PAPUA -- TENTATIVE NEW EFFORTS TO ADDRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000396 DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, EAP/ANP NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINS ID SUBJECT: PAPUA -- TENTATIVE NEW EFFORTS TO ADDRESS GRIEVANCES Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Residents of eastern Indonesia's Papua and West Papua provinces remain frustrated at their region's relative economic and political marginalization. Many Papuans feel the province's Special Autonomy Law has so far failed to deliver promised economic benefits or given them a greater voice in the national political discourse. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): The central and provincial governments are trying to address these concerns. The provincial government has further developed its Village-Based Development Strategy and promised free education and HEALTH care to ethnic Papuans. They are also exploring a development coordination body modeled on the agency that rebuilt Aceh after the tsunami. Separately, a key government think-tank has proposed a plan for enhanced political dialogue between Jakarta and Papua in order to assist the region's development. END SUMMARY. A HISTORY OF GRIEVANCES ¶3. (C) Economic underdevelopment and political marginalization have long plagued Indonesia's eastern provinces of Papua and West Papua. Despite natural resource wealth, Papua remains ONE of Indonesia's poorest regions. Many Papuans believe they have little say in how their region has been governed--a legacy of decades of centralized authoritarian rule from Jakarta. Discontent over the region's situation has alienated Papuans from the mainstream of Indonesian society and fueled support for separatist groups. Some Papuans have taken up arms in the separatist cause, although they present little danger to Indonesian control of the territory. ¶4. (C) Another source of Papuan discontent stems from the history of how the territory became part of Indonesia. The key issue is the Act of Free Choice--a 1969 UN-sponsored vote where a thousand Papuan leaders elected to join Indonesia. (Note: The Dutch retained control of Papua after they had granted independence to the rest of Indonesia in 1949. The Indonesian government tried for two decades to gain control of the territory, first through military action and then through a UN-brokered deal.) Many Papuans believe the Act of Free Choice was a sham that did not reflect the widespread popular support for independence. ¶5. (C) The Indonesian government attempted to address Papuan grievances by enacting a Special Autonomy Law for the region in 2001. Under the law, the provincial government assumed responsibility for all matters except for foreign affairs, defense and security, fiscal and monetary policy, religious affairs and justice. The Special Autonomy Law also required that Jakarta give the provincial government a greater portion of the revenue from Papua's natural resource exports. (Note: Papua has extensive mineral reserves, including copper and gold, as well as natural gas and timber.) The additional revenue was to allow the provincial government to work to address Papua's chronic underdevelopment. ¶6. (C) Most Papuans hailed Special Autonomy as the solution to the region's problems but some questioned the essentially top-down way the law came about. A number of key Papuan leaders lobbied for the law and advised the central government on the provisions it should contain. In as notoriously fractious a place as Papua, this only fueled the resentment of those Papuan elites who were left out of the consultation process. ¶7. (C) Implementation of the Special Autonomy Law has lagged due to failings in Papua and in Jakarta. The Papua provincial government lacked the trained personnel and administrative structures necessary to assume a range of new responsibilities. Papuan leaders frequently squabbled over priorities, which often led to gridlock. These problems are even more acute in West Papua, which the central government carved out as a separate province in 2003. For their part, central government ministries were reluctant to cede key responsibilities to the province. Corruption was also a factor as control over things like mining and forestry concessions gave some officials a steady source of income. ¶8. (C) Papuans increasingly regard Special Autonomy as a failure. The most vocal groups, Papuan students and traditional leaders, increasingly call for the law to be scrapped and replaced by some new arrangement. Papuan politicians, including some who participated in its creation, admit the law is in need of a drastic overhaul. All agree that Papua lags far behind the rest of Indonesia in areas like education, HEALTH care, and economic opportunities. As a result, Papuans remain angry. SOME SHORT-TERM HELP ¶9. (C) Recently, the provincial government has accelerated its efforts to address Papua's development deficit in education and HEALTH care. Governor Barnabas Suebu announced on March 2 that the provincial government would provide free elementary education to all ethnic Papuans in the region. (Note: Ethnic Papuans are about 1.5 million of the province's 2.5 million residents. The remainder are migrants from other parts of Indonesia. Relations between the two communities has been another source of tension.) He also announced that the provincial government would provide free basic medical care to the same population. This development is part of Suebu's Village-Based Development Strategy (RESPEK),which aims to improve Papuans' basic quality of life. ¶10. (C) Our Papuan contacts welcomed the Governor's announcement, but are circumspect about what he can accomplish. Papua's schools, especially those in remote areas, are poorly equipped and usually short staffed. The same is true of government HEALTH clinics. These factors will constrain how much benefit Papuans receive from the new initiative. Nevertheless, our contacts see the move as a positive one. LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES ¶11. (C) In addition to these immediate measures, the central and provincial governments are looking for ways to accelerate Papua's long-term development. Toward that end, they are exploring whether to create a development coordinating body modeled on the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) (Note: The GOI created the BRR to manage reconstruction after the December 2004 tsunami. The agency, which received extensive foreign assistance, operated according to international standards of management, transparency and oversight.) Governor Suebu has visited Aceh several times and discussed the proposal with Aceh Governor Irwandi Yusuf and BRR Chief Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. Suebu's advisors tell us that they hope to hire staff from the BRR, which is winding down its operations. ¶12. (C) Our contacts say this effort has potential, but questions remain. The BRR operated with extensive foreign funding and personnel support. It is unlikely that a BRR-like body in Papua will attract similar levels of international assistance. Other questions remain about how such an entity would relate to existing provincial and central government development bodies. Also unclear is when such a body might take off. Suebu's advisors told us the governor hopes to move forward before the end of 2009. Other observers think this unlikely, especially given this year's parliamentary and presidential elections. ADDRESSING POLITICAL ISSUES ¶13. (C) Parts of the Indonesian government are seeking ways to address Papua's most sensitive political issues. Toward that end, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) has recommended a way forward: The Papua Roadmap. (Note: LIPI is a government think-tank charged with providing policy advice and research to senior Indonesian officials.) The Roadmap calls for a dialogue between Jakarta and key Papuan stakeholders. The latter include the provincial government, traditional and ethnic leaders, religious groups, women's organizations, and NGOs. LIPI officials continue to build support for the Roadmap within the GOI and have sought advice from the Geneva-based Henry Durant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (please protect). ¶14. (C) LIPI's agenda is ambitious; no issue is off the table. The lead author of the Roadmap told us that the Jakarta-Papua dialogue must deal with the Act of Free Choice and other sensitive political matters. Only through an open and frank discussion of this historical question can Papuans and other Indonesians resolve long-standing issues of political identity, LIPI scholars argue. The Roadmap also calls for the GOI to address the history of security force human rights abuse in Papua through some sort of accountability mechanism. Only through a discussion of these issues can Papuans come to accept their place in Indonesia, and Indonesians accept Papuans as fellow Indonesians. ¶15. (C) Some key Indonesian officials support the Roadmap. Defense Minister Sudarsono pushed LIPI to undertake the project and continues to support it. Vice President Kalla also backs the initiative. LIPI and its partners are also building support in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). LIPI hopes to refine the Roadmap proposal and position it for action by the government that takes office after the 2009 elections. Should President Yudhoyono win a second term, LIPI officials hope that he will pursue the Papua Roadmap as a successor to his peacemaking efforts in Aceh. ¶16. (C) However, opposition to the Roadmap is strong. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Widodo A.S. did not back the idea despite Sudarsono's urging that he do so. Likewise, the Ministry of Home Affairs and most of the GOI's intelligence and security agencies oppose pursuing the Roadmap. They reject any attempt to review the Act of Free Choice or other sensitive issues. Such a dialogue could challenge the most fundamental value of Indonesian nationalists--the unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia. Hard-line nationalists will likely do all they can to stop it. WILL IT BE ENOUGH? ¶17. (C) Many questions remain. The Roadmap is an ambitious approach that has already secured more support from GOI officials than many observers expected. However, some of this support might fade in the face of truly determined opposition. Further, Papuan support remains unclear. Some key political and religious leaders in the province have signed on. That said, tribal, religious and regional differences within Papua complicate reaching a consensus there. Papuan elites rarely agree on who speaks for Papua. ¶18. (C) Finally, the Papuan public remains frustrated with the region's economic and political marginalization. Many have given up expecting Special Autonomy to deliver its promised benefits. Accelerating economic development in the region would likely create some space for a new and less contentious relationship between Papua and Jakarta. By itself, however, the Roadmap is unlikely to shake Papuans of their general apathy toward the Indonesian government and grand political schemes that promise to solve their problems. HUME