IRANIAN ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTS ENCOURAGE US HELP TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000183 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 TAGS: ECON EAGR PREL PGOV PINS UNDP IR TU SUBJECT: IRANIAN ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTS ENCOURAGE US HELP TO ADDRESS IRAN'S WATER PROBLEMS REF: (A) ISTANBUL 133 (B) ANKARA 687 (C) ANKARA 752 Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Several Iranian environmental experts recently decried to us the lack of attention and resources the GOI devotes to water-related issues in Iran. They urged the USG to reach out to Iran indirectly, through UNDP or academic channels, to offer a "cooperative partnership" (i.e., USG help) in several specific areas, including irrigation technology, desalination, and managing trans-boundary water resources. One expert pointed out that Supreme Leader Khamenei's March 21 speech responding to President Obama's outreach specifically highlighted the poor state of Iran's water conservation and irrigation capacities, a message reportedly reinforced by Iran earlier this month at the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. These contacts believe a USG offer of cooperation in those areas, made after Iran's elections, would be met with a cautiously pragmatic response from the GOI and with grateful enthusiasm from Iran's scientific and environmental communities. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In the past few weeks, ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher has solicited views from several Iranian environmental and water experts on environmental developments in Iran. Two experts who work for development-related NGOs attended the March 16-22, 2009 World Water forum in Istanbul (ref A) and have stayed in contact with us, while a the third expert (the head of the Watershed and Rangeland Management Department at Gorgan University in Golestan province, a leading Iranian university for agricultural and environmental studies, please strictly protect) was in Istanbul recently to receive a visa for a two-year research sabbatical in the U.S. starting in September. All shared similar cautionary views on the poor state of the environment in Iran, bemoaning the worsening trends of soil erosion and desertification, flooding, and water wastage throughout the country. They argued that the GOI was not doing enough to address these problems, in part because Iran's fragmented bureaucracy has led to inadequate enforcement of environmental laws, and in part because to address the problems effectively Iran would need to seek foreign help, which the regime is not currently willing or prepared to directly request. ¶3. (C) These experts were most concerned about the following environmental challenges: -- Rising salinity and wetland degradation: One contact characterized Iran's wetlands as being under serious threat. Iran receives less than 250 millimeters of rainfall annually, a third of the world average. 90% of Iran's area is arid or semi-arid. Only 35% of Iran's land is arable, with wetlands concentrated in six main areas, primarily the lowlands along the Caspian Sea, the Sistan basin on the Afghan border, central Fars province, and the Orumiyeh basin in northwest Iran. This expert believes one consequences of Iran's water shortage and misuse is the increasing level of salinity in wetland areas. Many important indigenous plant species cannot survive the higher salt content in the groundwater, disrupting the ecological balance. He received a small GOI grant to try to develop more salt-tolerant strains of such plants species but says it was not enough funding. He recently applied to UNDP's Iran office to request enough funding to make the project viable. He argued that the GOI is not doing enough to research or develop more advanced, cost-effective desalination techniques. -- Irrigation: One contact explained that irrigated agriculture consumes over 90% of Iran's renewable water resources. Because most of Iran's rivers are seasonal (i.e., flowing only when precipitation is heavy),up to 60% of the water for irrigation is drawn from water tables and underground reservoirs, usually at an ecologically unsustainable rate. Iran's approach to irrigation is inefficient, plagued by inattention to operations and maintenance, heavy GOI subsidies on delivered water, unclear lines of authority within the GOI, and a resulting GOI unwillingness to set a goal of requiring much more efficient irrigation methods nationally. He suggested that a more concerted GOI campaign to encourage use of methods like pressurized irrigation, drip irrigation, and qanat-based (ancient/traditional underground canals) irrigation systems would improve efficiency. Low irrigation efficiency, by contrast, is leading to water logging and over-salinization in the irrigated areas. Acknowledging that agriculture is a key economic sector, he said the GOI only recently recognized it must do more to increase the efficiency of irrigation methods and reduce the share of groundwater consumed in irrigation, but is still struggling to set realistic goals, and to assign clear bureaucratic responsibility and ISTANBUL 00000183 002 OF 003 sufficient resources to achieve those goals. -- Trans-boundary water-sharing: An expert in Iran's trans-boundary water resources (i.e., rivers that flow from neighboring countries, such as the Helmand from Afghanistan and the Aras from Turkey) told us that as Iran's water shortage increases, resulting from increasingly frequent and prolonged drought cycles, Iran will become more dependent on trans-boundary water-sharing. Iran needs more effective regional cooperation to manage these important water sources, he argued. Tran-boundary water disagreements, especially in this part of the world, can easily lead to serious conflict, especially as regional water scarcity increases. Iranian and Afghan forces exchanged gunfire over disputes related to the Helmand river in the 1990s, and in 1999 the Taliban shut off the Helmand's flow to Iran, completely drying up several vital eastern Iranian lakes. But if managed well, it offers an important subject for regional cooperation. He pointed to the "doosti" (friendship) dam operated on the trans-boundary river between Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan as a rare example of an effective regional water partnership. He encouraged the U.S. to help facilitate a more comprehensive trans-boundary or regional water-sharing dialogue, to include Turkey, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as the USG (through USAID) already does in the Caucuses and Central Asia. Such a dialogue could lead both to a more efficient and equitable use of shared water resources, and to lower tensions and raised confidence in the region. GOI views: signaling a need for help? ¶4. (C) One expert pointed to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei's late March Mashad speech as an indicator of GOI recognition that it faces significant water conservation problems, though Khamenei framed the challenge more as one of simply "working harder and wasting less." A close reading of those remarks, our contact said, reveals a sense of urgency on the regime's part, and an clear listing of areas where the regime needs help, including: rural development ("It is not right that a village suffers just because it is in an isolated part of the country"); drought's impact on wheat production ("wheat production decreased in the country because of last year's drought, and now we must import wheat"),water wastage ("Nearly 22% of water is wasted in our homes. Water is produced with difficulty, requiring dams and huge investments....The country's water pipelines are under strain...We must preserve our dams, improve our water supply lines, and train to economize on irrigation. Those who use less water should receive state aid.") While that portion of the speech was intended for a domestic audience, our contact said it shows not only how seriously the regime has recently begun to view its water problem, but it also shows several tangible areas where a USG offer of engagement through "partnership" assistance is most needed. ¶5. (C) The GOI's concerns were reinforced at the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) meetings in New York, May 4-15, 2009. A "very capable and pragmatic" Iranian diplomat, Javad Amin-Mansour, served as the vice-chair for the annual session, according to our contact. Amin-Mansour reportedly underscored in remarks to the CSD that Iran is facing a potential environmental crisis brought on by desertification, land degradation, deteriorating water quality, and misuse of water leading to water scarcity. Though he was representing the CSD, our contact told us that Amin-Mansour lobbied actively behind the scenes at that meeting for significantly more international assistance to Iran, via the UN system, on these issues. An internet search of remarks that Amin-Mansour made as Iran's representative to the 2008 CSD meetings further underscores the growing sense of GOI concern about these worsening environmental trends, and the need to look for both international and local solutions. In those May 2008 remarks, Amin-Mansour called on the international community to better fund the UN's Global Environmental Fund (GEF) to help poor countries deal with these challenges. He urged that national governments (including Iran) do more to invest in rural economies and empower local communities by, inter alia, making them "stakeholders" in better managing their local resources. He also urged that national governments (including Iran) do more to empower "grass-roots environmental organizations, civil societies, and academia" to help find creative solutions to these problems. How to engage Iran on these issues: Carefully and indirectly ¶6. (C) All three contacts suggested that any offer of USG help in these areas should wait until after the June 12 elections, and must be framed carefully. First, Given the GOI's pride in its scientific achievements, including in agriculture and the environment, the U.S. should offer "partnership" not assistance, agreeing to work jointly as equals on any agreed projects. Second, given the GOI's suspicions about USG intentions and hidden agendas, the USG ISTANBUL 00000183 003 OF 003 should not make the offer directly to the GOI. Instead, the USG should consider making such partnership offers through the UN system -- most usefully through UNDP, which has an established field presence in Iran and is respected for its humanitarian, developmental, non-political work (including in local watershed management). Such an offer of partnership could start with a scientific and technological exchange between leading USG and GOI environmental scientists, under UNDP auspices, to discuss latest developments in desalination or irrigation technologies. Another alternative, proposed by an academic contact, would be to make an initial offer of USG-funded partnership via academic channels, for example from California State University or Texas A&M, both of which have Centers for Irrigation Technology, to leading Iranian universities like Sharif, Tehran, and Gorgan University. Any such offer must be done openly, making clear that USG funding is being used. Finally, an offer to facilitate a regional trans-boundary water "confidence-building" dialogue could be conveyed in any number of official ways, including by a third party like Turkey, under the auspices of whatever regional economic or political forum would be most appropriate (e.g., one that includes all relevant participants as members). Comments ¶7. (C) As environmental experts from Iran's NGO and academic communities, it is no surprise that these contacts would actively encourage USG partnership with Iran on water issues. Indeed, to some degree it is professionally self-serving. But it also reflects a non-ideological pragmatism that we believe is a common trait among Iran's environmental and water experts. Experts from this field tend to be results-oriented, and to recognize that these cross-cutting crises require international coordination (and a willingness to accept foreign help) sooner rather than later. These contacts believe firmly that a USG offer of cooperation in these areas, made after Iran's elections, would be met with a cautiously pragmatic response from the GOI and with grateful enthusiasm from Iran's scientific and environmental communities. ¶8. (C) The one recommendation that merits a strong cautionary note is the proposal for a multilateral confidence-building approach to trans-boundary water sources. As Ref B and C note, we believe it is highly unlikely that Turkey would ever agree to have water resources discussed and allocated under any multinational or multilateral system involving non-riparian states, but rather strongly prefers to address water issues on a watershed basis, with all countries sharing a watershed jointly managing both water supply and demand. Thus far, including with Iran, that concept has been a tough sell. ¶9. (C) The idea of offering US assistance to Iran in the areas of agriculture and environment is not new. The P5-1's June 2006 incentives offer to Iran included "support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to United States and European agricultural products, technology, and farm equipment." Possible partnership with or assistance to Iran on issues like irrigation and desalination could helpfully reinforce the appeal of the P5-1's agricultural assistance offer, as Iran's leaders, and its agricultural sector stakeholders, come to realize that there is a direct causal link between better water management, more efficient irrigation, and more productive agriculture. ¶10. (SBU) We will stay in contact with these contacts and will report any further environmental developments or suggestions that they share with us. OUDKIRK