INTENSIVE POLICE OPERATIONS STRIKE BLOW AGAINST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001318 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT, DS, CA NSC FOR J. BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINS ASEC ID SUBJECT: INTENSIVE POLICE OPERATIONS STRIKE BLOW AGAINST TERRORISTS REF: A. OP CENTER - JAKARTA/J.NOVAK 08-09-09 TELECON ¶B. JAKARTA 1315 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: DCM Ted Osius, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Indonesian police operations against suspected terrorist safe houses in Central Java and on the outskirts of Jakarta, August 7-8, mark an important success in efforts to eliminate the terrorist threat posed by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) splinter group led by Noordin M. Top. Despite media reports that Top himself was killed in the Central Java raid, however, it looks likely that he remains on the run. While the raids damaged the capabilities of Top's organization, it remains capable of carrying out attacks. GOI contacts have underscored to us that they will continue to press the anti-terror effort hard. END SUMMARY. RAIDS IN CENTRAL JAVA AND NEAR JAKARTA ¶2. (S) Indonesian police carried out intensive counter-terrorist operations, August 7-8. As additional details emerge about the raids and their aftermath, doubts have emerged over whether terrorist leader Noordin M. Top was in fact killed. Indonesian and international media reported widely that Top, a Malaysian national and the apparent mastermind behind the July 17 bombings in Jakarta, was killed during a raid on a safe house in Temanggung, Central Java, by police counterterrorism squad Detachment-88. ¶3. (S) Indonesian officials have since been careful to tamp down on speculation that Top is dead, instead cautioning that it may take up to a week or more for DNA testing to prove conclusively whether the suspect killed was in fact Top. A number of analysts outside the government have stated publicly that they believe Top was not killed. Privately, Mission contacts within the police and elsewhere have told us there is a strong likelihood that the suspect killed was not Top but rather a separate suspect in the July 17 bombings. ¶4. (C) Central Java has been the site of a large-scale manhunt for Top and others suspected of involvement in the July 17 Jakarta bombings (ref b). The siege and gun battle in Temanggung in the heart of Central Java, followed the arrest in that city earlier in the day of the safe house's owner and two other alleged Noordin Top accomplices. Gunfire broke out late in the afternoon of July 17, and the ensuing siege, much of which was covered live on national television, lasted until the following morning. ¶5. (S) Concurrent with the siege in Temanggung, police raided a house in Bekasi on the outskirts of Jakarta, killing two suspects (identified as fugitive terrorists Air Setyawan and Eko Peyang, aka Eko Joko Sarjono) and seizing about 500 kg. of explosives. Indonesian police have stated publicly that the explosives were intended to be used in an attack on President Yudhoyono following the August 17 Independence Day ceremonies. Security has been raised at the Palace and the private residence of the President located in West Java as a cautionary measure. Privately, Mission contacts confirm that they believe there was a plot against the President, but that it remains unclear whether the plot was intended to be carried out at the Presidential Palace (as claimed by the GOI) or elsewhere. ¶6. (S) Details remain sketchy, but there were also other police operations in recent days, in addition to those in Central Java and Bekasi. GOI MAKES PROGRESS IN ANTI-TERROR EFFORT ¶7. (S) The GOI can take pride in the success of the raids. Regardless of whether Top was killed in the Temanggung siege, that operation--together with the police action in Bekasi--struck a significant blow against Top's JI splinter group. The police operations clearly disrupted his organization, heading off an apparent immediate threat against the President, and removing a large amount of explosives from the hands of terrorists. All that said, while the raids damaged the capabilities of Top's organization, it remains capable of carrying out attacks. ¶8. (S) In the meantime, the GOI effort to find and capture the rest of the terrorists moves forward. Astari Daenuwy, an international affairs assistant to the President, told Pol/C that the GOI "would not rest on its laurels, but was JAKARTA 00001318 002 OF 002 committed to ending the threat posed by the terrorists." Adnan Buyung Nasution, Legal Affairs Member of the President's Advisory Council, noted to poloff that the raids should also "provide psychological and political momentum" for Indonesian police counterterrorism forces, who in addition to coping with the July 17 bombings, had been facing public allegations of infighting in recent weeks. HUME