IRAN/ELECTIONS: A TURKISH PROFESSOR'S INFORMAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000198 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM PREL IR TU SUBJECT: IRAN/ELECTIONS: A TURKISH PROFESSOR'S INFORMAL ELECTION OBSERVATIONS PLANS REF: (A) 2008 ISTANBUL 96 (B) 2008 ISTANBUL 279 Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A Turkish political science professor plans to visit Iran with several colleagues June 9-13 on the pretense of holding academic exchanges with counterparts at Tehran and Esfahan universities, but for the primary purpose of visiting Iranian polling stations and observing the conduct of Iran's June 12 presidential elections. The professor, who undertook a similar effort during the March 2008 Iranian parliamentary elections, plans to visit five to ten polling stations in Tehran, while his colleagues do the same in Esfahan, talking to voters and even entering polling stations if possible. He also plans to meet with contacts of his at the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) and with Iranian journalists. He then intends to write up his and his colleagues' observations, and to make those notes available to us. He also shared with us concerns he has heard from his contacts at the CSR about the prospects for voting fraud by the Ahmadinejad campaign. End summary. An informal election observation mission -------------- ¶2. (C) A Turkish political science professor at Istanbul's Isik University (please strictly protect) described to us his plans to visit Iran with three Turkish academic colleagues June 9-13 on the pretense of holding academic exchanges with counterparts at Tehran and Esfahan universities, but for the primary purpose of visiting Iranian polling stations and observing the conduct of Iran's June 12 presidential elections. The professor is an election expert who undertook a similar effort during the March 2008 Iranian parliamentary elections (reftels). He and his three colleagues intend to divide up on June 12 into two pairs, one group going to Esfahan and one staying in Iran. Accompanied by Iranian academic colleagues, they intend to visit a number of polling stations, talking to voters outside the stations, and if permitted, entering the polling stations to talk to the election workers and observers inside. They would introduce themselves as Turkish visitors simply curious to see how Iranian voting works, and hope not to attract too much suspicion. He also plans to meet with contacts of his at the Iranian Expediency Council's think-tank, the Center for Strategic Research (CSR),at Iran's "House of Parties", and with Iranian journalists, to gauge their reaction to the conduct of the elections. He then intends to write up his and his colleagues' observations, and to make those notes available to us. Concerns About Pro-Ahmadinejad Voting Fraud -------------- ¶3. (C) The Turkish professor shared with us the concerns he has heard from his CSR contacts and other pro-Mousavi supporters about the likelihood of voting day election fraud in support of Ahmadinejad. One CSR expert told him that Mousavi's campaign assesses that Ahmadinejad's allies in the Ministry of Interior and other GOI organs have the capability to add "at least several million" illegitimate votes to the election tally. One means of doing so is through mobile polling stations -- basically, tables and chairs set up at arbitrary outdoor locations (for example, dozens are expected along Tehran's busy Valiasr street alone) that had not been announced ahead of time, unlike officially announced polling stations in schools, mosques, and elsewhere, and thus where Mousavi's campaign may not necessarily have an observer present to monitor misconduct. The votes from these mobile polling stations will be taken to unknown locations for counting, rather than tallied up on the spot in front of campaign observers and election commission representatives, the CSR contact claimed. The Mousavi campaign is organizing volunteers to try to identify where these mobile stations are being set up, monitor them, and follow the ballot boxes after polls have closed. ¶4. (C) The professor has heard that the Ministry of Interior may also experiment with electronic voting at select locations, having signed a contract earlier this year with a Swiss firm (NFI) to set up such a system. Electronic voting, he noted, offers numerous opportunities for fraudulent vote-counting. ¶5. (C) A CSR contact of his speculated that the Ahmadinejad campaign is weighing carefully how much fraudulent ballot-stuffing will be needed in the first round. If on election eve Ahmadinejad believes that with a few million additional votes he can win first round majority outright, he ISTANBUL 00000198 002 OF 002 may try to "go all out" with as much vote-stuffing and other fraud he believes he can get away with. But if his advisors convince him that winning a first round majority is impossible even with such fraud, he will likely engage in just enough voting fraud to guarantee he makes it into the second round, reserving his ability to engage in more extensive fraud for the second, winner-take-all round. CSR Under Pressure -------------- ¶6. (C) The Turkish professor's CSR contacts said they are feeling intense pressure. CSR's leadership, including former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former Deputy Foreign Minister Vaezi, are advising the Mousavi campaign almost full-time, and have called upon CSR staff to lend support, write papers for the campaign (including most of his foreign policy-related speeches),and help raise Mousavi's profile in the media. As a result, CSR experts believe that if Mousavi wins, he will take many CSR staff with him to the Presidency or send them to the MFA. Vaezi has reportedly been offered a position heading a think-tank that Mousavi plans to create within the Presidency, replicating a think tank that operated out of the Office of the Presidency during Khatami's tenure. ¶7. (C) Some of the papers that CSR experts have written for the Mousavi campaign include papers arguing that Iran should strengthen and expand its regional influence through "soft power" like educational exchanges with neighbors, development assistance to poorer states in the region, and by serving as "a model of Middle Eastern democracy." One paper that the professor had read advocated that if elected, Mousavi should pursue a number of procedural reforms of Iran's election process that would bring it closer in line with international standards, with a goal of making Iranian elections "the most free and fair in this region," thus bolstering Iran's reputation and standing as a regional leader. Polarizing Campaign -------------- ¶8. (C) The professor told us this campaign is evolving into the most polarized Iranian election he has ever seen, which he characterized as an unexpected irony given that all four approved candidates are from well within "the system." It is exposing fault lines, he said, that may not have emerged had the contest been between Ahmadinejad and Khatami (which would have resulted in a straightforward conservative vs. reformist dynamic),for example between social and education classes; between those who served during the war and those who didn't; those who enriched themselves from government careers and those who didn't; and those who recognize that fixing Iran's gasping economy requires better relations with the west and those still opposed on revolutionary grounds. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Our Isik University contact recognizes that trying to conduct an informal observation effort in Iran is fraught with some risk; last year he was forcibly removed from an Esfahan polling station and detained for an hour, then released with a stern warning not to enter any more polling stations. He hopes that being accompanied by Iranian professors will give him an extra degree of security. He also understands that collecting anecdotal observations at 10 to 15 polling stations only in Tehran and Esfahan will not allow him to render comprehensive judgments about the conduct of these elections. But he notes that in the absence of any international or credible domestic election observation effort, even having a snapshot of anecdotes from a few independent observers can help shine a spotlight on the elections in the event extensive voting fraud does occur. We plan to meet with him as soon as possible after his return to Istanbul following the elections, to hear his observations. End comment. OUDKIRK