FATAH INSIDERS ON THE SIXTH CONGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001206 SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA, NSC FOR NENA - SHAPIRO/KUMAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/9/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS IS KPAL KWBG SUBJECT: FATAH INSIDERS ON THE SIXTH CONGRESS REF: JERUSALEM 1166 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Greg Marchese for Reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Two Fatah insiders believe the Fatah General Congress will proceed on schedule, but differed in their prognoses of the event itself. Former Fatah mobilization committee head Hussein al Sheikh said disagreements within the movement could be contained by augmenting the number of delegates and by conducting successful Fatah Revolutionary and Central Committee (FRC and FCC) elections. Marwan Barghouthi-allied "young guard" leader Qaddura Fares foresaw contentious debates over the political program at the Congress and predicted "there will be casualties and blood" as Old Guard stalwarts are voted out. Their definitions of a successful conference converged on one which produces new leadership through elections and a revitalized internal structure. Even then, at least a year remains before Fatah is ready for elections, al Sheikh predicted. As for our role, Fares counseled the USG to stay silent publicly. End Summary. Prospects for the Fatah General Congress -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate meetings with Polchief, Fatah insiders Hussein al Sheikh and Qaddura Fares expressed cautious optimism that the Fatah General Congress would go ahead as scheduled on August 4. Al Sheikh said the list of 1,550 delegates would be published around July 15 (see Ref A for more on Conference mechanics). Pressures from segments of Fatah who feel under-represented could lead to "an additional 200 names" by the time of the Congress. He personally viewed such pressures as justifiable, noting the quotas for certain groups such as women (50) and students (10) were too low. The main obstacle to holding the Congress remains the fate of the Gaza delegates. At present, according to al Sheikh, Hamas has given no indication it will release detained Fatah members or allow safe passage to the crossings, despite pressure from the Egyptian and Syrian governments. Fallback ideas include participation by videoconference or postponing elections for a percentage of the FCC and FRC seats in proportion to number of Gaza delegates. (Comment: As important as the Gaza delegates' attendance is politically, their absence would not necessarily prevent the event from moving ahead. Much depends on whether key Fatah blocs who see their fortunes waning as the Congress approaches seize on this issue as a pretext for delay.) ¶3. (C) With regard to how the Congress itself will unfold, our contacts' prognoses diverged. Al Sheikh predicted little drama, given relative consensus on Fatah's political program ("except for Faruq Qaddumi, but he is isolated") and his expectation that elections would proceed without major hitches. He said prospects were not good for his erstwhile ally Mohammed Dahlan, whom many in Fatah continue to hold responsible for the movement's collapse in Gaza. ¶4. (C) Fares predicted a fractious event in which longstanding fissures in the movement would be exposed. He described Fatah members' sense of identity as "more tribal than political" and warned "there will be casualties and blood" as Old Guard stalwarts are voted out and others compete for their places in the FCC and FRC. Efforts are also underway outside of the formal preparatory committee structure to revise Fatah's political program, which could derail the leadership's plan to present the program as a fait accompli to the Congress. Fares said it was important that the program document include language on the "right of resistance" even if its implementation was by peaceful means. Definitions of Success -------------- ¶5. (C) When asked what would constitute a successful Congress, al Sheikh outlined four elements: (1) the political program does not become a major subject of debate (e.g., how it handles the "right of resistance"); (2) the internal structures of the organization are revitalized through new leadership; (3) the election process for the FCC and FRC is transparent; and (4) Abu Mazen emerges in a strengthened position. He said he was personally optimistic, noting that the transformation of Fatah from a movement to a political party is well underway. External factors (including the 2006 election debacle and the 2007 Hamas coup in Gaza) had strengthened internal unity. Internal factors such as district committee elections have injected a "culture of democracy," though he cautioned this was not yet a pervasive shift. Assuming a successful Congress, al-Sheikh cautioned JERUSALEM 00001206 002 OF 002 that Fatah still had a long way to go ("at least a year") before it would be prepared for general elections. ¶6. (C) Fares offered a more ambitious definition of success ("a 50% change in the leadership") and predicted the current Congress would yield only incremental progress in this direction. Key members of the Old Guard would return, such as a bloc he distainfully labelled the "Rightly Guided Caliphs plus One" (Abu Mazen, Muhammed Ghneim, Fariq Qaddumi, Ahmed Qurei and Salim Zanoun.) On the other hand, jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouthi was "assured" a seat in the FCC. Fares predicted bylaws would be amended to ensure Barghouthi was elected and not appointed. He also offered blunt advice as to the appropriate U.S. role in supporting the Congress: "shut up and stay out of it." WALLES