IMET HELPING DEFENSE REFORM IN INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000385 DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM, PM/PPA NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019 TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV ID SUBJECT: IMET HELPING DEFENSE REFORM IN INDONESIA Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesia is money well spent. Reinstated after the lifting of sanctions in 2005, IMET is one of the key tools at our disposal for transforming the Indonesian military into a more professional force. Indonesia consistently absorbs the funding we provide and can absorb more, particularly at the junior officer level, which constitutes the future of the Indonesian military (TNI). The IMET program is having a solid impact on the Indonesian military and its professional capabilities, thus complementing the Indonesian defense reform effort. END SUMMARY. TRENDING UPWARD ¶2. (U) Since the lifting of sanctions in 2005, Mission has successfully utilized IMET funding. In FY-08, we spent the entire allocation of $1.04 million. Of the $1.5 million allocation for FY-09, we have spent about $1 million under the continuing resolution. In FY-07 $1.39 million was allocated and $1.29 million of that was spent. The current proposal for $2.358 million in funding for FY-10 would be a welcome boost toward the more robust program appropriate for a country of Indonesia's size and importance. ¶3. (U) Roughly 90 percent of Indonesia's IMET funding goes to professional military training, i.e., career courses. At the senior level, Indonesia sends one TNI officer per year to each of the U.S. military staff and war colleges, a total of eight or nine per year. These officers are at the Major, LTC or Colonel level, and between 35 and 48 years of age. The courses are six to twelve months long. ¶4. (U) At the junior level, Indonesia sends company-grade officers to Captains Career Courses or Basic Officer Leadership Courses. The majority of these billets, which number from 10 to 12 per year, are filled by TNI Army officers at the Lieutenant or Captain level and aged 22-34. A few attend the Air Force Squadron Officer School or the Navy's Surface Warfare School. These courses typically run four to six months. ¶5. (U) A much smaller amount of IMET supports English language instruction at the DoD's language school in San Antonio, Texas. Annually 2-3 instructors receive 4-6 months of training. Participants in the senior and junior officers programs may also receive some remedial training before beginning their substantive study. A small amount of funding also supports technical training. ROOM FOR MORE ¶6. (SBU) While Indonesia is able to fill these slots regularly, there is room for expansion. Additional IMET funding would allow Indonesia to send a larger number of junior officers annually. This is where the impact would be greatest in terms of helping Indonesia develop a more professional military. ¶7. (SBU) Mission is also preparing to begin training Indonesian noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The multi-year effort would allow the use of IMET for such training in U.S. schools beginning in FY-11. We currently are planning to offer a small amount of NCO training in Indonesia using Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and may be able to send the first NCOs to U.S. training in FY-10 on FMF. This will allow us to include this important component of the Indonesian military in our reform effort, speeding the transition to a professional military. Additional funding would help to make this program a further success. ¶8. (SBU) Other options exist, of course. Other countries offer competing programs, the Australian one being particularly large. We have the sense, nevertheless, that the U.S. program, though limited in numbers, is among the most desired (if not the most desired). Graduates of the programs are consistently positive about their experience and the program. Officers who participate feel that they have enhanced knowledge and capabilities, and that they are better leaders. This speaks in favor of expanding the funding for Indonesia. EASING THE LANGUAGE BARRIER ¶9. (SBU) The greatest obstacle to participation in these U.S. programs is English-language capability. Traditionally, Indonesia's public and military education systems have not provided enough instruction to enable the average officer to pass the language test that is part of the U.S. IMET selection process. The individual's background has generally made the difference in having enough exposure to English to pass. The TNI is now making a concerted effort to offer more English instruction as part of its regular training. At the same time, younger officers generally exhibit a somewhat stronger command of English than in the past, which is positive. IMPROVING CAPABILITIES, PROFESSIONALIZATION ¶10. (C) The IMET program is having a solid impact on the Indonesian military and its professional capabilities. That said, the program can only partially assist in recovering the so-called "lost generation": TNI officers who missed out on U.S. (or other Western) career military training between 1992 and 2005 because of sanctions. Many of the officers who would have benefited from schools at this time are not at the Lieutenant Colonel level and above, and the limited number of school slots available at the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel level are unable to reach more than a handful of officers. The broader range of billets are at the junior level and the ability to increase that number is where IMET's impact is greatest. HUME