US-IRAN RELATIONS: CONTACTS IN TURKEY AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000014 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU IR SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: CONTACTS IN TURKEY AND IRAN URGE U.S. STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BEFORE IRAN'S JUNE ELECTIONS REF: 2008 ISTANBUL 560 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Iranian contacts and local experts have cautioned it would be a mistake if the USG, as it considers whether, when, and how to engage Iran, withheld such an approach in an effort to impact the outcome of Iran's elections, in this case against Ahmadinejad. One expert argued that Ahmadinejad's re-election might actually strengthen prospects for better US-Iran relations. Comment: We understand the idea of the USG offering a gesture in support of engagement with Iran in the near-term may run counter to current Washington thinking, as does the dissonant notion that Ahmadinejad's re-election may be in USG interests. But we consider these cautionary views worth reporting, as we have heard such views consistently in recent weeks not only from these well-informed contacts but from many "regular" Iranians as well. End summary. ¶2. (C) Over the past several weeks, ConGen Istanbul's NEA "Iran Watcher" has pulsed contacts in Iran (by phone and email),as well as local experts who follow Iranian affairs, on the question of US-Iran relations, prospects for improved relations, and impact of any such diplomacy on the June Iranian presidential elections. Make a gesture, but sooner rather than later -------------- ¶3. (C) An influential senior researcher at Iran's Center for Strategic Research (CSR) (protect),the Iranian Expediency Council's think-tank, conveyed his views through a mutual Turkish acquaintance, suggesting that "if the Obama administration concludes it is in America's interest to improve relations with Iran, make a gesture." He warned that if Iran's political system or voters think Washington is trying to use a gesture of dialogue to change the outcome of Iranian elections, "you will not get the outcome you want." He offered that an important early gesture from the USG which would have an immediate positive impact on the Iranian people, while confronting Iran's foreign policy establishment with "its own hard choices" to make, would be a request to send US diplomats to staff the US Interests Section on Tehran. If proposed in a "respectful and non-confrontational way," the "moderates" in Iran's decision-making arena would "probably be in a position to respond positively." He advised that "the sooner Washington makes such a gesture, the less risk there is that Iran's response will get caught and captured as an election issue." Better relations means the SL wants a moderate President -------------- ¶4. (C) A private Tehran-based political consultant told us that even if both the US and Iran started maneuvering towards bilateral dialogue as early as February, and if progress is made before June's elections, Iranian voters "will not give any credit to Ahmadinejad, but in fact they will see improving relations as a signal that Ayatollah Khamenei wants a more pragmatic Iranian candidate to win in June." Arguing that US-Iran relations are a fundamental issue touching on regime viability and survival, "not a mere presidential campaign issue like subsidies for the poor or aid to Gaza," most Iranian voters accept that only Khamenei will decide whether and when to allow improved relations. Since he signaled last year a willingness to consider such a step, and since the Obama administration is seen in Iran as having committed in its campaign to hold direct dialogue with Iran ("Iranians took that as a campaign promise not just to American voters, but to Iranians too"),both Iranian voters and the GOI expect the new administration to "make the first move", soon. The absence of any such move before Iran's elections would be seen in Iran as evidence that the new administration, fairly or not, backed away from its promises. On the other hand, positive steps towards improved relations "would generate significant voter support for the leading pragmatic candidate, like Ghalibaf or Larijani, because the Supreme Leader would not have allowed improved relations if he still wanted Ahmadinejad to win." Don't try to tweak Iranian elections -------------- ¶5. (C) An Iranian journalist living in Istanbul argued that "past efforts by the US to impact Iranian elections generated results you did not want," citing the June 2005 Iranian presidential elections as an example. In those elections, ISTANBUL 00000014 002 OF 003 she claimed, "Washington and Europe confidently predicted Rafsanjani and Karroubi" would be the second round candidates, while at the same time "harping constantly about the minor economic incentives Iran would get for suspending enrichment, as if both were a foregone conclusion." That mobilized hard-liners to make sure Ahmadinejad would get into and win the second round, the journalist asserted. "The moment the Obama administration hints at a favored candidate for this year's elections, or uses its Iran policy to try to leverage such a result, you can be sure you will get the candidate you least want." She suggested that "99% of Iranian voters" want better relations with America, "but on Iran's terms and timing, not yours, and not as an election issue, but as a shared national interest that benefits both America and Iran." But don't forego a genuine chance to improve relations -------------- -- ¶6. (C) A mid-level researcher at Iran's Center for Strategic Research (CSR) who follows election procedures, public diplomacy and media (protect),assessed to us that Iran's voters have "lived through a generation of propaganda" and thus are "sophisticated enough to recognize when someone is trying to manipulate their voting intentions." She warned that if Iran's voters think the US is intentionally delaying for a few months a genuine opportunity to lessen tensions and improve relations with Iran, in order to help a moderate candidate get elected or to defeat Ahmadinejad, they will see that as another bad faith gesture in "a historically long line" of such gestures from the US. She explained that Iranian voters understand that only the Supreme Leader can decide when the system is ready to accept improved relations with the US; "it is not something that will impact voting for presidential candidates." Delay favors Ahmadinejad; talk to the Supreme Leader -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) A European political analyst who tracks Iran for an international crisis response NGO told us that any delay in U.S. initiative towards Iran plays in Ahmadinejad's favor. "Ahmadinejad's letter to President-elect Obama was a smart move, setting himself up for a win-win situation. If Obama engages Ahmadinejad, he wins. If Obama ignores Ahmadinejad, he also wins, because he can show that Obama's policy towards Iran will not differ from President Bush's." The analyst explained that Ahmadinejad wants to distract voters from the economic situation and other dismal DOMESTIC issues. The crisis in Gaza is having that effect currently, allowing Ahmadinejad to stake out a tough position against Israel beyond reproach from other candidates. Relations with the U.S., and a failure of the US to reply to Ahmadinejad's letter, "may fill that same role in run-up to the elections." The smartest move the U.S. can make, he suggested, is to seek engagement with Iran soon, "but do it via the Supreme Leader's office" via his diplomatic advisor, former Foreign Minister Velayati, a rival of Ahmadinejad's. "Ultimately, it does not matter who is President. The USG is focused too much on Ahmadinejad. He is not the issue, nor is the presidential elections. Whoever wins in June, Iran's fundamental policies will only change when the Supreme Leader wants them to. That is why you need to find a way to talk to the Supreme Leader's key advisors." A counter-intuitive idea: Hope Ahmadinejad wins -------------- --- ¶8. (C) An Istanbul-based western news correspondent who travels frequently to Iran and maintains contacts with Iranian policy-makers reinforced the same line of advice: Iran's elections are too complex for the US to try to manipulate via diplomacy, and any effort to do so will only result in unintended and unwanted consequences. That said, he also offered the dissonant advice that "an Ahmadinejad re-election would actually strengthen prospects for a US-Iran rapprochement" as only Ahmadinejad -- "like Nixon to China" -- can win over Iran's hard-liners to accept improved relations with the US. The correspondent believed it was important that an Obama administration make a "positive but reversible" gesture soon, not to Ahmadinejad, but to Iran as a nation. "For example, request Iran's permission to send U.S. diplomats to staff the Interests Section; issue a White House statement on Iran's independence day acknowledging the Iranian people's sacrifices and congratulating their successes, while formally recognizing the constitutional basis of Iran's government; and reaffirm Washington's policy of not supporting regime change, actually enforcing that ISTANBUL 00000014 003 OF 003 policy within the USG." ¶9. (C) Such gestures would, he felt, swiftly unlock momentum towards compromise on the Iranian side as well. "But for the compromise the USG most needs -- Iran compromising on its enrichment program -- only Ahmadinejad, the personification of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, can persuade Iran's hard-liners to accept such a deal over the long-term. You need him in office to do that." Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) We understand the idea of the USG offering a gesture in support of bilateral dialogue in the near-term may run counter to current Washington thinking, as does the cognitively dissonant argument that only Ahmadinejad can secure Iranian hard-liners' support for better relations and a possible Iranian compromise on the nuclear issue. But we consider these cautionary perspectives worth reporting, as we have heard such views consistently in recent weeks, not only from these well-informed contacts, but from many "regular" Iranians as well. WIENER