HALKI AND PATRIARCHAL SUCCESSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000434 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: OSCE PGOV PHUM PREL GR TU SUBJECT: HALKI AND PATRIARCHAL SUCCESSION REF: A. ISTANBUL 326 ¶B. 04 ANKARA 1342 ¶C. ISTANBUL 243 ¶D. 06 ISTANBUL 1478 Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Echoing statements made earlier by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the U.S.-based spokesperson for the Ecumenical Patriarchate on November 14 reiterated to poloff that Turkey's remaining community of 2,500 Greek Orthodox alone is not large enough to sustain the Patriarchate. The inclusion of foreign students at a reopened Halki Seminary would permit meaningful expansion of Patriarchate staff but would not by itself assure a healthy future for the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate and members of the Greek Orthodox community in the U.S. contend that an expansion of the GOT's limited definition of eligibility for the patriarchy is a necessary additional step for the Patriarchate's survival. Because the current limitations are established only in an edict from the Istanbul governorship, an expansion would not involve a constitutional amendment or legal change. During a meeting on Buyukada in August 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan asked the Patriarch why the Patriarchate had not yet tried to naturalize the non-citizen metropolitans of the Holy Synod in this regard. If naturalized metropolitans were accepted as eligible candidates for the patriarchy, and if all non-citizen metropolitans were accepted for naturalization, the succession concern would become moot. End Summary. Foreign Patriarch "Unacceptable" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Currently there are close to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens in Turkey, more than fifty percent of whom are over the age of fifty. While there are Greek Orthodox schools in Istanbul, the number of students attending is diminishing, according to the Patriarchate. Only 230 Greek Orthodox community students attend Greek Orthodox schools. Regulations issued by the Istanbul governor in 1922 and 1970 also limit eligibility for the Patriarch to Turkish citizens born in Turkey. In March 2004, representatives from the MFA said publicly the appointment of a foreigner as patriarch would be "unacceptable" (Ref B) but there are no legal restrictions on the Patriarch's nationality other than the Istanbul municipal regulations. The one exception to this rule occurred in 1948 when President Truman accompanied American citizen Patriarch Athenagoras to Turkey where he was naturalized after his election. The Patriarch has reiterated the importance of resolving the issue of succession through expanded eligibility (Ref C and D). ¶3. (C) Since 2004, the Holy Synod--the panel from which the Ecumenical Patriarch would be elected--has been comprised of six Turks and six non-Turks. The GOT had previously contended that such a composition would violate the Lausanne Treaty as well as other domestic decrees. Since 2004, however, the GOT has said nothing on the issue and implicitly allowed the composition. Projecting an accommodating posture, during a meeting on Buyukada in August 2009 (Ref A),Prime Minister Erdogan asked the Patriarch why the Patriarchate had not yet tried to naturalize the non-citizen metropolitans of the Holy Synod. Halki : Succession = No Direct Relationship -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Some representatives of the Patriarchate stress the importance of Halki's reopening for patriarchal succession. However, according to the Patriarch's U.S. spokesperson and speechwriter, Reverend Father Mark Arey, there is no direct link between ensuring Ecumenical Patriarchal succession and the reopening of Halki. Succession can occur without the reopening of Halki. The Ecumenical Patriarchate existed for 1550 years before the opening of Halki in the middle of the 19th Century. The value of reopening Halki lies in what the Patriarchate contends is the quality of its graduates who, if in leadership roles, would be strong guides for the Patriarchate and ensure not only its survival but its prosperity. While any Turkish citizen metropolitan who graduated from an Orthodox seminary anywhere (note: there are over one hundred around the world) would be eligible for the patriarchy, the Ecumenical Patriarchate contends that the quality of leadership and vision of such a candidate could be lacking without the benefit of the Halki educational ISTANBUL 00000434 002 OF 002 experience. Arey compared Halki to U.S. military academies. "Just as the military would suffer from lack of good leadership without affiliated academies, the Ecumenical Patriarchate would be devoid of the necessary quality of leadership to maintain the institution without Halki graduates." ¶5. (U) Arey pointed to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew as a case in point of the quality of leadership that came from the Patriarchate's seminary. "Patriarch Bartholomew has been a stop-gap over the last 38 years - including the years he was the previous Patriarch's assistant - who prevented the decay of the Patriarchate that would have otherwise occurred." ¶6. (U) Arey also noted that the Patriarch himself would say that the issue of Halki "is not about opening the door and turning on the lights." Halki would only hold value if it were reopened as it was prior to 1964 - allowing for the education of students from around the world. Arey contended that as it stands, without the reopening of Halki, the maintenance of the institution of the Patriarchate would fall on the shoulders of one good leader - as it does now. The burden needs to be shifted to an institutional bulwark, according to Arey. Without being able to guarantee the quality of future leaders while Halki remains closed, the Patriarch and others are concerned about the future of the strength of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. ¶7. (C) Comment. Halki's reopening is not as important as the citizenship eligibility issue to the continuity of patriarchal succession. Even if Halki were reopened to accept international students, succession could still remain a sticking point if there were no guarantee of automatic naturalization for metropolitans prior to or upon election as Patriarch. Erdogan's apparent encouragement to naturalize non-citizen metropolitans of Turkey suggests a solution that may accommodate the Patriarchate's most immediate practical needs in this regard. To our knowledge, neither party has pursued the option further since the Buyukada exchange but neither has ruled it out. Even if the GOT commits to naturalize non-citizen metropolitans, absent codification, naturalization would remain subject to GOT discretion and mutable political will in practice unless codified by law. The Patriarch is hesitant to press for codification, acknowledging the political and legislative challenge such a move would present at this time. End Comment. WIENER