IRAN--INDONESIA INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001945 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, S/SANAC, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/IR, ISN, ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW) NSC FOR D WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP IAEA ID IR SUBJECT: IRAN--INDONESIA INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED OVER NUCLEAR ISSUE REF: A. STATE 120288 ¶B. JAKARTA 1902 Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesia is increasingly frustrated with Iran's continued intransigence on the nuclear issue, GOI contacts told us in response to Ref A demarche. Indonesia supports the P5 1's dual track efforts to engage Iran. While supporting Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, the GOI shares our concerns regarding Tehran's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA obligations. Indonesia agrees that IRAN should accept the international community's offer of assistance for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor and will advise IRAN to do so. These factors create an opportunity to deepen our cooperation with Indonesia on this issue. Maintaining high-level dialogue on nonproliferation issues is essential to securing this cooperation. However, any Indonesian efforts on this issue will likely remain in the background given some domestic sympathy for Iran. END SUMMARY. INDONESIA SUPPORTS P5 1 APPROACH ¶2. (C) Per Ref A instructions, Mission officers discussed the status of P5 1 efforts to address Iran's nuclear program with key Indonesian government contacts. Pol/C raised the matter with Presidential foreign affairs advisor Astari Daenuwy on November 23 while poloff discussed the issue with Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director for International Security and Disarmament Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),that same day. We emphasized the United States' commitment to engaging IRAN based on the principle of mutual respect and the USG's full engagement in the P5 1 effort. We underscored the dual track nature of the approach, which includes both engagement and pressure if IRAN does not engage constructively. We noted that Iran's response has so far been disappointing and that the international community should be prepared to increase pressure on Iran. ¶3. (C) Indonesian officials reiterated strong support for the P5 1 approach. Rachmianto told poloff that Indonesia welcomed President Obama's willingness to engage IRAN and to seek a better relationship should the Iranians take positive steps regarding their nuclear program. This approach, Rachmianto noted, made it much more difficult for IRAN to justify refusing to meet its nonproliferation obligations. He agreed that the international community must consider increasing the pressure on Iran. However, Indonesian officials hoped that such a step would not be necessary. TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR--IRAN SHOULD RESPOND ¶4. (C) Turning to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),poloff noted that the P5 1 had offered IRAN a way forward--international support for refueling the TRR. Despite Iran's continued noncompliance with multiple UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA requirements, the United States, France and Russia made this offer as a confidence building measure. However, poloff noted, IRAN has so far failed to accept the deal. This fact cast doubt on Iran's willingness for a genuine engagement with the P5 1. ¶5. (C) Rachmianto said Indonesia agreed that IRAN should accept the offer to refuel the TRR and GOI officials would look for opportunities to "advise" their Iranian counterparts to do so. He agreed that the offer undermined Iran's claim that the United States and its partners were attempting to halt Iran's legitimate nuclear activities. Indonesia, he added, supported Iran's right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. IAEA REPORT AND THE QOM ENRICHMENT FACILITY ¶6. (C) We also discussed with our GOI contacts the IAEA Director General's November 16 report on Iran, particularly regarding the Qom enrichment facility. The report, poloff noted to Rachmianto, documented significant areas where Tehran has not complied with IAEA requirements. It pointed out that Iran's tardiness in informing the IAEA of the Qom JAKARTA 00001945 002 OF 002 facility further reduced the international community's confidence in Iran's intentions. Finally, the IAEA called attention to Iran's continued enrichment activities in defiance of multiple UNSC resolutions. ¶7. (C) Indonesia is concerned about Iran's failure to comply with the IAEA, Rachmianto explained. The Qom enrichment facility was, he noted, further cause for concern. Indonesia fully agreed that IRAN must adhere to all UNSC resolutions regarding its nuclear program. Rachmianto noted that Indonesia's vote for UNSCR 1835 (2008) demonstrated Jakarta's commitment on this issue. (Note: Indonesia was a non-permanent member of the UNSC 2007-2008). He said that Indonesia would discuss the matter with other Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members in advance of the next IAEA Board of Governors' meeting. However, Rachmianto stopped short of promising any specific action in that forum. ENGAGING INDONESIA FURTHER ¶8. (C) Indonesian frustration with Iran's continued intransigence is clearly growing. This factor, coupled with strong GOI support for the United States' willingness to engage Iran, creates an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation on this issue. Deepening our high-level nonproliferation dialogue with IRAN will be critical to securing such cooperation. The recent visit of Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (S/SANAC) Robert Einhorn and Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk was an important step in launching that dialogue (See Ref B). U/S Burns' planned December trip to Indonesia offers the next opportunity to press senior GOI officials on this matter. However, some elements of the public in Muslim-majority Indonesia retain some sympathy for Iran. As a result, the GOI will likely prefer to remain in the background on this matter. HUME