BURMA -- AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000544 DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: PREL ASEAN ID BM EU SUBJECT: BURMA -- AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU SPECIAL ENVOY FASSINO REF: BANGKOK 719 Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Hume discussed Burma with EU Special Envoy Fassino on March 24. Fassino said the 2010 elections in Burma offered a historic opportunity and the international community should try to influence the process constructively. Fassino welcomed recent signals that Washington might be willing to try new approaches. The Ambassador said geopolitical concerns were uppermost for Indonesia and should be an important factor in any new Burma policy. He suggested the ASEAN Secretariat might serve as an intermediary for achieving concrete steps. END SUMMARY. MEETING WITH EU ENVOY ¶2. (C) EU Special Envoy to Burma Piero Fassino met with the Ambassador on March 24. Czech Ambassador Pavel Rezac accompanied Fassino. (Note: The Czech Republic currently holds the EU Presidency.) Fassino, an Italian politician, noted his earlier discussions in Bangkok (reftel) and said he was also meeting with Indonesian FM Wirajuda and ASEAN SG Surin while in Jakarta. NO CHOICE BUT ENGAGEMENT ¶3. (C) Fassino said the international community had a choice between two options in approaching Burma's 2010 elections: remain uninvolved, to avoid appearing to endorse a flawed process; and trying to influence the process. Fassino favored the latter. The elections would occur in any event, he said, so the EU wanted to try to use the vote as far as possible. This was a crucial moment and it would be foolish to pass up the opportunity. ¶4. (C) Fassino commented that Secretary Clinton's remarks on Burma during her February visit to Jakarta indicated to him that the new administration was looking for new approaches. Her remarks suggested that the United States was prepared to adopt a "flexible and pragmatic" line. This would open the way for the international community to take a united position. Both sanctions and "persuasion" had failed, it was time to try something different. This was not exactly the same as the domestic opposition's program, he stressed. ¶5. (C) Rather, Fassino said, the international community should set some standards and seek commitments from the regime for specific steps. For instance: engaging in dialogue with the opposition, releasing political prisoners and allowing non-regime elements to run for election. It was important to "create space" for the opposition. Elections were always dynamic situations and the election process could open up possibilities for the opposition. ASEAN had succeeded in coordinating humanitarian relief after Cyclone Nargis; it should also be used. GEOPOLTICAL FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA ¶6. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the Secretary's comments indicated a search for a new approach. In concrete terms, that meant searching for a set of policies that offered the possibility of producing different results. For twenty years, U.S. policy had been driven by the democracy agenda and tied closely to Aung San Suu Kyi and to a strong stand on human rights. But beyond this, there had been little engagement. The United States now had no vested interests in Burma. Washington might be open to new proposals and willing to support a concerted effort, or at least a coordination of multiple tracks, toward a practical solution. ¶7. (C) As a young democracy, the Ambassador said, Indonesia wanted democracy to prevail in the region. Much of the domestic Indonesian criticism of the ASEAN Charter sprang from its perceived weakness on human rights. There was no need to persuade FM Wirajuda on the need for reform in Burma. The question for Indonesia was rather whether Burma was going to be a part of the region or migrate toward China. The Indonesian concern, in other words, was primarily geopolitical. The traditional wisdom on Burma, however, had put human rights first and geopolitical concerns second. ¶8. (C) That said, it was hard to imagine that Indonesia would deliver a hard message to Burma. The Bali Democracy Forum was a laudable initiative but had no agenda for action. President Yudhoyono believed his relationship with the Burmese leadership, though feeble, was having some effect. SG Surin might be able to take some of the practical steps needed to get the process moving. ASEAN could potentially negotiate some of the concrete steps Fassino had proposed. HUME