Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09JAKARTA3
2009-01-02 04:43:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:
INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
VZCZCXRO8506 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHJA #0003/01 0020443 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 020443Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1114 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5780 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3463 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1549 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1536 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2556 RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 4149 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5284 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2905 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 3384 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3207 RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH 1378 RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000003
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR
BARCLAY/ROESS/BUHLER, S/CT FOR SHORE/MAHANTY
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
(REVISED)
REF: 08JAKARTA2313
08STATE120019
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000003
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR
BARCLAY/ROESS/BUHLER, S/CT FOR SHORE/MAHANTY
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
(REVISED)
REF: 08JAKARTA2313
08STATE120019
1. (SBU) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified --
Please handle accordingly.
2. (SBU) The following is a revised draft text of the 2008
Country Report on Terrorism for Indonesia. The amended text
contains additional information on DS/ATA's success in
working with the Indonesian National Police. The original
text was submitted through Diplopedia on December 22.
Mission has updated the Diplopedia entry to include this new
information. Please treat as Sensitive until the report is
finalized for submission to Congress.
Begin text:
-
Indonesia experienced its third consecutive year without a
major terrorist incident. The Indonesian government's
counterterrorism efforts drastically reduced the ability of
militant groups in Indonesia to carry out attacks.
Indonesian National Police (INP) successes from previous
years in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist
organizations continued to pay dividends. Arrests in South
Sumatra and Jakarta demonstrated that JI and other radical
groups, such as KOMPAK, remained a security threat, but with
reduced ability to carry out attacks. The Attorney General's
Office's counterterrorism prosecutions continued, and
numerous terrorists were convicted of crimes. The Government
of Indonesia continued to build a legal and law enforcement
environment conducive to fighting terrorism within its
borders. International funding for terrorism nearly dried
up. The U.S. government lifted its Travel Warning for
Indonesia in recognition of Indonesia's success in curbing
terrorism and the improved security situation in the country.
Last year's INP raids paid dividends as the INP used
information gained from suspects to maintain tight
surveillance over suspected militant strongholds. In July,
the INP raided a home in Palembang, South Sumatra, capturing
ten suspects and a small cache of explosives. In October, a
raid on a house in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, led to the
capture of five suspects and another small cache of
explosives. The suspects were related to KOMPAK, which in
the past fanned militancy in Poso, Sulawesi and to Darul
Islam, a long-standing Islamist extremist group with some
militant strains. Both raids demonstrated the success of
DS/ATA training and the improved ability of the INP and
Security Detachment-88 in monitoring and capturing militants.
The Embassy also worked to build the investigative support
for and forensic capabilities of the INP through numerous
developmental programs administered by DOJ/ICITAP/LEGATT.
The USG-funded Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and
Transnational Crime successfully prosecuted terrorists, and
DOJ/OPDAT enhanced the prosecutorial capacity of the task
force. In April, JI Emir Ustad Syaroni (aka Zarkasih) and
senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainul Bahri) were
sentenced to 15 years in prison each for violating the 2003
counterterrorism law. Zarkasih, as Emir, held a JI
leadership position. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran and
JI military leader, had been involved in several JI attacks.
In addition to handing down the sentences, the judges
declared JI a terrorist organization, laying the legal basis
for the GOI to ban JI. In November, Abu Dujana testified on
behalf of the prosecution in the terrorist trials of Dr.
Argus Purwantoro and Abu Husna. Additionally, the Task Force
successfully prosecuted 12 other JI members in 2008. The
court sentenced five JI members for aiding and abetting Abu
Dujana and Zarkasih to between seven and eight years of
prison each. The court sentenced six other members of JI's
military wing to eight to ten years each in prison.
Other Indonesian legal institutions took a hard line against
terrorists. In October, the Constitutional Court rejected a
last-ditch appeal by the Bali bombers of their death
sentences and upheld that death by firing squad was
constitutional. Also in October, the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights did not include sentence remissions for
convicted terrorists in its annual Eid holiday remissions
list.
In November, the Government of Indonesia executed three of
the 2002 Bali bombers, Amrozi bin Nurhasym, Imam Samudra, and
Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas. The three had been convicted for
planning and carrying out the October 2002 bombings in Bali,
which killed over 200 people. There were no serious
incidents following the executions, and the public reaction
was calm, despite the public calls by JI co-founder Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir for retaliatory attacks.
The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an
effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and
prosecutions. UNSCR 1267 requires such controls.
Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered
during investigations. However, the Government of Indonesia
has yet to demonstrate the political will to implement UNSCR
1267.
USAID promoted capacity-building to the Financial Crimes
Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK) and related GOI
agencies through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project
(FCPP),a multi-year program, now concluded, which provided
technical advisors and policy support to Indonesia's effort
to develop an effective and credible regime against money
laundering and terrorism finance. FCPP assistance included
the drafting of a National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy
adopted by the President in 2007, with DOJ/OPDAT to develop a
comprehensive asset forfeiture law (which is still under way
with USDOJ),and certification of GOI officials as
anti-money-laundering specialists and fraud examiners. Other
donors are also providing assistance to PPATK. The unit
receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash
Transaction Reports. The number of STRs PPATK received
increased from 10 per month in 2002 to over 811 per month in
2008 (through October 2008),and these reports led to 19
prosecutions during the period. One of these had a terrorist
component, and the strengthened financial oversight
strengthened the tracking of potential terrorist financial
transactions.
The Indonesian National Police (INP) continued their program
to "deradicalize" convicted terrorists. The program
identified individuals who might be open to more moderate
teachings, with the intent that INP officials work with them
in prison. The program focused on providing spiritual
support to the men and on providing modest financial support
to their families. By providing this support, the police
gained the trust of the men and received information about
terrorist networks. The program aimed to reduce terrorist
recruitment inside prisons. Based upon the success of the
INP de-radicalization program, the Department of Corrections
also decided to undertake a prisoner de-radicalization
program. The Directorate General for prisons proposed the
creation of a set of guidelines for the handling of terrorist
prisoners to improve security and surveillance of the
prisoners and encourage prisoners to not resort to violence
to carry out their religious beliefs.
While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been
impressive and its capacity to fight terrorism within its
borders has improved steadily, continued vigilance is needed.
The arrests in Palembang and North Jakarta demonstrate that
militant networks remain partially intact and that groups
continue to stockpile explosives for potential operations.
That said, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a
safe haven in Indonesia. As more gains are made in the
Philippines' counterterrorism efforts, a small number of
Indonesian militants in the Philippines may try to return to
Indonesia. Malaysian JI operative, and recruiter Noordin
Mohammed Top, who is suspected of involvement in every
anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002,
remains at large.
-
End text.
3. (U) Mission point of contact for this report is Poloff
Kate Rebholz (RebholzTK@state.gov or
RebholzTK@state.sgov.gov).
HEFFERN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR
BARCLAY/ROESS/BUHLER, S/CT FOR SHORE/MAHANTY
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
(REVISED)
REF: 08JAKARTA2313
08STATE120019
1. (SBU) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified --
Please handle accordingly.
2. (SBU) The following is a revised draft text of the 2008
Country Report on Terrorism for Indonesia. The amended text
contains additional information on DS/ATA's success in
working with the Indonesian National Police. The original
text was submitted through Diplopedia on December 22.
Mission has updated the Diplopedia entry to include this new
information. Please treat as Sensitive until the report is
finalized for submission to Congress.
Begin text:
-
Indonesia experienced its third consecutive year without a
major terrorist incident. The Indonesian government's
counterterrorism efforts drastically reduced the ability of
militant groups in Indonesia to carry out attacks.
Indonesian National Police (INP) successes from previous
years in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist
organizations continued to pay dividends. Arrests in South
Sumatra and Jakarta demonstrated that JI and other radical
groups, such as KOMPAK, remained a security threat, but with
reduced ability to carry out attacks. The Attorney General's
Office's counterterrorism prosecutions continued, and
numerous terrorists were convicted of crimes. The Government
of Indonesia continued to build a legal and law enforcement
environment conducive to fighting terrorism within its
borders. International funding for terrorism nearly dried
up. The U.S. government lifted its Travel Warning for
Indonesia in recognition of Indonesia's success in curbing
terrorism and the improved security situation in the country.
Last year's INP raids paid dividends as the INP used
information gained from suspects to maintain tight
surveillance over suspected militant strongholds. In July,
the INP raided a home in Palembang, South Sumatra, capturing
ten suspects and a small cache of explosives. In October, a
raid on a house in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, led to the
capture of five suspects and another small cache of
explosives. The suspects were related to KOMPAK, which in
the past fanned militancy in Poso, Sulawesi and to Darul
Islam, a long-standing Islamist extremist group with some
militant strains. Both raids demonstrated the success of
DS/ATA training and the improved ability of the INP and
Security Detachment-88 in monitoring and capturing militants.
The Embassy also worked to build the investigative support
for and forensic capabilities of the INP through numerous
developmental programs administered by DOJ/ICITAP/LEGATT.
The USG-funded Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and
Transnational Crime successfully prosecuted terrorists, and
DOJ/OPDAT enhanced the prosecutorial capacity of the task
force. In April, JI Emir Ustad Syaroni (aka Zarkasih) and
senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainul Bahri) were
sentenced to 15 years in prison each for violating the 2003
counterterrorism law. Zarkasih, as Emir, held a JI
leadership position. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran and
JI military leader, had been involved in several JI attacks.
In addition to handing down the sentences, the judges
declared JI a terrorist organization, laying the legal basis
for the GOI to ban JI. In November, Abu Dujana testified on
behalf of the prosecution in the terrorist trials of Dr.
Argus Purwantoro and Abu Husna. Additionally, the Task Force
successfully prosecuted 12 other JI members in 2008. The
court sentenced five JI members for aiding and abetting Abu
Dujana and Zarkasih to between seven and eight years of
prison each. The court sentenced six other members of JI's
military wing to eight to ten years each in prison.
Other Indonesian legal institutions took a hard line against
terrorists. In October, the Constitutional Court rejected a
last-ditch appeal by the Bali bombers of their death
sentences and upheld that death by firing squad was
constitutional. Also in October, the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights did not include sentence remissions for
convicted terrorists in its annual Eid holiday remissions
list.
In November, the Government of Indonesia executed three of
the 2002 Bali bombers, Amrozi bin Nurhasym, Imam Samudra, and
Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas. The three had been convicted for
planning and carrying out the October 2002 bombings in Bali,
which killed over 200 people. There were no serious
incidents following the executions, and the public reaction
was calm, despite the public calls by JI co-founder Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir for retaliatory attacks.
The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an
effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and
prosecutions. UNSCR 1267 requires such controls.
Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered
during investigations. However, the Government of Indonesia
has yet to demonstrate the political will to implement UNSCR
1267.
USAID promoted capacity-building to the Financial Crimes
Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK) and related GOI
agencies through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project
(FCPP),a multi-year program, now concluded, which provided
technical advisors and policy support to Indonesia's effort
to develop an effective and credible regime against money
laundering and terrorism finance. FCPP assistance included
the drafting of a National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy
adopted by the President in 2007, with DOJ/OPDAT to develop a
comprehensive asset forfeiture law (which is still under way
with USDOJ),and certification of GOI officials as
anti-money-laundering specialists and fraud examiners. Other
donors are also providing assistance to PPATK. The unit
receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash
Transaction Reports. The number of STRs PPATK received
increased from 10 per month in 2002 to over 811 per month in
2008 (through October 2008),and these reports led to 19
prosecutions during the period. One of these had a terrorist
component, and the strengthened financial oversight
strengthened the tracking of potential terrorist financial
transactions.
The Indonesian National Police (INP) continued their program
to "deradicalize" convicted terrorists. The program
identified individuals who might be open to more moderate
teachings, with the intent that INP officials work with them
in prison. The program focused on providing spiritual
support to the men and on providing modest financial support
to their families. By providing this support, the police
gained the trust of the men and received information about
terrorist networks. The program aimed to reduce terrorist
recruitment inside prisons. Based upon the success of the
INP de-radicalization program, the Department of Corrections
also decided to undertake a prisoner de-radicalization
program. The Directorate General for prisons proposed the
creation of a set of guidelines for the handling of terrorist
prisoners to improve security and surveillance of the
prisoners and encourage prisoners to not resort to violence
to carry out their religious beliefs.
While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been
impressive and its capacity to fight terrorism within its
borders has improved steadily, continued vigilance is needed.
The arrests in Palembang and North Jakarta demonstrate that
militant networks remain partially intact and that groups
continue to stockpile explosives for potential operations.
That said, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a
safe haven in Indonesia. As more gains are made in the
Philippines' counterterrorism efforts, a small number of
Indonesian militants in the Philippines may try to return to
Indonesia. Malaysian JI operative, and recruiter Noordin
Mohammed Top, who is suspected of involvement in every
anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002,
remains at large.
-
End text.
3. (U) Mission point of contact for this report is Poloff
Kate Rebholz (RebholzTK@state.gov or
RebholzTK@state.sgov.gov).
HEFFERN