IRAN: TURKISH EXPERTS SEE KHAMENEI IN CHARGE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000345 SIPDIS LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR MUSTAFA; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2024 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU IR SUBJECT: IRAN: TURKISH EXPERTS SEE KHAMENEI IN CHARGE, OPPOSITION IN DISARRAY, ENGAGEMENT AS THE BEST OPTION REF: A) ISTANBUL 78 B) RPO DUBAI 373 C) ISTANBUL 343 Classified By: ConGen Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: We recently pulsed several leading Turkish think-tank experts for latest views on developments in Iran and the Iranian regime's view of engagement with the international community. The common themes we heard were: Supreme Leader Khamenei remains in firm control of the regime, supported by "new radicals" in the IRGC; the opposition movement lacks strong leadership and poses little threat to the regime; Iran still seeks engagement with the USG but on its own terms, including keeping uranium enrichment capability and cooperating against the Taliban in Afghanistan; the UNSC is unlikely to approve tougher economic sanctions, and such sanctions would likely benefit the regime in any event. Our experts' views diverged on whether other measures, such as tougher political/diplomatic pressure, or eventually military action, would be feasible or effective. One expert argued that "no matter the pressure, this regime will not change its behavior", while another emphasized that "you don't get points in Iran for being nice," suggesting only a realistic threat of military action, currently off the table, might compel the regime to change course on its nuclear program. End summary. ¶2. (C) Over the past two weeks we have solicited views from several of our most knowledgeable Turkish contacts on Iran (ref a),who work in Istanbul- and Ankara-based think-tanks and universities and specialize in Middle East politics and security. We asked for their views broadly about US-Iran relations and specifically what is happening internally within Iran and how it impacts Iran's interaction with the international community (including on the nuclear program). They were eager to share insights, though several asked that their opinions and identities be treated in confidence to protect their relationships with their Turkish government and Iranian academic contacts. Khamenei runs the show; no current threat to regime stability -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Bilkent University (Ankara) professor Mustafa �00A;Kibaroglu told us that Supreme Leader Khamenei remains the dominant leader in Iran, despite rumors he played only a supporting role in an election coup led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to Kibaroglu, Rafsanjani tried but failed to challenge Khamenei's authority in the weeks following the election, unable to secure enough help from allies within the Assembly of Experts or in the IRGC and other "power ministries." Kibaroglu assessed that Rafsanjani was rebuffed because those other power centers feared any institutional assault on the Supreme Leader, especially in the tumultuous weeks following the election, could have led to a total breakdown of the system. Kibaroglu said that most Iranian power brokers and decision-makers feel little loyalty to President Ahmadinejad, but out of self-interest they remain loyal to Khamenei and had no choice but to support the decision to give Ahmadinejad four more years as President. There is a power struggle continuing inside the regime, Kibarolgu suggested, but it is among conservatives vying to retain influence with Khamenei and in some cases (like Majles Speaker Larijani) trying to limit Ahmedinejad's influence. ¶4. (C) Kibaroglu believes the opposition does not currently pose a viable threat to regime stability. Mousavi "lacks the charisma or desire to bring millions of people back into the streets; his moment has come and gone." Khatami "has the charisma but like Mousavi lacks the courage to risk his life or his followers' lives" to challenge the nature of the system. Rafsanjani "is a creature of the system and his ambition is to lead it, not destroy it." Kibaroglu said that the real goal of the regime's post-election round-up of opposition activists is to exert control over the next generation of activist leaders who could potentially threaten the regime, to "force them into long-term submission." ¶5. (C) According to Kibaroglu, Iran still wants engagement with the USG. Iranian leaders remain committed to developing a uranium enrichment capability, he assessed, but would be willing to accept intensive safeguards to prevent diversion, as well as other confidence-building measures to preclude Iran from pursuing weaponization. Iran is also eager to discuss Afghanistan, Kibaroglu suggested, and shares Washington's and Ankara's concerns over deteriorating conditions there. "Even if their response to the P5-1 is not ISTANBUL 00000345 002 OF 004 constructive you should still pursue engagement, directly or through a facilitator like Turkey, on issues like Afghanistan and other areas of mutual concern." On the consequences if Iran fails to respond constructively to the P5-1, Kibaroglu dismissed the efficacy of economic sanctions. He argued that trade and other economic sanctions cannot be effectively enforced and that such sanctions actually help black market and trafficking networks grow, to the ultimate benefit of many regime leaders and supporters. "New Radicals" vs. Old Guard, but Both Agree on Enrichment -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Dr. Huseyin Bagci of Ankara's Middle East Technical University (METU) told us the Iranian regime is facing a deep and serious power struggle between the "neo-cons or new radicals", against an old guard who have become more pragmatic and realistic in recent years. The outcome of that struggle will determine, perhaps over the next year, whether Iran moves towards or further away from the international community. Khamenei and the IRGC's "new radicals" have developed a symbiotic dependence on each other: "The Rahbar has the authority, but the Sepah Pasdaran has the power." Their ideological and political outlooks are now "almost exactly the same," including their support for Ahmadinejad, "the third part of the symbiosis." Rafsanjani represents the pragmatic old guard and retains considerable political and economic clout, but currently not enough to challenge Khamenei's leadership. "As long as Khamenei's health holds up, he will be the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad will be President, and the IRGC will control internal and external security policies." Mousavi and Khatami play no part in this struggle, as they are seen by the regime as outside, adversarial figures, who oppose velayat-e faqih (the rule of a religious Supreme Leader). Bagci predicted they will find themselves ever more marginalized and under pressure, if not jailed, in coming months. ¶7. (C) Even this "new radical" Iranian regime, however, supports engagement with the U.S and pursuing "mutually-beneficial" regional policies (including against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and in support of diversified energy supply, i.e., selling Iranian natural gas to Europe), Bagci assessed. But Iran's nuclear program remains non-negotiable, a point on which the hardliners and pragmatists agree. At most Iran will try to buy more time vis-Q-vis the P5-1 through delay tactics, while it tries to "buy off" Russia and China through lucrative trade and energy deals. "The lesson Iran's leaders learned since resuming enrichment in 2005 is that they can change facts on the ground much faster than the international community can adjust." Moreover, multilateral sanctions make both the regime and the Iranian population "more nationalistic" without causing the regime enough economic pain to force compromise. "Only the threat of military action might force Iran to make real concessions on enrichment, but nobody in Iran believes this U.S. administration would take that step." The only realistic policy option, Bagci felt, is to continue to offer engagement, try to secure cooperation with Iran on other important fronts (Afghanistan, Iraq),and "slowly turn Iran into a pragmatic regional partner" until it no longer sees nuclear weapons capability as necessary for its self-preservation. This Regime Can't Change its Behavior -------------- ¶8. (C) Can Buharali, Vice Chairman of the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) and a former Turkish diplomat once assigned to Tehran, assessed that President Obama's engagement efforts with Iran, especially since the March 21 Nowruz message, put the regime in a state of "confusion and uncertainty." The optimism of Mousavi's election campaign reflected popular hope that Iran would respond in kind. But the official election results and the crackdown on peaceful demonstrators that followed showed that that the regime's real power-brokers -- including the IRGC and the "Bonyads" (quasi-governmental, patronage-oriented, tax-exempt foundations that control large swaths of Iran's economy and report only to Khamenei) -- feared they would lose control under a Mousavi government over how to pursue such engagement, equating that loss of control with potential loss of control over the regime itself. ¶9. (C) According to Buharali, the hardliners believe they have largely contained the threat to their control posed by pre-election public support for Mousavi and the prospect of rapid lurching towards better relations with the U.S., but ISTANBUL 00000345 003 OF 004 they remain internally at odds on whether or how to proceed with engagement. Buharali assessed that Khamenei retains a "hardline pragmatic view" that sees engagement with the U.S. on Iran's terms (i.e., securing USG acceptance of Iran's enrichment capability and eventual lifting of oil sanctions) as critical for the regime's long-term survival. But Khamenei must contend with powerful figures within the IRGC and hard-line clerical community who continue to view antagonism with the U.S. as a fundamental pillar of the regime's raison d'etre. To those officials, "there is no difference between U.S.'s former goal of regime change and its more recent, softer goal of regime change-of-behavior." Any Iranian concessions of "better regime behavior", such as seeking normalized relations, will be "opposed, blocked, or sabotaged" by these spoilers at every turn. "Unfortunately for the U.S. and the international community, many of the same officials who gave Ahmadinejad his re-election, cracked down on the opposition, and now enjoy closest influence with Khamenei, are the ones who will fight to the death to stop better relations with you." As a consequence of this dynamic, Buharali cautioned, "no matter the international pressure, this regime cannot change its behavior," which may eventually leave the international community with a difficult binary choice, between accepting a nuclear weapons-capable Iran, or using "all necessary measures" to stop it. "You don't get points for being nice"; Time for Tougher Measures -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Dr. Ercan Citlioglu, President of Bahcesehir University's Strategic Research Center, urged USG policy-makers to recall that Iran's regime has been "in constant crisis" since 1979. Pointing out that "there has never been a time when power centers inside the regime were not at each other's throats," he downplayed the sense of internal crisis that Khamenei and other regime leaders feel. "The protesters are off the streets, and the debates about Ahmadinejad are back in the Majles where they belong, so the Leader feels secure." As a result, Citlioglu suggested that the USG "forget about the democracy movement and Mousavi, and refocus on examining and responding to the regime's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the nuclear program." ¶11. (C) Citlioglu assessed that "you don't get points in Iran for being nice", supporting the view that if Iran's response to the P5-1 is not concrete or constructive, it will be time to take a tougher approach. "This regime values strength and assertiveness, not kindness or compromise. Look what they did to protesters who thought they had constitutional rights to march peacefully. They jailed, tortured, and killed them." ¶12. (C) Asked what type of tougher sanctions might impact Iranian decision-making, Citlioglu suggested that political, diplomatic, and military isolation undercut the regime's legitimacy more than economic pressure. He argued that the UNSC would be unlikely to approve tougher economic sanctions, especially on oil and gas, since such measures would hurt Russia and China too. "But Russia and China might allow a resolution that pressures the regime without hurting their own economic interests." For example, he suggested, a resolution could block Ahmadinejad from going to the UN, put travel bans on top regime leaders and freeze their Swiss bank accounts, or spotlight the human rights abuses against the detainees. He suggested that (non-UNSC) multilateral sanctions if implemented effectively, "especially by all EU member states", would also be effective: "An embargo on European luxury goods or petrol exports to Iran would not hurt regime leaders directly, but would widen the gap between the Iranian people and the regime." Ultimately, Citlioglu assessed, Iran's economy can withstand years more of sanctions; "it is the regime's legitimacy that sanctions should target." If such tougher measures don't compel compliance from the regime, "then you will be left with only one option, the military option, which will be very difficult for the U.S. to take, and would be strongly opposed by the EU, Turkey, and many others." Comments -------------- ¶13. (C) The four contacts cited here are among our most knowledgeable Turkish academic and think-tank experts on Iran; we consider their views on Iranian dynamics and policies to be credible and well-informed. These contacts maintain close professional connections with Iranian academic ISTANBUL 00000345 004 OF 004 and think-tank counterparts, and in some cases also offer regular, informal policy advice on Iran to the Turkish Prime Ministry (Kibaroglu),MFA (Buharali),and military (Citlioglu). ¶14. (C) We found most noteworthy in this recent exchange with these experts the uniformity of view that Khamenei remains in firm control and that the regime has successfully managed to force opposition movement activists into a combination of defensiveness, disarray and detention. Their dismissiveness of the pro-Mousavi opposition as a viable counter-weight to a radicalizing regime is at odds with what we hear on occasion from opposition activists themselves (ref c),but their conclusion does reflect the establishment view in Turkey, from which these experts then extrapolate the pragmatic policy advice that the USG and international community must continue to try to engage this regime. Our contactsQ, opinions also generally reflected the broader Turkish (and perhaps Iranian) public and establishment view that using military force against Iran is not a credible option for the USG, and thus the international community must instead try to find a diplomatic formula that allows it to live with an Iranian nuclear program (including an enrichment capability) under intensive safeguards. End comment. WIENER