COUNTERTERRORISM -- GOI DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS

S E C R E T JAKARTA 000526 DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT, INL DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ; NCTC WASHDC; NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC PREL ID SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- GOI DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS SHOW PROMISE REF: JAKARTA 0497 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesia's deradicalization program owes much to the personal commitment of several key police officials. Along with the primary goal of intelligence collection, deradicalization aims to change the mind-set of terrorists and reintegrate them into society after their release from prison. As these initiatives develop, the challenge will be to link them into a single program. Despite the ad hoc nature of deradicalization so far, the prospect of countering extremist ideologies with ideas and persuasion appear promising in the Indonesian context. As an example of the use of "Smart Power," Mission is working on ways to assist this effort. END SUMMARY. POLICE LEAD DERADICALIZATION EFFORT ¶2. (SBU) The GOI is moving forward with its deradicalization efforts. The programs began as the personal initiative of a few motivated senior officials, most notably former heads of Special Detachment 88 (SD-88),the special anti-terrorist detachment of the Indonesian National Police (INP). The initiative was a part of the search for soft-power elements to complement the more traditional hard-power elements of the GOI's counterterrorism strategy. The soft-power approach aims to counter radical ideologies head-on, using persuasion. Although the primary goal of the police effort has been intelligence collection, it has led to positive relationships with terrorists in detention, offering the opportunity for officials to wean terrorists from radical ideologies and the commitment to the use of violence. ¶3. (S) The police led deradicalization program involves relatively few officials and is, for them, labor-intensive. Together with "Team Bomb," the ad hoc police task force for counter-terrorism, SD-88 officials identify suspected and convicted terrorists in custody who appear to be receptive to moderate ideas and forge a personal relationship with them. The officers, who are themselves Muslims, provide the families of the detained radicals with modest police-provided financial support and opportunities for the terrorist to reconnect with his family and community during detention. By praying and eating with the suspected terrorists, the officers demonstrate an alternative and mainstream way of observing Islam. The individual contact continues through prosecution, imprisonment and release from prison. ¶4. (C) Nasir Abas, a former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) -affiliated terrorist, has played a key role in the police effort. Abas meets with released former terrorists to provide modest police-funded assistance for daily needs and help guide them through the transition back into society. Abas is the most striking product of the deradicalization effort. Since his arrest in 2003, he has cooperated extensively with the police in helping to undermine the JI network (the articulate Abas was also featured in a CBS "60 Minutes" report in 2007). FURTHER INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT NEEDED ¶5. (S) The INP initiative has yet to take the shape of an institutionalized government program. GOI interlocutors, including Ansyaad Mbai, the head of the CT desk at the Coordinating Ministry, have expressed concern that, without more direct GOI support in terms of a political mandate and a dedicated budget, SD-88 and "Team Bomb" might not be able to maintain the initiative. Deradicalization has been largely the personal initiative of several motivated leaders in SD-88 leadership and has been dependent on assistance from foreign governments and corporate donors. The personal attention of individual officers has therefore been essential. When those officers are promoted, however, the personal connection to the former terrorist is often lost. ¶6. (C) Because the INP has the interagency lead in the deradicalization effort, other governmental bodies such as the Ministry for Social Affairs have been reluctant to assume a role in terrorist rehabilitation. Normally, police play a minor role in any follow-up after the terrorist's release from prison, one usually limited to their normal law enforcement activities. ¶7. (C) Working through Nasir Abas, however, SD-88 officers have taken it upon themselves to provide some social support to the former terrorists. According to psychologist Dr. Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, who has worked with the INP on post-imprisonment however, deradicalization since the first Bali bombings in 2002, well-meaning officers working on the side in addition to their normal duties can only do so much. GOI financial and institutional support is essential in order to conduct deradicalization in any systematic way. A formal government program could provide more robust assistance for a more effective outcome. PRISON DERADICALIZATION ¶8. (C) Convicted terrorists often use their time in prison to recruit and radicalize fellow inmates. According to Irsyad Bustaman, the Director for Security at the Directorate-General for Corrections, terrorist prisoners traditionally are comingled with regular inmates in Indonesia, creating opportunities for prosetylization and reinforcement. Those in detention who elected not to participate in deradicalization have tried to recruit new terrorists from among the prison population, including some guards. ¶9. (SBU) The Directorate of Corrections, which operates under the authority of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, so far has not been integrated into the deradicalization process. This process often ends when terrorists move from police custody into the prison system, where SD-88 is no longer in close and continuing contact with the former terrorists. In some instances, the trust and rapport built during detention is lost to the police as the terrorist disappears behind bars. Prison officials who want to try to continue the initiative must start anew in building personal relationships. ¶10. (SBU) In concert with foreign missions and the NGO community, the Directorate of Corrections is seeking to make deradicalization a part of normal prison procedures. The Asia Foundation has developed a blueprint for prison reform that supports better overall prison management. The Australian government has funded the development of a database regarding prison inmates and to keep a record of their activities. Through S/CT and INL funding, Mission is working with the Directorate of Corrections on the development of a standard operating procedures (SOP) manual for the handling of terrorist prisoners. The study team will be meeting with members of SD-88 to discuss how to best continue their deradicalization efforts in a prison environment. RELEASE INTO SOCIETY ¶11. (C) Members of academia, SD-88 officers and private citizens have created an ad hoc parole system. In line with the thinking that terrorists fall within the purview of the police, the Ministry of Social Affairs, which would normally provide social work services, does not facilitate the reintegration of terrorist prisoners into society. Rather, when a convicted terrorist receives a conditional release from prison, a member of his community serves as a guarantor for his behavior. The government thereby loses an opportunity to shape pro-actively the individual's reintegration into society. ¶12. (C) Because a member of the prisoner's community is held responsible, the social and financial context of the released prisoner has become increasingly important in determining whether that individual will return to terroristactivities or become a productive member of socity. Sidney Jones (AmCit--please protect) of the nternational Crisis Group has noted that many reeased terrorists rely on old networks for their ivelihood if they are unable to start a small busiess or develop a reliable source of income. Whe able, members of SD-88 meet and provide modest fnancial support to the former terrorists. ¶13. (C) The GOI does not have quantitative or qualitaive data on recidivism. But on the basis of anedotal evidence, it appears that, without any coutervening influence, many former terrorists rever to their earlier radical beliefs after their reease from prison. In an effort to counter this,one academic is seeking too promote moderate teachigs among releasees by integrating deradicalizatin into his regular professional research and practice as a psychologist. Working without any formal support from the GOI, Dr. Sarwono has developed a program that brings mainstream religious leaders into contact with terrorists in prison and those recently released, to promote mainstream interpretations of jihad. He plans to use a reinterpretation of the meaning of jihad written by the Center for Islamic Studies as the basis for his study materials. ROLE OF ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ¶14. (C) GOI interlocutors repeatedly state that deradicalization needs to be a societal as well as a police responsibility. Muhammadiyah and Nahdkatul Ulama (NU) have not been formally involved in the GOI de-radicalization program, although Muhammadiyah's Abdul Mukti used to be involved in the GOI's CT efforts. Indonesia's two largest Islamic social organizations have shied away from directly participating in or pledging support for the GOI's deradicalization efforts. The leaders of the organizations have maintained that they would work with former terrorists if that work were a part of their normal activities. Further efforts must be made by the GOI to work with these key mass Muslim organizations on deradicalization. RESULTS SEEM PROMISING ¶15. (C) Despite the ad hoc nature of the GOI's deradicalization efforts, the GOI's initiative to counter extremist ideologies through persuasion may be showing results. From 2000 to 2008, the GOI arrested 438 terrorist suspects and convicted 360 of those suspects on terrorism charges. Many of those convicted have already been released from police custody and prison. There are approximately 150 terrorists currently incarcerated in Indonesia. Most notably, Indonesia has not had a major terrorist incident since 2005. ¶16. (C) Although the transition of SD-88 leadership from Surya Dharma to S. Usman Nasution has raised questions about the continuity of the police initiative, GOI officials continue to reiterate their commitment to deradicalization. Ansyaad Mbai believes that Surya Dharma's natural successor for leading the INP's deradicalization activities is Colonel Tito Karnavian, a member of SD-88 currently on sabbatical in Singapore. To turn this well-meaning effort of motivated individuals into a successful national program, however, will require institutional support in the form of a government budget, standard procedures and staffing. As an example of the use of "Smart Power," Mission is working on ways to assist this effort. HUME