INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY--REALIZING THE POTENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001879 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP NSC FOR D.WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV SUBJECT: INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY--REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO'S SECOND TERM REF: A. JAKARTA 1788 ¶B. JAKARTA 1782 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ted Osius, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As he begins his second term in office, which began on October 20, President Yudhoyono seeks an expanded global role for Indonesia. He wants his country to bridge the gap between developing and developed countries in the G20. He also seeks a role building understanding between Muslims and the West and bridging the democratic divide. Yudhoyono's vision of Indonesia's global role presents opportunities for greater cooperation on critical foreign policy priorities, including Afghanistan, climate change, Burma, nonproliferation and Middle East peace. To realize this potential, we have to overcome the ingrained habits of an obstreperous bureaucracy, fickle public opinion, and a potentially unhelpful legislature. A strategic vision for U.S.-Indonesia relations and regular dialogue at all levels of government--key elements of our developing Comprehensive Partnership--are essential to make the most of this opportunity. END SUMMARY. SBY'S VISION--INDONESIA AS A GLOBAL BRIDGE ¶2. (C) President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) seeks an expanded global leadership role for Indonesia by emphasizing the country's ability to bridge international divides. Southeast Asia and ASEAN will remain the core of Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia is the largest member of ASEAN and sits at a strategic fulcrum between India and China. Yudhoyono understands that this gives Indonesia an opportunity to serve as a bridge between these two Asian giants and the region's medium and smaller powers. ¶3. (C) Yudhoyono is looking for leadership opportunities beyond Asia. The G20 will be one venue for that leadership. There Yudhoyono hopes that Indonesia will serve as a bridge between the developed and developing world on issues like climate change. Yudhoyono also sees Indonesia--a Muslim-majority democracy with a strong tradition of religious liberty--as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West. Finally, Indonesia's democracy is increasingly shaping the country's foreign policy as Yudhoyono seeks to bridge the global democratic divide. STEADY LEADERSHIP AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ¶4. (C) Newly appointed Foreign Minister Marty Natelegawa is well suited to implement Yudhoyono's vision. (See Ref B for a full profile) Natelegawa seems set to continue the moderate and pragmatic foreign policy leadership of his mentor, former FM Hassan Wirajuda. He brings strong experience in both the bilateral and multilateral spheres having served as Ambassador to the UK and PermRep to the UN in New York. Natelegawa has a well-deserved reputation as an advocate of fair minded and inclusive approach to diplomacy, including on controversial matters like Israel-Palestinian issues. ¶5. (C) The new FM will manage a bureaucracy of varying quality. Many senior Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) officials are also Wirajuda protgs and share his pragmatic and business-like approach. They are close to Natelegawa and will likely work well with him. Other DEPLU officials--especially those in the middle ranks--remain imbued with the vaguely anti-Western worldview of the Non-Aligned Movement. Their first impulse is usually to oppose our initiatives, especially in multilateral contexts. They are also inclined toward recalcitrance on issues like protocol, privileges and immunities, and other formal matters. POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS FROM THE LEGISLATURE ¶6. (C) The Indonesian Parliament (DPR) could constrain the Yudhoyono government's action on some sensitive issues. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)--Indonesia's largest Islamic-oriented political party--has gained control of the parliamentary committee responsible for foreign affairs and defense. Committee chairman Kemal Stamboel, a successful business man turned politician, represents a moderate and pragmatic face of the party. (See Ref A for a full profile.) The U.S.-educated Stamboel has taken largely positive positions on climate change, anticorruption and other issues important to us. However, Stamboel faces a PKS base that can be quite conservative when Muslim sensitivities are involved. This could limit the Yudhoyono administration's flexibility dealing with matters like the Israeli-Palestinian JAKARTA 00001879 002 OF 003 conflict--especially in the event of new Israeli military action--or Iran's nuclear program. KEY OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES ¶7. (C) SBY's next five years in office offer the possibility of significant cooperation in several important areas of U.S. foreign policy: -- AFGHANISTAN: As part of his interest in building ties between the Muslim world and the West, President Yudhoyono wants Indonesia to play a helpful role in Afghanistan. Indonesia could be an important partner helping the GOA address the internal security challenges it faces. As a first step, Mission is exploring possible Indonesian training for the Afghan police. Success in this initiative could lead to other Indonesian support for Afghanistan. -- CLIMATE CHANGE: President Yudhoyono's pledge of a 26/41 percent emission reduction target reflects his desire to lead developing countries on climate change. The Indonesia-U.S. Climate partnership currently under USG interagency review will support Indonesia's leadership aspirations on this matter. -- BURMA: Indonesian leaders are increasingly frustrated at the lack of democratic progress in Burma and have hailed the new U.S. approach of engagement with the Burmese authorities. This provides an opportunity to engage the GOI as the leader of ASEAN on this issue. Indonesia's experience of democratic reform and success resolving internal conflicts like Aceh and Papua can be a model for Burma. -- NONPROLIFERATION: Indonesia has long been an important voice on nonproliferation in the Non-Aligned Movement. President Obama's renewed emphasis on strengthening arms control regimes and working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons has created greater space to cooperate with Indonesia in this area. Indonesia has voiced steadily stronger support for P5 1 efforts to address Iran's nuclear program. The GOI's commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in response to the USG's promise to do so is an important step cementing this cooperation. With the right approach, Indonesia could help us achieve some of our key nonproliferation goals. However, given domestic sensitivities, the GOI is unlikely to support heightened sanctions or other coercive measures aimed at Iran. -- MIDDLE EAST PEACE: Indonesia has supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by working to build the capacity of the Palestinian Authority. We may see more of this in the coming years. Jakarta may also show some flexibility in dealing with Israel, as in the GOI's recent decision to issue a visa to an Israeli tennis player for a tournament in Bali. However, the GOI is unlikely to make any overt moves toward improved relations with Tel Aviv absent significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Any new Israeli military action toward the Palestinians would trigger significant public opposition in Indonesia--as it did in December 2008-January 2009--and thus limit the GOI's flexibility. SOME ROUGH PATCHES ¶8. (C) We can expect some pitfalls amid the promise. For example, progress on establishing the Indonesia-United States Center for Biomedical and Public Health Research (IUC) has slowed due to intense politically-motivated attacks on the new Minister of Health, who has been accused of being too close to the United States. Indonesia still regularly votes with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in UN votes, as it recently did regarding the Goldstone Report on the conflict in Gaza. These difficulties will not disappear overnight. MAKING THE MOST OF THE OPPORTUNITY ¶9. (C) An overarching strategic vision and vigorous senior-level USG engagement with Indonesia is necessary to realize the full potential of these opportunities for cooperation. We will need to surmount the deeply ingrained habits of Indonesia's foreign affairs bureaucracy and legislature. We will also have to deal with public opinion that is not always sympathetic to American positions. The developing Indonesia-United States Comprehensive Partnership is the key mechanism to do this. As we develop the Partnership, we should reach agreement on a set of shared JAKARTA 00001879 003 OF 003 strategic principles. It is also critical that we use the Partnership to institutionalize a broad range of regular bilateral consultations from the ministerial level on down. OSIUS