PRIVATE SECTOR QUESTIONS AKP WILL TO LEAD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000365 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019 TAGS: ECON EFIN EINT ETRD PHUM PREL TU SUBJECT: PRIVATE SECTOR QUESTIONS AKP WILL TO LEAD ON ECONOMIC REFORM Classified By: Classified by Consul General Sharon Wiener for reasons 1 .4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Leading Turkish businessmen and economists gave the Justice and Development Party (AKP) mixed reviews at a luncheon hosted by the Consul General on September 23, 2009. The group acknowledged that the government of Prime Minister Erdogan has done a better job of handling the economy than any of its predecessors, but several of the interlocutors stressed that the AKP seems increasingly isolated and expressed skepticism about the ability of the GOT to implement a credible medium term fiscal plan and to pursue much needed regulatory reforms. End summary. ¶2. (C) Guests at the working luncheon were Yapi Kredi Chief Economist Cevdet Akcay, Sabanci Retail Group President Haluk Dincer, Koc Deputy CEO Turgay Durak, Garanti Bank President and CEO Ergun Ozen and former British Petroleum exec and International Investors Association (YASED) Chairman Tahir Uysal. AN IMF DEAL? ¶3. (C) Yapi Kredi,s Akcay offered that Prime Minister Erdogan never intended to reach an IMF standby agreement, and that Erdogan would like to sever any rigid relationship with the Fund. Akcay conceded that Erdogan played a shrewd hand this year by giving the financial markets hope that an agreement might occur, and added that this strategy was made possible by Turkey's shrinking foreign financing gap (USD 10-12 billion),based largely on unidentified capital flows amounting to USD 19 billion ("Errors and Omissions") and a rapidly diminishing current account deficit. ¶4. (C) Akcay stressed that an IMF deal matters because it would serve as an anchor for fiscal discipline in Turkey: "I trust no Turkish politicians on fiscal matters," he declared. Several interlocutors stated that Economic Minister Babacan and Treasury U/S Canakci almost surely understand the importance of an IMF standby agreement, but this does not matter because PM Erdogan is a "one-man show." The Turkish economy is still weak, and Akcay thinks the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) will cut interest rates by at least another 100 basis points this year (the CBT has reduced rates by 950 basis points since November 2008). Interestingly, none of the interlocutors saw any risk of global interest rates rising significantly until at least 2011. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ¶5. (C) Garanti Bank CEO Ozen expressed concern about low foreign capital inflows into Turkey. He believes that Turkey's economy will have difficulty growing by more than 3.5% without significant increases in foreign direct investment (FDI); in Ozen,s view, GDP growth could be much higher with an IMF deal and the capital inflows it would bring. He stated that "private equity is dead in Turkey" and that capital flows through 2012 will be scarce. (Note: Turkey has the world's 16th largest economy, but ranks only 20th in FDI at around USD 10 billion. The recently released GOT Medium Term Economic Plan projects even greater reliance on Turkish Lira (TL) denominated debt in the next three years and over 100% debt rollover, which means continued crowding out of the private sector from domestic financial markets, making FDI and foreign credit flows even more important. End note). Energy specialist Tahir Uysal countered that this year's FDI of USD 10 billion is "not bad" and noted that Ford, Microsoft and other major multinational firms do business in Turkey. Economist Akcay of Yapi Kredi offered that in the short to medium term, Turkey's domestic savings rate will not support high levels of GDP growth, and therefore more foreign capital will be needed to produce a level of economic output which will increase domestic savings and investment. On a note of optimism, Akcay observed that in attracting FDI, "size matters," and he described Turkey as "large and investable." He also views the GOT's foreign policy as sound, and therefore conducive to foreign investment. INVESTMENT CLIMATE ¶6. (C) The Consul General raised the importance of reform in Turkey to improving the investment climate, and one of the interlocutors added that Turkey needs the European Union (EU) ISTANBUL 00000365 002 OF 002 accession reform process to "keep the economic story going" to attract foreign capital. Banker Ozen maintained that tax reform is the single most import regulatory issue in Turkey. Turgay Durak of Koc Holding readily conceded that Turkish corporations should pay their fair share of taxes, but he described the GOT,s fine of TL 3.7 billion (USD 2.5 billion) imposed on Dogan Holding Group as unjust (it represents almost all of Dogan,s net worth) and chilling to the business community. He noted that Turkey used to have a cadre of 200 trained and competent tax inspectors; now Turkey has more inspectors, but generally they are less competent. Ford, Fiat, Renault and Toyota all have majority or near majority foreign ownership in Turkish auto subsidiaries, and collectively they have been fined 65 million TL (USD 44 million) and now are taxed two TL per liter on gas that goes into the tanks of vehicles destined for export. POLITICS ¶7. (C) A few of the interlocutors stated that Erdogan might call early elections in 2010. Akcay averred the political setting in Turkey has deteriorated in recent years. The April 2007 e-memorandum and the closure case against the AKP in 2008 were perceived as coup attempts against Erdogan,s government. The secular business community fears the risks of affiliation with the AKP. At the same time the AKP would have liked more support from that community when it was (in its own view) under siege from the military and the judiciary. Akcay said that the AKP was traumatized by these events in 2007 and 2008, and despite the government's "victory" in the closure case, its policies and attitudes continue to be driven by its (and particularly PM Erdogan's) "siege mentality." In Akcay's view Turkey is not politically "normal," in the sense that the State (bureaucracy, judiciary and military) do not serve the government and help it to implement policy. Akcay opined that the AKP should try to overcome this, win broad popular support and drive the political agenda by demonstrating courage on IMF and EU reform issues. The Yapi Kredi economist confided his opinion after the lunch that the AKP was winning net support from the electorate on its democratic opening despite the opposition's loud criticism. U.S.-TURKEY COMMERCIAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ¶8. (C) In response to a query on ways to bolster the U.S.-Turkish commercial relationship, Haluk Dincer of Sabanci Holding announced that McKinsey and Co. will release a report on that topic in a couple of weeks. This report apparently was requested by TAIK (Turkish-American Business Council). ¶9. (C) Tahir Uysal offered that "Turkey is only starting to learn the world" and that, strangely, many Turks are still afraid to do business in America, except in obvious sectors like textiles. In his view, American business will first have to make greater inroads into Turkey before major Turkish trade and investment will flow to the United States. ¶10. (C) Comment. Noteworthy during the discussion was a general sense of skepticism about the willingness of the GOT to pursue meaningful structural reforms in Turkey that would create a better climate for foreign direct investment. Tahir Uysal, for instance, believes that no meaningful reform will occur in Turkey until at least 2011. Equally striking was the near consensus that PM Erdogan,s government distrusts many elements of the secular business community, and vice versa. Both sides feel threatened by the other. WIENER