AHMADINEJAD IN ISTANBUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000421 SIPDIS LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; ASGHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KNNP OIC TU IR SUBJECT: AHMADINEJAD IN ISTANBUL REF: (A) 2008 ISTANBUL 438 (B) ISTANBUL 394 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey and Iran have actively courted each other in recent months, including Foreign Ministerial bilats in August, September, and early November, Erdogan's October trip to Iran, and Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 Istanbul visit. Ahmadinejad came for the OIC Summit, but also to further bind Turkey in Iran's diplomatic embrace and paint a picture of a confident Iranian President surrounded by friendly counterparts including President Gul, Syrian President Assad, and Afghan President Karzai. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: This was more low-key than Ahmadinejad's 2008 visit, however, as the GOT did not allow him to speak to a public gathering or visit local sites. In his press and OIC Summit remarks Ahmadinejad stuck to familiar talking points on the nuclear issue and US-Iran relations; he also blamed the global financial crisis on the practice of charging interest on loans, and urged the OIC not to trade in dollars or Euros. Turkish officials pressed Iran on the side to send its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey to salvage the P5 1 TRR offer, but Iran was reportedly noncommittal. Several contacts predict Turkey's relations with Iran will face serious challenges soon, especially if the P5-1's engagement with Iran ends and tougher measures against Iran are needed. We agree the direction of Turkey-Iran relations going into 2010 will depend both on the status of P5-1 diplomacy and on whether Turkey continues to judge that its "positive" influence serves as a moderating and stabilizing factor vis-avis Iran's hard-line, defensive regime. We will offer a more detailed look by septel at Turkey's efforts to influence Iran and the limits of that influence. End Summary. Turkey and Iran: Relations at a High point? -------------- ¶3. (C) Relations between Iran and Turkey have been marked by warm rhetoric and active courtship since President Ahmadinejad's August 2008 visit to Istanbul (ref A) and Turkey's critical response to Israel's January 2009 incursion into Gaza. With a cautious lull before and after Iran's disputed June elections -- to avoid a perception of favoritism beforehand, and to allow the violent dust to settle afterwards -- this mutual effort has accelerated the past three months, including Iranian FM Mottaki's participation in the August "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" Ministerial in Istanbul, Turkish FM Davutogulu's mid-September visit to Tehran, Prime Minister Erdogan's late October travel to Tehran, Davutoglu's bilateral meeting with Mottaki at the D-8 Ministerial in Kuala Lumpur on November 1, and President Ahmandinejad's November 8-9 visit to Istanbul. One close observer of Turkish diplomacy, retired Turkish Ambassador Murat Bilhan (please protect),an international relations professor at Istanbul Kultur University, told us that Turkey's relations with Iran are currently at a high point, possibly the closest they have been since the Iranian revolution. Ahmadinejad in Istanbul -------------- ¶4. (C) The nominal purpose of Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 visit to Istanbul was to participate in an OIC Summit focused on trade and anti-poverty measures. However, several observers suggested the real reasons were to reciprocate Erdogan's Iran visit, further bind Turkey into a diplomatic embrace with Iran (personified by Ahmadinejad's apparently awkward attempt to bear-hug the much taller Erdogan at their November 8 bilat, according to a Press TV contact who saw it),and paint a picture of a striding, confident Iranian President surrounded by friendly regional counterparts including Syria's Assad, Afghan President Karzai, and a gaggle of Gulf state leaders. (Comment: Sudan's Al-Bashir was invited and expected to come but canceled at the last minute, in part due to behind-the-scenes intervention from President Gul, Bilhan suggested.) ¶5. (C) Unlike Ahmadinejad's August 2008 visit, this time the GoT did not re-route city traffic for him, allow him to speak in public, or arrange a visit to a mosque or other cultural site. Our Press TV contact told us that when he was not in meetings, Ahmadinejad stayed almost entirely in his hotel. Ahmadinejad did give several interviews to Turkish press (including TRT and NTV),in which he praised Turkey's efforts to engage Iran but said Turkey should also keep close links with the west, offered Iranian support for Turkey's EU membership ("this would promote EU credibility in the eyes of Muslims"),and defended Iran's "glorious achievements in nuclear technology" while insisting Iran had answered all ISTANBUL 00000421 002 OF 003 outstanding IAEA questions. Ahmadinejad also spoke at an invitation-only November 8 dinner for Iranian businessmen and expats, reaffirming the goal of a USG 20 billion relationship by 2011 (ref B),praising Iranian-Turkish cultural links, and urging Turkish companies to invest more in Iran, according to a Turkey-Iran Business Council contact. ¶6. (C) On November 9, Ahmadinejad joined Gul, Karzai, Assad, and Pakistani and Saudi officials to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, according to the Turkish press. However, an Istanbul-based Afghan diplomat told us that the discussion rarely elevated beyond congratulatory praise for President Karzai's announced election victory or Iran urging that Afghanistan seek more help from Muslim nations to "safeguard its sovereignty" rather than relying on NATO or the USG to bolster Afghanistan's security and stability. Ahmadinejad's OIC Speech -------------- ¶7. (C) In a circuitous speech later on November 9 to OIC Summit participants, Ahmadinejad called on the OIC to act as a counter-weight to the West, including by adopting a foreign exchange basket of OIC currencies excluding the dollar and the Euro. Ahmadinejad blamed the global financial crisis on "the excesses of capitalism" including the practice of charging interest on loans, which he called un-Islamic. Ahmadinejad also called on the OIC to establish a common market for tariff-free trade, and challenged all OIC members to devote more attention and resources to anti-poverty programs. Iranian LEU to Turkey? -------------- ¶8. (C) On the sidelines, according to the Turkish media and a well-informed Turkish contact close to Davutoglu, Turkish officials pressed for Iranian support for the November 6 proposal from IAEA DG ElBaradei that Iran send its LEU to Turkey rather than Russia as a compromise to keep the P5-1--Iran Tehran Research Reactor deal alive. But FM Mottaki declined to publicly support the idea, instead pledging noncommittally to Turkish interlocutors that Iran will "consider the idea carefully." ¶9. (SBU) In a press conference following the OIC Summit, Ahmadinejad defended Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, praised Iran's technical achievements in developing uranium enrichment, and said that Iran stands ready to hold dialogue with any parties. On the P5-1's TRR proposal, Ahmadinejad said Iran has "finalized everything" with the P5 1. "We're not making any further discussions on energy matters." Regarding Iran-USA relations, Ahmadinejad said "We are looking in a positive light to the U.S. If they really reach out their hand, we will shake it.... But they have to make changes. Did they close Guantanamo? Did they end their support for the Zionists? If change really happens we,ll be positive." ¶10. (C) Ahmadinejad was accompanied by Vice President Parviz Davoodi, FM Mottaki, Economy Minister Shamseddin Hosseini, Presidential advisors Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie and Mojtaba Samareh-Hashemi, and Ambassador to Ankara Bahman Hosseinpour. But What Goes UP Must Come Down -------------- ¶11. (C) According to several contacts including Bilhan and Istanbul Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) Vice Chair Can Buharali (a former Turkish diplomat once based in Tehran),Turkey's warm relationship with Iran is likely to face serious challenges in coming months that will test Ankara's ability to deconflict its Iran policy with its ties to the US and its obligations as a UNSC member. If Iran fails to accept core aspects of the P5-1's offer to further enrich Iranian LEU abroad, for example, and P5-1 engagement with Iran subsequently ends, Turkey will be hard-pressed to justify maintaining such close political and economic relations with Iran, especially as the international community considers tougher economic and financial measures. ¶12. (C) Even in the nearer-term, according to a Bilkent University professor who closely follows Iran's nuclear program, a report from the IAEA DG is expected in mid-November that may reveal Iran gave only partial cooperation and access to IAEA inspectors at Iran's formerly-undeclared Fordo enrichment plant. Depending on the language in that report, Turkey could find itself in an uncomfortable position when the November 23 IAEA Board of Governors address the Iran issue. ¶13. (C) Perhaps to Turkey's relief, the recent wave of high-level bilats -- the most visible embodiment of the Turkish-Iranian relationship -- appears to have crested. According to Bilhan, a simple function of a crowded Ministerial calendar (including upcoming OSCE and NATO ISTANBUL 00000421 003.2 OF 003 Ministerials) is likely to keep Davutoglu away from Mottaki, while prudence and the early December visit of PM Erdogan to Washington are likely to preclude any further Erdogan- or Gul-Ahmadinejad hand-shaking, hugs, or photo-ops at least until next year. ¶14. (C) The direction that the Turkey-Iran relationship takes going into 2010 will depend largely on the status of P5 1 diplomacy and/or sanctions on Iran at that time, as well as on whether Turkey believes its pragmatic approach and positive neighborly influence can genuinely moderate a hard-line, defensive, and increasingly vulnerable Iranian regime, and add to rather than detract from regional stability. We will offer a more detailed look at Turkey's efforts to influence Iran, and the limits of that influence, by septel. WIENER