ALEVIS WITHOUT A PARTY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000456 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OSCE PGOV PHUM PREL TU SUBJECT: ALEVIS WITHOUT A PARTY REF: A. 08 ANKARA 1599 ¶B. 08 ANKARA 1696 ISTANBUL 00000456 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The definition of Turkish Alevism varies greatly, as do the cultural and political objectives of the rainbow of Alevi organizations in the country. Three significant Alevi organizations/federations share only two demands: official GOT recognition of Alevi places of worship ("cem evler") and the abolition of compulsory religion courses. The same organizations do not have a common definition for their own religion, much less their political perspectives. In light of the recent uptick in perceived nationalistic statements by members of the traditional Alevi fallback party - the Republican People's Party (CHP) - the political community is closely watching how the 10 - 20 million Alevis choose to use their votes, if not with CHP. The search is on for a suitable bride for the diverse Alevi community's rather schizophrenic groom. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) An estimated 10-20 million Alevis live in Turkey but their definition of Alevism varies widely. Turkish Alevism is commonly characterized by Turkish Sunni Muslims as a heterodox Muslim faith, more closely aligned with Shiism than Sunnism. However, some Alevi groups, namely those belonging to the five associations of the umbrella Alevi Bektasi Federation, consider Alevism to be a religion independent of Islam. According to Federation Vice President Ali Kenanoglu, Alevis do not consult just one book as a guide for life and instead follow a general ideology outlined by Bektas Veli of the 13th century. While the Koran is "holy" to Alevis, so are many other texts and works, Kenanoglu noted. Conversely, two other prominent Alevi groups, the Cem Foundation (Vakfi) and Ehli-Beyt Foundation (Vakfi) -- distinct from one another and not under the Bektasi Federation's umbrella -- consider Alevism to be a third branch of Islam, separate from Sunnism and Shiism. Of the three organizations, the Cem Foundation and Alevi Bektasi Federation have relatively strong ties with one another, neither has ties with the Ehli-Beyt Foundation. Conversely, the Alevi Bektasi Federation considers the Ehli-Beyt Foundation to be a "Shia establishment, which is in bed with the AKP and receives support from Iran." No other Alevi organizations with which poloffs have met had favorable views of the Ehli-Beyt Foundation, and other than those organizations under the umbrella of the Bektasi Federation, few work together on mutual interests. Reactions to the AKP -------------- ¶3. (U) At the Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s annual winter meeting in Kizilcahamam, PM Erdogan voiced his support for Turkey's Alevi community, perhaps as a reaction to a main opposition party (CHP) deputy who made contentious comments regarding a government attack on the Alevi/Kurdish city of Dersim (now Tunceli) during a revolt in 1938. Erdogan also stressed the importance of all ethnic groups in Turkey, stating once again that the AKP is against religious, ethnic and regional nationalism. ¶4. (SBU) In 2008, the AKP began a series of Alevi workshops intended to provide a platform from which the GOT could address the problems of the Alevi population. Viewing these platforms as useless, all Alevi organizations except for the Ehli-Beyt Foundation have chosen not to participate in the bimonthly gatherings. Kenanoglu said that members of the Alevi Bektasi Federation considered the workshops to be an insult when so many other more substantial demands-such as official recognition of Alevi places of worship ("cem evler") and abolishing compulsory religious courses--are left unaddressed. For this reason, he said, the Federation organized a march in Istanbul on November 8th in which 300,000 Alevis and sympathetic "leftist Sunnis" participated. According to Kenanoglu, members of the Alevi Bektasi Federation would never vote for the AKP for fear that its ultimate goal is the imposition of Sharia law. Alevis would instead continue voting for CHP until a viable left of center party appeared, he said. (Note: Alevis in general have tended to vote for leftist parties since the 1960s, attracted by secular policies that they believe would keep Sunni Islamic values out of politics. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) On November 6, President Gul visited the central province of Tunceli, where he also attended a cem evi service in an effort to reach out to Tunceli's largely Alevi Kurdish population. Gul extended an invitation to the Cem Foundation's Dogan, who told us he "didn't want to refuse." While there, Dogan - whose mother's family settled in Tunceli ISTANBUL 00000456 002.2 OF 002 "over 1000 years ago" - gave the opening lecture to the local university about EU accession and Turkey with a sprinkling of Alevi lore from the region. ¶6. (SBU) Ehli-Beyt's close relationship with AKP was apparent with Altun's very public meeting with President Gul on November 11th. Additionally, several leading members of the Ehli-Beyt Foundation are AKP representatives on the Istanbul municipal board. Altun contended he is the only Alevi leader with whom the government will meet because he is the only true representative of Turkish Alevis, having established the first Alevi foundation in the 1960s. (Comment: Gul's invitation to Dogan would appear to counter Altun's assertion. End Comment.) Dersim and the Cost to CHP -------------- ¶7. (U) Alevi members of the CHP have been defecting from the party in increasing numbers following Deputy Chairman Onur Oymen's comparison of the Dersim massacres of 1938 to the struggle against the PKK. The defections have been most striking in the province of Tunceli (previously known as Dersim),where 300 CHP Members -- including the mayors of the sub-provinces of Pulumur, Nazmiye, and Ovacik -- resigned as part of a mass demonstration. Although Tunceli is Turkey's least populous province, its population contains a relatively high percentage of Alevis, Kurds and Armenians. It traditionally bucks national trends, electing unusually high numbers of independents and leftists to prominent offices. Many newspapers, including Radikal, Zaman, and Taraf, are speculating that CHP's unwillingness to disown Oymen's statements will cost them Alevi votes in national elections to be held no later than 2011. Alternatives to CHP? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Kenanoglu said that Alevis have no other option than to stick with CHP, even after Oymen's fumble, because they certainly would never vote for AKP. However, a late November interview with the Federation's president in daily Milliyet charted the potential of a new leftist party created by the Federation and various labor unions as an alternative to the CHP by January 2010. Cem Foundation's Dogan suggested that the newly re-founded Demokrat Partisi (DP) would attract some Alevis from CHP and may garner as much as 15 to 20 percent of the popular vote in 2011. Altun, on the other hand, sees no incompatibility with Alevism and the AKP and dismisses the CHP as a party past its prime. None of the three Alevi groups suggested Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul's Turkish Change Movement (TDH) as an alternative to the CHP. Kenanoglu instead decried Sarigul's stance as "two-faced and hypocritical." He contended that because Sarigul publicly supports all religions in Sisli but has yet to appoint an Alevi to his staff, Alevis in Sisli did not vote for him in the last municipal elections. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: For now, the Alevis constitute a secularist-oriented, liberal constituency that remains disenchanted with Turkey's choice of political parties and that may be up for grabs in the run-up to the next election. By failing to unite under a single banner with a common strategy, however, the disparate Alevi community appears incapable of mustering significant political capital. Indeed, because the Alevis are so disparate and uncoordinated, Turkish political parties may continue to judge that specific campaign promises and outreach to Alevis beyond general lip service are not worth the risk of alienating other, more coordinated constituencies in Turkey's polarized political arena. End Comment. WIENER