ELITE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE -- A WAY FORWARD ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001466 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT, PM, INL, DS/IP/EAP, DS/ITA/EAP, NSC FOR J.BADER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM ASEC ID SUBJECT: ELITE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE -- A WAY FORWARD ON VETTING REF: JAKARTA 1232 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The USG's current training policy toward Mobile Brigade is counterproductive. Prohibiting this key law enforcement element from receiving ICITAP training prevents members from learning about INL-funded DOJ/ICITAP-developed use-of-force policy and thus take steps to overcome the group's past history. Mobile Brigade has undertaken internal reforms, is providing members with human rights training, and has played a critical role in protecting American citizens. A number of human rights groups support the training of Mobile Brigade. Mission advocates vetting Mobile Brigade members as we would any other police or military entity so as to ensure that no one trained with USG funds has committed human rights abuses. END SUMMARY. HISTORY OF USG POLICY TOWARD BRIMOB ¶3. (SBU) The Department of State has a mixed policy regarding engagement with Mobile Brigade, also known as Brimob. Although some U.S. entities are permitted to train Mobile Brigade, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE)funding through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) may not be used to support Mobile Brigade training. ¶4. (SBU) In 2003, subsequent to a GAO audit that criticized the USG's inconsistent vetting practices in Indonesia, INL set a policy against training Mobile Brigade. The INCLE-funded training was halted, not because members of Mobile Brigade had been accused of human rights violations at that time, but because prior to 2003, vetting was inconsistently carried out on Mobile Brigade officers, allowing some officers who had previously engaged in human rights offenses to be trained. In an effort to ensure that no human rights abusers were trained with INCLE funding, INL established a policy that prevented training Mobile Brigade as a part of the INL program. ¶5. (SBU) However, updates to ICITAP's vetting procedures have since been implemented, bringing the program's vetting regime fully in line with Leahy Law requirements. ICITAP vets 100 percent of all training recipients, ensuring that no human rights abusers receive USG-funded training. As a result, the policy preventing training of Mobile Brigade should be reconsidered. Mobile Brigade is under the authority of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and subject to civilian laws. BRIMOB'S RECORD ¶6. (SBU) Mobile Brigade has been criticized by some human rights NGOs for lack of accountability in alleged human rights abuses. NGOs often cite the acquittal by the Makassar Permanent Human Rights Court in 2006 of a Papua Brimob Commander in Abepura, Papua, as evidence of lack of accountability. The court in this case determined that the incident did not rise to the level of a crime against humanity. Many of the incidents provided in NGO reports fail to meet the standard of gross violations of human rights as defined in Section 502 B (D) of the Foreign Assistance Act. Most of the allegations are based on inappropriate or excessive use of force, which are not instances of gross human rights violations. ¶7. (SBU) Although more needs to be done, the INP and the Attorney General's Office (AGO) have taken steps to enforce accountability. The following are a selection of incidents for which the GOI has taken steps toward accountability. Six Mobile Brigade officers, who in April 2008 were accused of beating a university student, were sentenced to two months in prison. In 2007, a Mobile Brigade officer was sentenced to two years in jail for the 2006 killing of a farmer (these sentences are in line with Indonesian practice). NGO SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING ¶8. (SBU) Some human rights groups in Papua have endorsed USG training for Mobile Brigade. Rev. Budi Hernawan, Director of the Jayapura Catholic Diocese Office for Peace and Justice, told us that such training would be valuable. Hernawan assessed that police leaders in Papua were genuinely JAKARTA 00001466 002 OF 003 committed to improving respect for human rights. However, their capacity to do so remained limited. U.S. training, including human rights training, could help address that deficit, according to Hernawan. Theo Hesegem, director of the Law Enforcement and Human Rights Advocacy Network in Wamena concurred. His organization provides human rights training to the Indonesian police--including Mobile Brigade--and he has encouraged the USG to do the same. (Note: Human rights training is covered in the DOJ/ICITAP developed use-of-force policy and was recently enacted in the INP's human rights regulations.) ¶9. (SBU) Other foreign governments, who do not have the same restrictions, have been able to train Mobile Brigade. The Australians are about to begin a program to enhance human rights awareness through Kemitraan (Partnership for Governance Reform),an NGO dedicated to building prosperity through good governance principles and practices. UNHCR also provided similar training to Mobile Brigade from 2001 to ¶2003. The New Zealand Embassy is running a community policing project in Indonesia, which has a focus on Papua, and involves some members of Mobile Brigade. U.S. SHOULD REENGAGE MOBILE BRIGADE ¶10. (SBU) Department policy prohibits almost all engagement with the Mobile Brigade. The involvement of some Mobile Brigade personnel in past human rights violations in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua should not prevent our working with this critical unit now. The Mobile Brigade has undertaken significant reforms--including human rights training for all personnel--since Indonesia became a democracy. Moreover, the majority of Mobile Brigade personnel were not even members of the force when the previous violations took place. Mobile Brigade played a critical role in protecting American Citizens in the aftermath of the July 17 bombings in Jakarta and in responding to the series of shootings at the Freeport-McMoRan mining operation in Papua. The United States already trains the small number of Mobile Brigade personnel who are responsible for Embassy security. ¶11. (SBU) ICITAP would like to utilize INCLE funding to train Mobile Brigade in three critical areas: INL-funded DOJ/ICITAP-developed use-of-force policy socialization, Standard Emergency Management Systems (SEMS) for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and pandemic assistance (including pandemic avian influenza),and environmental and resource protection. ¶12. (SBU) Training in use-of-force policy socialization is consistent with the recommendations made by most NGOs that have been critical of the GOI handling of accountability with Mobile Brigade, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Standard Emergency Management Systems training and pandemic assistance training would enhance the capability of Mobile Brigade to fulfill their core mission of providing emergency response. Preventing environmental and natural resource crimes is a Department priority for curbing transnational crime and trafficking, and providing training to Mobile Brigade would only enhance our ability to fulfill this important mandate. ¶13. (SBU) For the past four years, ICITAP has been 100 percent Leahy Act compliant, without exception. The training of Mobile Brigade personnel would not represent a departure from Mission's current vetting practices. Indeed, the structure of Mobile Brigade facilitates the vetting process. Unlike military units, Mobile Brigade is organized in discrete units, to which Mobile Brigade personnel return after deployment. If allowed to train Mobile Brigade personnel with INCLE funding, we would vet both the individual and his/her unit, which would add an additional layer of vetting to the already thorough State Department policy that we follow in vetting foreign security forces for U.S. training. ENGAGEMENT -- THE WAY FORWARD ¶14. (SBU) The vast majority of human rights allegations leveled against Mobile Brigade revolve around excessive or inappropriate use of force. With INL funding, DOJ/ICITAP developed a use-of-force policy that has been adopted by the INP. However, this policy has not been socialized among all Mobile Brigade officers. ICITAP, using INCLE funding, would JAKARTA 00001466 003 OF 003 like to train Mobile Brigade on this use-of-force Policy. We believe this non-lethal training would enhance understanding of and respect for human rights. The other areas of engagement with Mobile Brigade would involve providing nonlethal training in emergency management, pandemic assistance and combating illegal logging, all areas of concern for the U.S. government. HUME