TURKEY-IRAN COMMERCE: "MOSTLY JUST NATURAL GAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000094 SIPDIS LONDON FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX; BERLIN FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX; BAKU FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX; BAGHDAD FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX AND XXXXXXXXXXXX; ASHGABAT FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 TAGS: ECON PREL PGOV ETRD IR TU SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAN COMMERCE: "MOSTLY JUST NATURAL GAS AND HOT AIR" REF: (A) 2007 ISTANBUL 104 (B) 2007 ISTANBUL 152 (C) 2007 ISTANBUL 557 (D) ISTANBUL 22 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Despite two recent trade-related Ministerial visits to Iran and accompanying press suggesting a rapidly expanding bilateral trade relationship, Turkish-Iranian Business Council contacts assured us that beyond Turkey's interest in Iranian natural gas, the trade relationship is "mostly hot air." Total trade between Turkey and Iran in 2008 reached USD 10.3 billion, of which over USD seven billion represented Turkish imports of Iranian hydrocarbons. Turkish exports to Iran accounted for USD two billion. GOT State Minister for Trade Tuzmen, visiting Iran in January, agreed with GOI counterparts on a target goal of USD 20 billion in bilateral trade by 2011, but our contacts called this a fantasy, predicting that bilateral trade would rise to no more than USD 12 billion in coming years. Our contacts said "2008's big success story," a Turkish consortium's purchase of one of Iran's largest petrochemical companies for USD 630 million, is "2009's big failure." They downplayed Iran's request to conduct all future trade in local currencies, but revealed that Iran wants to deposit USD 500 million in Bank Mellat's Istanbul branch to serve as a line of credit and admitted that if Iran can modernize its banking industry, closer bilateral banking ties could lead to more growth in bilateral trade. Our contacts also pointed to rivalries both among Turkish associations and within the Iranian bureaucracy that complicate trade negotiations, and dismissed the recent transportation MOU as "just a piece of paper for the ECO Summit." End Summary. Reports of Expanding Turkish-Iranian Trade ties? -------------- ¶2. (C) ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher met recently with XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect),the XXXXXXXXXXXX of the Turkish-Iranian Business Council, a trade promotion association under the auspices of Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK),and separately with XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect),the Turkish-Iranian Business Council's XXXXXXXXXXXX, to discuss recent signs of expanding trade contacts between Turkey and Iran. We took note of recent meetings between Turkish and Iranian trade delegations, including: -- The Istanbul-based "Developing Eight" (D8) Commissioners meeting in Istanbul on January 10, attended by a "large and energetic" Iranian delegation (according to a D8 contact). Press reports indicated the Iranian side called for closer banking cooperation with D8 member states including Turkey. -- Turkish Minister for Foreign Trade Tuzmen led a delegation of GOT and business officials, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, on a late January visit to Tehran and Mashhad. He met with Iranian Vice President Davoodi, Oil Minister Nozari, Commerce Minister Kazemi, Minister for Industry and Mines Nahavandian, and Agriculture Minister Eskandiari. Press reports indicated the two sides pledged to expand bilateral trade to USD 20 billion by 2011, and quoted Tuzmen claiming that his visit resulted in USD 250 to 300 million in bilateral trade deals signed. Local press also quoted Nahavandian saying that Iran wants to use Turkish ports like Trabzon as primary transit venues for importing European goods to Iran, replacing Persian Gulf ports like Dubai. According to Iranian press, Davoodi said both sides also discussed a proposal to conduct future trade only in Turkish Lira and/or Iranian Rials, rather than in dollars or Euro. -- The Governor of Iran's East Azerbaijan Province Ahmad Alireza Beighi, Chairman of the Iran-Turkey Trade Council Rahim Sadeghian, and Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Bahman Hosseinpour led a group of 120 Iranian officials and businessmen to a "trade promotion exchange" in Istanbul on February 24-26, hosted by Turkey's National Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (USIAD). DEIK Chairman Rona Yircali and Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) Chairman Cihat Vardan also attended, and welcomed prospects for expanded trade ties. -- Turkish Transport Minister Yildirim visited Tehran February 28-March 3 to chair a "Turkey-Iran Joint Commission on Transportation" meeting. He signed a transportation MOU with GOI Transport Minister Behbehani reportedly committing both sides to improving road, rail, and air links between Turkey and Iran, including a project that would link Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan by a single freight-train rail-line. Yildirim also met President Ahmadinejad. Turkish press quoted both of them as reaffirming the goal of reaching USD 20 billion in bilateral trade by the end of 2011. "Don't Believe the Press" -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite this spate of recent meetings, our Turkish-Iran Business Council contacts dismissed claims of a warming or expanding bilateral commercial relationship. Instead, they highlighted a number of economic and political challenges in dealing with the GOI and Iranian companies, and acknowledged that the global economic downturn was negatively impacting Turkish businesses' interest in Iranian markets. ¶4. (C) Trade volumes: XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that trade between Turkey and Iran had indeed expanded in 2008, reaching a total annual volume of USD 10.3 billion. However, more than USD seven billion of that was Turkey's import of Iranian hydrocarbons (mostly natural gas),while Turkish exports to Iran -- mostly iron and steel, tobacco products, textiles, and automotive parts -- accounted for only USD two billion. (Current trade figures are available at the GOT's statistical agency's website, www.tuik.tr, under the tab "VeriBilgi" and then "Ulkelere Gore Dis Ticarat".) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that Turkish imports of Iranian gas would increase in 2009-2010, but would be offset by declining bilateral trade in most other sectors. He speculated that bilateral trade would not reach more than USD 12 billion by 2011, "with 80-90% of that being hydrocarbon imports." ¶5. (C) A "showcase" deal gone bad: Our contacts said one of Trade Minister Tuzmen's objectives in his January trip to Tehran was to press the GOI to allow the Turkish petrochemical company Gubretas, which in February 2008 purchased Iran's one of largest petrochemical companies, Razi Petrochem, for USD 635 million (ref A),to restructure the deal. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Gubretas's Chairman, a member of DEIK, admits that the deal was a bad one, "losing tens of millions" of dollars in the past several months from lower-than-expected fertilizer prices, lower-than-expected production from Razi's aging factories, overly-leveraged balance sheets, and a GOI order in January that all petrochemicals sold through Iran's Mercantile Exchange (IME) must only be sold domestically rather than exported. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the January 2008 deal required Gubretas to assume Razi's USD 320 million in debt, to pay USD 125 million at the time of sale, and to deposit the remaining USD 510 million in an Iranian escrow account, to be paid in full in five years. Gubretas reportedly asked Tuzmen to press the GOI to give Razi permission to export its petrochemicals abroad and to ease restrictions on the use of Gubretas's escrow deposit, but so far Iran has refused. ¶6. (C) Pressed about the other reported outcomes of Tuzmen's Iran trip, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it had been "a waste of time." The USD 300 million in deals reportedly signed during Tuzmen's visit really only referred to the January 2009 bilateral trade volume (USD 426 million). XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed the press misunderstood what Tuzmen was saying, and he insisted that no significant deals were signed during that trip. He laughed off Nahavandian's claim that Trabzon could replace Dubai as Iran's primary transit port for European imports, noting that as a Trabzon native he was familiar with its port facilities, which would need massive expansion to rival Dubai's facilities or cut into Dubai's Iran trade. "We asked if Iran would help invest in port improvements at Trabzon, or highway improvements from Trabzon to Iran, they declined. I would love to see Trabzon become like Dubai, but it will never happen. Nahavandian just wants to talk about Trabzon to press the Emirates to stop fingerprinting Iranian businessmen." ¶7. (C) Dueling trade groups, murky Iranian rivalries: XXXXXXXXXXXX said DEIK was caught by surprise at the February visit of the East Azerbaijan province Governor and trade group. He noted that even though DEIK should act as the single contact for Iranian trade delegations, independent Turkish trade associations, including MUSIAD and USIAD, think they can deliver better bilateral trade deals for their members than DEIK, and thus reach out to Iran directly. "Iranian businessmen don't care who sponsors them; they just want a free trip to Turkey." When XXXXXXXXXXXX learned of that trade delegation he called USIAD and demanded a seat at the table, which USIAD grudgingly gave. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Iran's Ambassador to Turkey, Hosseinpour, and its Consul General in Istanbul, Yasini, argued about this trip, with Hosseinpour insisting that bilateral trade visits work only through DEIK, while Yasini (supported by Iranian-Turkish Business Council Chair Sadeghian) lobbied the GOI to work through MUSIAD (a Islamist oriented trade association),USIAD (a nationalist trade association) and others. XXXXXXXXXXXX also lamented the "murky power rivalries" within Iran, which Turkish companies find difficult to navigate. As one example, he cited a deal that a Turkish hotel chain wanted to buy some Iranian hotels in 2008, a deal supported by the Iranian MFA and Commerce Ministry. Somehow it ran afoul of the "Supreme Leader's Representative" to one of the ministries, and the deal died. "When that happens, it is not over politics or ideology, but always over who gets what cut from the deal." ¶8. (C) Banking expansion: Asked about the press reports of a proposal to use national currencies in bilateral trade, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Turkish businesses would never accept payments in Iranian Rials. He acknowledged that Iran had tabled a proposal under which it would deposit a sum of money ("maybe around USD 500 million") in Bank Mellat's Istanbul branch (ref D),as a line of credit for Iranian businesses importing Turkish goods, as well as for hard currency payments by the GOT for its hydrocarbon purchases. But the two sides disagree on key terms, including over the initial deposit. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Turkey proposed Iran make the full deposit using Euros from its foreign exchange reserves which would then be deposited in a Turkish Lira account, while Iran proposed making the deposit in Rials, which would be converted to Lira at a favorable rate. Iran also pressed for agreement to expand its banking presence in Turkey "to facilitate the arrangement," but Tuzmen declined. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us the proposal was "going nowhere" but he professed surprise when shown an Iranian Commerce and Industry press release reporting that Iran's Export Development Bank has already deposited an initial tranche of 50 million Euros into Bank Mellat's Istanbul branch for this purpose. XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that if Iran can modernize its banking industry, closer banking ties between Turkey and Iran could lead to significantly expanded bilateral trade. Next Steps: ECO Summit, Ahmadinejad's visit -------------- ¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX called the transportation MOU signed between Transport Ministers March 3 "just a piece of paper." He said Iran wants Turkey to finish constructing rail and ferry links that would allow Iran to send goods by train into Turkey's eastern Van province, over Van Lake, and on to central and western Turkey. Turkey wants Iran to reduce the fuel tariff it charges to Turkish truckers entering Iran (to protect Iran's domestic fuel subsidies),which drives up the cost of Turkish exports to Iran and points farther east. Neither issue was fully resolved in the transport MOU, per XXXXXXXXXXXX. Instead, it commits Turkey and Iran to build a freight rail link with Pakistan. Although "real improvement of regional transportation links and infrastructure would be a great benefit to regional trade" the current MOU with Iran "is just for show, for the ECO Summit in Iran" on March 11. ¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOT has not invited DEIK or any trade associations to attend the ECO Summit. XXXXXXXXXXXX was dismissive of ECO's (and the D8's) role in promoting regional trade, calling ECO a "paper organization" whose weakness is exploited "by a few member states" to pursue strictly national goals. "It does nothing to make Turkish trade with Iran more profitable." He speculated that the real talks at the ECO Summit will be about pipelines, not trade or transportation, with President Gul trying to convince Central Asian ECO member states to support the Nabucco pipeline. ¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX did not know if President Ahmadinejad plans to bring trade officials with him when he visits Istanbul March 16-20 for the World Water Forum. He promised to inform us if Ankara asks DEIK to organize trade talks with the Iranian delegation, though he asserted that many of his GOT contacts are distracted by preparations for Turkish municipal elections March 29, and won't focus on trade issues until afterwards. ¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX separately told us he has been asked to begin preparations for the next Turkey-Iran Joint Business Council Meeting, to be held in Istanbul in early May. That meeting will continue discussions on Iran's banking proposal and the outstanding transportation issues, and will also focus on new potential areas for trade and commercial cooperation including Turkish interest in expanding into Iran's USD one trillion "halal" (religiously approved) food market, as well as "tourism expansion" (ref C). Comments -------------- ¶13. (C) It is likely that our contacts' efforts to downplay prospects for expanded bilateral trade, and to highlight the difficulties of dealing with Iran, were partially motivated by self-interest. As businessmen with years of experience pursuing Iranian trade deals, they are well aware of the US and international sanctions on Iran, probably well experienced at navigating as close as possible to the limits of those sanctions, and eager not to attract USG attention in the event Washington increases economic pressure on Iran. On the other hand, their frustrations with Iran were palpable. That a neighboring market of such potential -- 70 million mostly young, western-minded, consumer-oriented people -- is still largely off limits to some Turkish goods and unprofitable for others because of the GOI's unhelpful economic and political policies is genuinely galling to Turkish businessmen like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. They asked the USG to support Turkish-Iran trade cooperation as "the easiest and least threatening way" to modernize Iran's economy, "to free it from Iranian government mismanagement." But they ultimately concurred that absent a decision by the Iranian government itself to reform its economic system, the focus of Turkish-Iranian trade in coming years would likely remain "mostly just natural gas and hot air." ¶14. (C) Bio note: XXXXXXXXXXXX's full-time job is as Chairman of "Forum Fairs and Promotions," which Turkey's Under Secretariat for Foreign Trade uses to organize international fairs with trade partners. (Indeed, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked if the USG would like to participate in a Turkey-Iraq trade fair in Gaziantep, May 22-24.) As noted, XXXXXXXXXXXX is from Trabzon, where he previously was (among other business ventures) Deputy Chairman of TrabzonSpor, one Turkey's best soccer teams. XXXXXXXXXXXX speaks good English. End comments. Wiener