NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001902 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, S/SANAC, ISN, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP NSC FOR D WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 TAGS: PREL MNUC IAEA NPT ID SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA -- VISIT OF SANAC EINHORN AND AMB. BURK Classified By: DCM Ted Osius, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During their November 4-6 visit to Jakarta, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (S/SANAC) Einhorn and Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Amb. Burk urged their Indonesian counterparts to try to encourage Iran and North Korea to respond positively to recent U.S. actions and explained American positions on a wide range of nonproliferation and disarmament issues. They also expressed hope that their visit would be the start of a sustained bilateral dialogue. GOI interlocutors described their efforts to encourage positive movement by Iran and the DPRK. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Cont'd): Presidential Spokesman Dino Djalal said President Yudhoyono saw "no strong reason why" Indonesia had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and said Indonesia could ratify in advance of the United States, earlier than its previously stated commitment to do so immediately after the United States. Based on his experience during a presidential visit to Iran last year, Djalal described Ayatollah Khamenei as the key to a solution on the Iran nuclear issue, given Ahmadinejad's absolute deference to Khamenei, but noted that Khamenei appears isolated from information. ASEAN Secretary General Surin made a push for the U.S. to support and sign the protocols for the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Parliamentary and DEPLU representatives requested further information on export controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). SANAC Einhorn said the USG would provide that in the near future. END SUMMARY. U.S. OVERVIEW OF NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT POLICY ¶3. (C) Throughout their meetings in Jakarta, visiting SANAC Robert Einhorn and Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Amb. Susan Burk stressed the value of deepening U.S.-Indonesia cooperation on nonproliferation and disarmament in the context of the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership. They noted that the United States and Indonesia had often taken opposing positions in the past on these issues. SANAC Einhorn said he hoped that would change under President Obama, noted the administration's view that nonproliferation and disarmament are integrally related, and reviewed its efforts to reinvigorate both nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. The inclusive approach of the USG recognizes the important role that major non-weapons states such as Indonesia can play. Indonesia is particularly important, as a founding member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and now as a member of the G-20. SANAC Einhorn said he hoped his visit would not be a one-off engagement on nuclear issues, but rather the start of continued bilateral dialogue and engagement, particularly in the run-up to the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon). ¶4. (C) SANAC Einhorn made clear that North Korea must commit to complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through irreversible steps, adding that full implementation of UNSCR 1874 was also essential. He urged Indonesia to press Iran to fulfill its NPT, IAEA, and UNSC obligations, including cooperation in IAEA inspections at the newly revealed Qom enrichment facility, and noted that the Obama administration had &extended its hand8 for engagement and remains open to the possibility of greater engagement if Iran took positive steps. SANAC Einhorn stressed to his Indonesian interlocutors that the American goal for Iran was not regime change, but rather a change in its behavior. He noted that Indonesia could play a useful role in encouraging Iran to move forward with the IAEA-sponsored proposal to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) including agreement that it send most of its current stocks of low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for further enrichment and fabrication for eventual return for use in the TRR. Iran,s agreement to move forward would be a &win-win8 and would serve as a confidence building measure to reduce anxiety over its accumulation of nuclear material. ASIAN AFFAIRS -- DPRK AND IRAN JAKARTA 00001902 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) At a November 5 meeting, Amb. T.M. Hamzah Thayeb, Director General for Asia Pacific and African Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs said the GOI saw nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea as destabilizing and thus bad for Indonesian interests. He noted that Indonesia would "persevere" in continuing in its efforts to persuade both Pyongyang and Tehran. On the DPRK, Thayeb acknowledged the lack of progress, despite the urgings of all concerned parties, for the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. Indonesia had made it clear to the DPRK that Indonesia opposed the acquisition by Asian countries of a nuclear weapons capability, as it would spur an arms race that would not be beneficial for the Asia-Pacific region. Thayeb commented that the lack of a peace treaty ending the Korean War had led the DPRK not to trust the other parties and wondered if that was the reason for the DPRK,s unwillingness to denuclearize. Einhorn noted that the United States is prepared to pursue a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula but that it could only be finalized with complete and verifiable denuclearization. ¶6. (C) Thayeb said that Indonesia had told Iran that Tehran must comply with its NPT commitments and IAEA safeguards obligations but that Iran continued to view acquisition of a nuclear program as a means of gaining international respect. Muhammed Asruchin, Director for South and Central Asia, said that the Iran nuclear issue may best be solved in the framework of a comprehensive peace for the Middle East. He noted that there was a great deal of public support in Indonesia for Iran, due to Muslim solidarity and what the public viewed as the American double standard for Iran and Israel. Einhorn responded that Israel was not the only or major motivation for Iran,s nuclear program and that postponing a solution on the Iran nuclear issue until peace could be achieved in the region would result in missing the opportunity to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. SPECIAL ENVOY ON NORTH KOREA ¶7. (C) At a November 6 meeting, Special Envoy for North Korea Amb. Nana Sutresna said the North Korean ambassador in Jakarta continued to meet with him about the possibility of a future visit to Pyongyang, possibly by the end of the year, though Sutresna was still unclear as to the purpose of a visit. The GOI had also yet to reach a decision about the utility of such a visit. Sutresna said his previous multiple visits had not achieved much. Despite his recent efforts in Jakarta to encourage the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks, his North Korean interlocutors continued to maintain that the DPRK nuclear issue can only be resolved via bilateral talks with the United States. Sutresna believed that the DPRK,s ultimate objective in seeking bilateral talks with the United States was an assurance that the Kim Jong-il regime would survive even after denuclearization. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DINO DJALAL ¶8. (C) At a November 5 meeting, Presidential Spokesman Dino Djalal said President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) welcomed the renewed leadership of the USG on nonproliferation and disarmament, particularly highlighting the GOI,s positive impact that President Obama,s Prague speech made in Jakarta. Djalal noted that, although the GOI has publicly committed to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately after the United States ratifies, SBY is unconvinced that Indonesia needs to wait even that long. Accordingly, the President has made Indonesian ratification an early priority for his second administration, which began October 21, even in the absence of prior American ratification. Djalal said it was realistic to expect the treaty could be ratified within the next year as part of the new Parliamentary session. SANAC Einhorn welcomed this possibility and said that early Indonesian ratification could be very helpful in building momentum for ratification by the U.S. Senate and could also help spur other states to ratify the treaty. ¶9. (C) SANAC Einhorn noted that SBY's presence at the Nuclear Security Summit would also be of great value, as the JAKARTA 00001902 003 OF 005 leader of a country that has suffered terrorist attacks, has a nuclear research program, and has a history of engagement on nonproliferation issues. Djalal said SBY was aware of the invitation but would not be able to make a decision on attending until closer to the date. ¶10. (C) Djalal discussed SBY's visit to Iran last year, noting that SBY reserved comment on the nuclear issue until his private meeting with Ahmadinejad, at which SBY urged him to take the matter very seriously. SBY told Ahmadinejad that Iran could not take Indonesian support for granted, given that the GOI would only back Iran so long as its nuclear program was for peaceful uses only. SBY was willing to speak frankly to Iranian leaders and told Ahmadinejad that you "can,t play around with the IAEA." Djalal said that at his meeting with SBY, Ahmadinejad returned a number of times to the theme of reclaiming the "lost Islamic glory" that was "stolen" by the West. Djalal recounted a separate meeting between SBY and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that he and Ahmadinejad also attended. Khamenei expressed similar strong views about the West "robbing" the Islamic world. Throughout that meeting Ahmadinejad did not speak, and "his body language was like a child" according to Djalal. Djalal said it seemed that Khamenei, who was treated as a "demigod," was virtually in solitary confinement due to his apparent isolation from outside information. Djalal assessed that any nuclear agreement with the West would have to be "blessed" by Khamenei, who would have to be assured that it was a "good deal." He added that many governments in the region were "very nervous" about Iran and committed to again raise our concern with SBY. CHAIRMAN AND DEPUTY OF DPR COMMISSION ONE ¶11. (C) At a November 6 meeting hosted by DCM, MP Sidarto Danusubroto, Vice Chairman of Parliamentary Commission One (foreign affairs) said he would lead a delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians to Iran the week of November 9 for an Asian Parliamentary Assembly conference. In response to SANAC Einhorn's explanation of the issue, he said he would try to advocate on behalf of the IAEA proposal on the TRR to his Majlis counterparts. MP and Commission One Chairman Kemal Stamboel suggested that if Iranians were afraid they might not get their fuel back, Indonesia could consider serving as a third country depository for Iran's LEU "escrow." ¶12. (C) Danusubroto said Commission One had yet to take up the matter of CTBT ratification in the current session, which just began in late October. Kemal said he believed it would not be difficult for Indonesia to ratify the CTBT shortly after the United States and took on board SANAC Einhorn's suggestion that Parliament could pursue ratification in advance of the United States. ¶13. (C) Einhorn explained the need for Indonesia to enact comprehensive export controls as proliferators sought "weak links" in the region where they could set up front companies for the illicit procurement and transshipment of controlled and sensitive dual-use technologies. Danusubroto said that, although Commission One does not have the lead on the issue, both Commission One and the Trade Commission would appreciate the opportunity to learn more on the subject. Similarly, Danusubroto requested information on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and how it corresponds to the framework of international law. Einhorn said the USG would be happy to provide information on both subjects to Commission One. ASEAN VIEWS ¶14. (C) At a November 6 meeting, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan praised the Obama approach to Southeast Asia and nonproliferation as a "new beginning" and called for forward movement on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Specifically, he asked that the United States sign the protocols for the treaty. Surin said the support of the nuclear weapons states for SEANWFZ would strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime, and as that regime strengthened, the treaty could become a useful tool to JAKARTA 00001902 004 OF 005 deal with potential nonproliferation violations, such as in Burma. Einhorn replied the United States was reviewing its policy on nuclear-free zones generally; it was the goal of the United States to support countries which wished to develop such zones. The P-4 (France, Russia, the UK, and the United States) had asked ASEAN states to respond to its concerns over SEANWFZ in a 2002 letter. The P-4 were still awaiting a response, and the ball was in ASEAN,s court, but we were willing to work together to move forward. Einhorn also noted that, among the ASEAN states, only Singapore and Indonesia had ratified the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements and urged Surin to press the remaining ASEAN members to do so. Surin replied that he expected progress on the matter, since ASEAN leaders had already made a political commitment for their nations to sign. ¶15. (C) Einhorn suggested that ASEAN consider establishing an ASEAN-wide sensitive goods export control list along the lines of that created by the European Union. Additionally, it may be useful if the ASEAN Secretariat developed the expertise to deal on a regional basis with fuel cycle questions and other issues related to the control of nuclear materials as member countries begin to build up their nuclear infrastructure. Surin took Einhorn,s suggestions on board but recommended that the P-5 countries jointly propose these efforts, which could be endorsed during the Intersessional Meeting (ISM) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF ISM could then institutionalize the concept. Einhorn further urged that ASEAN states join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),pointing out that only Cambodia had joined to date. An ASEAN &group endorsement8 of the GICNT could be useful. NPT AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES ¶16. (C) At a November 6 meeting with Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director of the DEPLU Directorate for International Security and Disarmament, and Bunyan Saptomo, Director of the Directorate of North and Central America, Amb. Burk laid out American priorities for strengthening the global nonproliferation regime at the upcoming NPT RevCon. Amb. Burk said the United States wanted to see a balanced review, focusing on all three pillars -- nonproliferation, arms control, and peaceful use of nuclear technology. The United States had already demonstrated its recommitment to disarmament, particularly through talks on a renewed START treaty with Russia. On nonproliferation, it was important to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, seek greater adherence to the Additional Protocol (AP),and improve compliance. There was a particular need, she noted, to address abuse of the withdrawal process, which would require NPT parties to develop a response in cases where a party violated the treaty and then announced its intention to withdraw, as was the case with North Korea. The United States was not seeking to change Article 10, but hoped that the RevCon would reestablish a subsidiary body on Article 10 issues, and Burk urged Indonesian support for such a move. She also expected a "rich debate" on peaceful uses and said the United States would like the RevCon to encourage the IAEA,s work on fuel banks and assurances. ¶17. (C) Rachmianto agreed with the importance of the three pillars and was pleased with the Obama administration's balanced approach, which had created "new momentum" on these issues for the first time in a decade. He concurred on the need for strengthened IAEA safeguards and greater adherence to the Additional Protocol, but he said that some Middle East countries were sensitive to any movement toward making the Additional Protocol mandatory. For the GOI, he added, Article 10 was very clear -- every state has the right to withdraw -- although accountability can be addressed within the existing framework of the NPT. Indonesia could "live with" an Article 10 subsidiary body, but we would have to "be cautious" on creating conditions for withdrawal. Einhorn noted that IAEA Director General ElBaradei has said that he needed adherence to the AP to accomplish the IAEA,s job of determining if undeclared nuclear activities were occurring. He urged Indonesia to take the lead in seeking ASEAN-wide adherence to the AP, which would be a huge contribution to the NPT RevCon and could also help to allay regional and JAKARTA 00001902 005 OF 005 global concerns about Burma,s nuclear ambitions. ¶18. (C) On the Middle East resolution within the NPT RevCon, Rachmianto said that addressing all three pillars would not be sufficient in 2010 if there was not progress on the Middle East issue. He said that NAM countries were seeking a standing committee to deal with the issue and the dynamic among NAM countries on this topic had changed since 2005, particularly singling out Syria. Einhorn pushed back, stating that no single country should be allowed to hijack the NPT RevCon because there was too much at stake. Indonesia could help by asking Egypt, the key backer of the Middle East resolution, to put the issue in perspective. ¶19. (C) In response to a question from SANAC Einhorn regarding NAM perspectives on Iran, Rachmianto said Iran has held that it was not obligated to notify the IAEA about the covert Qom nuclear facility, since Iran had only signed, but not ratified, the Additional Protocol. He added that he expected Iran would maintain that position in NAM discussions. Einhorn pointed out that it is Iran's original NPT and IAEA comprehensive safeguards obligations, particularly under Code 3.1 modified and not the Additional Protocol, that are relevant in this case. ¶20. (C) Rachmianto said the Indonesian National Atomic Energy Agency (BATEN) was studying fuel cycle proposals but that some countries in the region were still allergic to studying those issues within the IAEA framework. Indonesia was open to these suggestions, however, and had asked its technical experts to review the various proposals. ¶21. (C) Turning to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT),Einhorn requested that Indonesia encourage Pakistan to engage in negotiations rather than continue to create procedural roadblocks. Rachmianto said that Indonesia understood the importance of this but had already tried to persuade Pakistan without success. ¶22. (C) Rachmianto noted that the GOI has already created an interagency team to draft the documents required for CTBT ratification, but added that it needed to make Commission One members more aware of the issue. Rachmianto said he understood the importance of having a comprehensive export control law, but the GOI lacks a sense of urgency because Indonesia does not produce or export sensitive dual use goods. Regarding PSI, he said Indonesia continued to have concerns about interdiction and liability issues. Einhorn explained that PSI allowed high seas interdiction only in accordance with international and national laws and offered that the USG would be happy to provide further information, either in documentary form or by a visit of experts to Jakarta. Rachmianto said efforts on behalf of a collective ASEAN statement on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism were still in early stages. In addition, Indonesia remained willing to host a regional workshop on UNSCR 1540. ¶23. (U) This message was approved by SANAC Einhorn. HUME