NEW PA INFORMATION DIRECTOR ON MEDIA, HAMAS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001224

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR; JOINT
STAFF FOR LTGEN SELVA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PGOV KPAO KWBG IS
SUBJECT: NEW PA INFORMATION DIRECTOR ON MEDIA, HAMAS,
RECONCILIATION

Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Greg Marchese
for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a July 13 meeting with Polchief, newly-appointed
Palestinian Authority (PA) Director of Information Ghassan al
Khatib outlined plans to reform the Palestinian Authority's
communications strategy. He noted that Hamas support fell in
Gaza after December 2008-January 2009 Israeli combat
operations, but rose in the West Bank due to Al Jazeera's
role as the primary source of news for Palestinians. Rather
than focus on hapless PLO-run local media outlets, the PA
government must build strategic communications abilities
within each ministry and broaden its approach. Al Khatib,
who plans to assume his new position on August 16, said the
USG should maintain a low public profile on security
assistance and in the lead-up to the Fatah Sixth Party
Conference. He also predicted Fatah-Hamas reconciliation
talks will not succeed unless the USG creates incremental
incentives for Hamas. End Summary.

PA Strategic Communications a "Complete Failure"
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2. (C) In a meeting just two days after his appointment, al
Khatib, a veteran pollster and head of the leftist People's
Party, said he considers the PA's traditional approach to
public relations a "complete failure." He intends to
professionalize PA strategic communications by building
institutional capacity within the ministries and encouraging
ministers to take a more proactive role. Al Khatib noted
that PLO control of Palestinian public television and radio
limits his ability to directly affect programming. Most
Palestinians rely on Al Jazeera for their news in any case,
so the PA should focus on regional media, he said.

Measuring Shifts in Hamas Popularity
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3. (C) According to polls conducted by al Khatib's
institute, Hamas's popularity declined in the Gaza Strip
following December 2008-January 2009 Israeli combat
operations, as Gazans blamed Hamas, at least in part, for the
resulting destruction. In contrast, Hamas support actually
increased in the West Bank. Al Khatib attributed this
divergence to the fact that West Bankers primarily saw the
conflict through Al Jazeera, which focused on IDF attacks and
portrayed Hamas positively. Al Khatib said few Palestinians
followed the conflict on Palestinian broadcast media, which
he termed "technically and professionally a disaster."

Profile of US Assistance in Fatah Reform, Security
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4. (C) Al Khatib said that the public profile of U.S.
security assistance is increasingly becoming an issue in the
West Bank. Critics of the PA are manipulating public
comments by USG officials to argue that the "real" mission of
USG-trained PA security forces (PASF) is to protect Israel,
not serve the Palestinian people. Al Khatib stressed the
importance of portraying the PASF as guardians of Palestinian
law and order, and advised the USG to take a low profile in
ongoing train-and-equip efforts. He had similar advice with
regard to the upcoming Fatah Sixth Party Congress, assessing
that overt USG engagement would likely backfire and endanger
Fatah's credibility.

Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Wrong Issues on the Table
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5. (C) Al Khatib, who attended recent rounds of
Egyptian-sponsored Fatah-Hamas talks, was pessimistic over
prospects for reconciliation. He suggested that resolution
of issues currently on the table in Cairo depended on
resolution of issues "off the table," like prisoner
exchanges, a medium-term "hudna" (truce),and opening the
Gaza crossings to goods. Al Khatib proposed a "package
deal," in which Israel and Egypt would engage Hamas on the
release of Gilad Shalit and the opening of crossings, and the
international community would create incentives for Hamas to
improve the tone of its rhetoric and adopt
internationally-acceptable positions.


6. (C) Polchief noted President Obama's speech in Cairo
outlined such a path, if Hamas accepts the Quartet

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principles. Al Khatib said renouncing violence ("in word and
in deed") and respecting prior PLO agreements are key. If
Hamas accepts these points, he said, the Quartet should be
willing to allow Hamas members to sit in a PA government,
based on an unambiguous platform consistent with the Quartet
principles. Without these incentives, he argued, Hamas has
no reason to share power, and reconciliation efforts would
remain stalled.
WALLES