INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000003 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR BARCLAY/ROESS/BUHLER, S/CT FOR SHORE/MAHANTY DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH NCTC WASHDC NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM (REVISED) REF: 08JAKARTA2313 08STATE120019 ¶1. (SBU) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- Please handle accordingly. ¶2. (SBU) The following is a revised draft text of the 2008 Country Report on Terrorism for Indonesia. The amended text contains additional information on DS/ATA's success in working with the Indonesian National Police. The original text was submitted through Diplopedia on December 22. Mission has updated the Diplopedia entry to include this new information. Please treat as Sensitive until the report is finalized for submission to Congress. Begin text: - Indonesia experienced its third consecutive year without a major terrorist incident. The Indonesian government's counterterrorism efforts drastically reduced the ability of militant groups in Indonesia to carry out attacks. Indonesian National Police (INP) successes from previous years in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist organizations continued to pay dividends. Arrests in South Sumatra and Jakarta demonstrated that JI and other radical groups, such as KOMPAK, remained a security threat, but with reduced ability to carry out attacks. The Attorney General's Office's counterterrorism prosecutions continued, and numerous terrorists were convicted of crimes. The Government of Indonesia continued to build a legal and law enforcement environment conducive to fighting terrorism within its borders. International funding for terrorism nearly dried up. The U.S. government lifted its Travel Warning for Indonesia in recognition of Indonesia's success in curbing terrorism and the improved security situation in the country. Last year's INP raids paid dividends as the INP used information gained from suspects to maintain tight surveillance over suspected militant strongholds. In July, the INP raided a home in Palembang, South Sumatra, capturing ten suspects and a small cache of explosives. In October, a raid on a house in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, led to the capture of five suspects and another small cache of explosives. The suspects were related to KOMPAK, which in the past fanned militancy in Poso, Sulawesi and to Darul Islam, a long-standing Islamist extremist group with some militant strains. Both raids demonstrated the success of DS/ATA training and the improved ability of the INP and Security Detachment-88 in monitoring and capturing militants. The Embassy also worked to build the investigative support for and forensic capabilities of the INP through numerous developmental programs administered by DOJ/ICITAP/LEGATT. The USG-funded Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime successfully prosecuted terrorists, and DOJ/OPDAT enhanced the prosecutorial capacity of the task force. In April, JI Emir Ustad Syaroni (aka Zarkasih) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainul Bahri) were sentenced to 15 years in prison each for violating the 2003 counterterrorism law. Zarkasih, as Emir, held a JI leadership position. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran and JI military leader, had been involved in several JI attacks. In addition to handing down the sentences, the judges declared JI a terrorist organization, laying the legal basis for the GOI to ban JI. In November, Abu Dujana testified on behalf of the prosecution in the terrorist trials of Dr. Argus Purwantoro and Abu Husna. Additionally, the Task Force successfully prosecuted 12 other JI members in 2008. The court sentenced five JI members for aiding and abetting Abu Dujana and Zarkasih to between seven and eight years of prison each. The court sentenced six other members of JI's military wing to eight to ten years each in prison. Other Indonesian legal institutions took a hard line against terrorists. In October, the Constitutional Court rejected a last-ditch appeal by the Bali bombers of their death sentences and upheld that death by firing squad was constitutional. Also in October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights did not include sentence remissions for convicted terrorists in its annual Eid holiday remissions list. In November, the Government of Indonesia executed three of the 2002 Bali bombers, Amrozi bin Nurhasym, Imam Samudra, and Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas. The three had been convicted for planning and carrying out the October 2002 bombings in Bali, which killed over 200 people. There were no serious incidents following the executions, and the public reaction was calm, despite the public calls by JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir for retaliatory attacks. The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and prosecutions. UNSCR 1267 requires such controls. Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered during investigations. However, the Government of Indonesia has yet to demonstrate the political will to implement UNSCR ¶1267. USAID promoted capacity-building to the Financial Crimes Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK) and related GOI agencies through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project (FCPP),a multi-year program, now concluded, which provided technical advisors and policy support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and credible regime against money laundering and terrorism finance. FCPP assistance included the drafting of a National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy adopted by the President in 2007, with DOJ/OPDAT to develop a comprehensive asset forfeiture law (which is still under way with USDOJ),and certification of GOI officials as anti-money-laundering specialists and fraud examiners. Other donors are also providing assistance to PPATK. The unit receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash Transaction Reports. The number of STRs PPATK received increased from 10 per month in 2002 to over 811 per month in 2008 (through October 2008),and these reports led to 19 prosecutions during the period. One of these had a terrorist component, and the strengthened financial oversight strengthened the tracking of potential terrorist financial transactions. The Indonesian National Police (INP) continued their program to "deradicalize" convicted terrorists. The program identified individuals who might be open to more moderate teachings, with the intent that INP officials work with them in prison. The program focused on providing spiritual support to the men and on providing modest financial support to their families. By providing this support, the police gained the trust of the men and received information about terrorist networks. The program aimed to reduce terrorist recruitment inside prisons. Based upon the success of the INP de-radicalization program, the Department of Corrections also decided to undertake a prisoner de-radicalization program. The Directorate General for prisons proposed the creation of a set of guidelines for the handling of terrorist prisoners to improve security and surveillance of the prisoners and encourage prisoners to not resort to violence to carry out their religious beliefs. While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been impressive and its capacity to fight terrorism within its borders has improved steadily, continued vigilance is needed. The arrests in Palembang and North Jakarta demonstrate that militant networks remain partially intact and that groups continue to stockpile explosives for potential operations. That said, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a safe haven in Indonesia. As more gains are made in the Philippines' counterterrorism efforts, a small number of Indonesian militants in the Philippines may try to return to Indonesia. Malaysian JI operative, and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, who is suspected of involvement in every anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002, remains at large. - End text. ¶3. (U) Mission point of contact for this report is Poloff Kate Rebholz (RebholzTK@state.gov or RebholzTK@state.sgov.gov). HEFFERN