COORDINATING MINISTER REVIEWS COUNTERTERRORISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000702 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT, DS DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ; DOJ/OPDAT FOR ALEXANDRE/BERMAN NCTC WASH DC; NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID SUBJECT: COORDINATING MINISTER REVIEWS COUNTERTERRORISM SUCCESS IN ANNUAL REPORT REF: 08 JAKARTA 2317 JAKARTA 00000702 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a report to Indonesia's parliament, Coordinating Minister Widodo Adi Sucipto highlighted Indonesia's 2008 counterterrorism successes and looked forward to improvements in 2009. Sucipto described the Government of Indonesia's (GOI) approach to counterterrorism and evaluated law enforcement activities over the past year. Looking to the future, Sucipto recommended that the GOI develop official guidelines to institutionalize police and military cooperation. Minister Sucipto concluded his remarks by reiterating the importance of international cooperation. END SUMMARY. REMARKS TO PARLIAMENT ¶2. (C) During a March 2 parliamentary session, Coordinating Minister Widodo Adi Sucipto from the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs delivered an annual report on Indonesia's counterterrorism activities. Ansyaad Mbai, the head of the counterterrorism desk at the Coordinating Ministry provided poloff with a copy of the notes from which Sucipto delivered his remarks. The speech was not made public. GOI: COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY ¶3. (C) Sucipto reviewed the GOI's approach toward overcoming terrorism. According to his notes, fighting terrorism required strong interagency cooperation, strengthened capacity of government institutions, and civil society cooperation. The GOI was committed to using the traditional law enforcement model and prosecute terrorists with due process. (Note: GOI interlocutors describe the law enforcement model as a means to fight terrorism in a way that contrasts the Indonesian model with the Malaysian and Singaporean models, which are based on those two countries' internal security acts.) ¶4. (C) The GOI has a four-pronged approach to countering the terrorist threat. According to Sucipto, this approach includes eliminating opportunities for a terrorist attack; building community commitment and government capacity to track the illicit flow of goods and individuals; deterring an attack by providing tight security to potential targets (such 
as western hotels or important visitors); and using the police to search, arrest and detain those suspected of committing or intending to commit a terrorist act. EVALUATION OF 2008 ¶5. (C) Indonesia has not experienced a major terrorist incident since 2005. Sucipto credited this success in fair measure to the GOI's counterterrorism efforts. According to Sucipto's notes, the GOI increased intelligence collection activities, increased security, prevented acts before they happened through regional detection units, and leveraged the status of religious and societal leaders to lessen radicalization. ¶6. (C) In addition to detecting and arresting suspected terrorists, the GOI has successfully prosecuted suspected terrorists and sentenced them to the full extent of the law. Through 2008, the GOI has arrested 436 suspected terrorists, prosecuted 360 terrorists (5 of whom received the death penalty),and executed three terrorists. Sucipto noted that the executions of the 2002 Bali bombers had been conducted smoothly, without a public backlash. Sucipto concluded that the Indonesian public was relatively safe from the threat of terrorism. LOOKING FORWARD TO 2009 ¶7. (C) Sucipto emphasized that the GOI must remain vigilant. Although the GOI had killed, arrested, prosecuted and sentenced many terrorists, terrorist networks remained a threat. Terrorist groups were still able to recruit new members and potentially capable of carrying out new attacks. According to Sucipto, the GOI was using both hard-power and soft-power approaches in the effort to prevent future acts of terror. In addition to deradicalization and early detection, the police were using intelligence and special units to break JAKARTA 00000702 002.2 OF 002 up terrorist cells. ¶8. (C) Cooperation between the Indonesian police and military would be essential in a major terrorist attack, Sucipto underscored. Their ability to collaborate was tested in the joint exercise of police and military in December 2008 (reftel). Sucipto deemed this exercise a success and recommended the GOI formulate official guidelines and procedures to institutionalize the cooperation. He cited Law Number 2 of 2002, regarding the police, and Law Number 34 of 2004, regarding the military, as the legal basis for this cooperation. According to Sucipto, the December 2008 joint exercise between police and military (see reftel) could become a reference for developing "Best Practices" for Indonesian police-military counterterrorism cooperation. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION ¶9. (C) Sucipto highlighted the importance of international cooperation. Because terrorists used international networks to finance and carry out terrorism, countering terrorist activities required international cooperation. In support of international counterterrorism cooperation, Indonesia had signed bilateral agreements with Australia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Romania, Russia and Egypt. The GOI was drafting a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on counterterrorism cooperation with Poland, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Sudan and Venezuela. ¶10. (C) Sucipto noted that, despite significant Indonesian bilateral counterterrorism coordination with the European Union, the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and ASEAN countries, the GOI had not yet concluded a Mutual Legal Assistance agreement or memorandum of understanding with these countries. HUME