRONT OFFICE AND
PRM/ANE; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR;JOINT CHIEFS FOR LTG SELVA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PTER PREF KISL PGOV KWBG KPAL IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS PURSUES THREE-FOLD STRATEGY IN GAZA

REF: JERUSALEM 1451

Classified By: A/PO Greg Marchese for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C/NF) Summary. In separate meetings August 27, UNRWA
Director for Gaza John Ging and Gaza-based Associated Press
reporter Ibrahim Barzak characterized Hamas' agenda in Gaza
as three-fold: (1) imposing gradual social and cultural
change in accordance with Islamic values; (2) seeking
international recognition and legitimacy; and (3)
consolidating economic and security control. Ging suggested
that Hamas is willing to delay progress on social change
while it focuses international recognition and maintaining
security control. He also said that UNRWA can provide a
viable and popular alternative to Hamas, particularly in
education and economic growth, with proper support and access
to materials and cash. End Summary.

Hamas' Social and Cultural Agenda
--------------


2. (C/NF) In separate meetings on August 27, two Gaza-based
observers provided overlapping descriptions of Hamas,
governance strategy. Since taking power in 2007, Hamas has
continued its gradual campaign to impose Islamic values on
Gazan society, Ging said. However, Hamas leaders have
stopped short of overt enforcement of Islamic values (such as
decrees) in an attempt to portray themselves as a "moderate"
alternative to Salafist groups. More subtle methods are
employed, he noted, such as "religious police" questioning
unchaperoned couples and women wearing "inappropriate"
attire. Both contacts noted that Hamas leaders did not
officially decree that high school girls must wear the jilbab
and hijab, but promoted the practice at the grassroots level.
So far, the results were measurable, Ging said. Seventy
percent of Gazan women now wear the hijab, he claimed,
compared with only 30 percent in the 1980s.


3. (C/NF) Both Ging and Barzak felt that the closure of Gaza
is furthering Hamas' social agenda. Barzak pointed out that
civil society groups are particularly vulnerable to Hamas
pressure, now that they are cut off from foreign visitors and
denied the ability to leave Gaza. Similarly, media
organizations must now rely on stories written from outside
Gaza or by local correspondents who may be subject to Hamas
pressure. Ging said "a new kind of extremism" centered
around religion has emerged in Gaza. The trend is
reversible, he noted, but the longer the current situation
prevails, the more difficult it becomes to reverse it.

Seeking International Recognition
--------------


4. (C/NF) Our contacts said a second pillar of Hamas'
strategy is to seek international recognition and legitimacy.
According to Ging, Hamas leaders claim that Israel's
international reputation was badly damaged during the recent
Gaza conflict for the cost of "only 1,300 Palestinian lives."
Following the conflict, Hamas leaders have adopted a policy
of unilateral restraint while assessing USG efforts, he
added. Some leaders claim that they are implementing one of
the three Quartet principles (nonviolence) by preventing
rocket attacks against Israeli targets. Ging said another
element of Hamas, strategy is to facilitate international
VIP visitors, even for those who refuse to meet with Hamas.
The status quo will not last forever, Ging predicted, as
Hamas faces pressures from "hotheads" within its own ranks.

Consolidating Control Inside Gaza
--------------


5. (C/NF) According to Ging, Hamas has full control of
security in Gaza. Hamas' organizational structure is flat,
with close connections between leaders and the grassroots.
Loyalty within Hamas remains strong, he added. This loyalty
was recently demonstrated when Hamas operatives in Rafah,
upon instruction from Hamas leadership, moved against the
Salafist group Jund Ansar Allah (reftel),despite the fact
that some former Hamas executive force members had joined the
group. Hamas, one potential Achilles Heel, according to
Ging, is the growing perception of its disproportionate use
of force against other Palestinians.


6. (C/NF) On the economic front, according to Barzak, Hamas
is able to pay salaries in full and on time, and never
appears to face budget shortfalls. Key sources of income
include charities, taxation, and foreign support, he said.

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Some examples include transaction fees in the
telecommunications and media sectors, mandatory car
registration fees, and a Hamas-controlled firm's monopoly in
the car insurance sector. Ging characterized the tunnels as
"a fully operational underground commercial crossing,"
including palletization and a fuel depot. "Some tunnels are
large enough to drive a car through," he said. Barzak said
Hamas also generates income from its investments in
agricultural greenhouses, palm trees, fish ponds, and real
estate. Investments in real estate are significant enough to
have increased property values in Gaza, he claimed.

Efforts to Marginalize Hamas
--------------


7. (C/NF) Ging said that UNRWA social programs run counter to
Hamas' Islamist agenda. He described key UNRWA initiatives,
such as secular summer camps for 250,000 Gazan children,
women's radio networks, and an initiative to teach junior
high students about various human rights movements, including
the U.S. civil rights movement and the anti-apartheid
movement in South Africa. Ging noted that UNRWA has
implemented all of these programs with the consent and
support of the Palestinian refugee community, including
UNRWA's 10,000 Palestinian staff in Gaza. "People berate
Gazans for not fighting back (against Hamas),but the fact is
that they do -- through programs such as ours," he said,
adding that Hamas and other Islamist groups in Gaza
frequently and publicly criticize UNRWA for these programs.


8. (C/NF) Ging said he worries that Gazans' willingness to
support these programs will wane if UNRWA is unable to
deliver essential services and relief. "It's basic
politics," he said, adding, "if we deliver, then we'll have
popular support." Ging noted that Hamas could "throw us out"
at any time, but for now the group's leaders have "bigger
issues" to deal with, such as gaining international
recognition and legitimacy.


9. (C/NF) Ging said education is the key to stemming Hamas'
influence in Gaza. He noted that UNRWA has enrolled 8,000
more students in its Gaza schools compared with last year.
However, GOI restrictions on the import of construction
materials continue to prevent UNRWA from repairing damaged
schools, or from building new classrooms to accommodate
increased enrollment. By contrast, Ging noted, Hamas can
bring in whatever construction materials it needs to rebuild
bunkers or other infrastructure through the tunnels. He
added that, while Hamas has plenty of cash, UNRWA is having
difficulty in obtaining the cash it needs for social welfare
payments, and for families to replace windows damaged in the
conflict as winter approaches.


10. (C/NF) Ging noted that Hamas does not have the means to
undertake large-scale reconstruction in Gaza. This is an
area where the international community, through
implementation of UN construction projects, could claim
credit and counteract Hamas' economic control, he said.
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