US-IRAN RELATIONS: "BEWARE THE SPOILERS"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000138 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU IR SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: "BEWARE THE SPOILERS" REF: (A) ISTANBUL 47 (B) ISTANBUL 131 (C) RPO DUBAI 148 Classified By: DPO Sandra Oudkirk; Reasons 1.5 (d) and (e). ¶1. (S) Summary: Several contacts who closely watch Iranian politics have cautioned that in the wake of recent positive "atmospheric" developments in US-Iran relations, Washington should take extra care not to "over-extend" its efforts to reach out to the regime. The remaining two months before Iran's elections are a particularly sensitive period, some argued. Even though Supreme Leader Khamenei wants to remove the issue of US-Iran engagement from the campaign trail, spoilers in Iran "will be working overtime" during this period, as also highlighted in ref c. They will try to use any further USG gestures to derail a growing regime consensus that Iran should soon make a positive gesture of its own, contacts warn. A western journalist said a GOI contact told him GOI pragmatists hope Washington will "ignore the negative messages" emanating from hardliners, and instead show patience until after the elections. A former senior Iranian diplomat recommended a next step of allowing American diplomats below policy-making levels to meet with Iranian counterparts, but cautioned against bilateral meetings with Ahmadinejad appointees. End summary. ¶2. (S) Following President Obama's March 20 Nowruz message to the Iranian government and people and Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei's March 21 Mashhad speech in response, we pulsed Turkey- and Iran-based contacts who follow Iranian politics closely to gauge reactions to these developments and probe on what Iranian decision-makers may consider to be next steps. (Ref B reports on the views of one particularly well-placed Tehran-based analyst; this reports conveys the views of several other good contacts of ours.) Don't over-extend; Build trust incrementally -------------- ¶3. (S) Former Iranian MFA Director General Kia Tabatabee, now Executive Director of the "Developing Eight" (D8) states (ref A, please strictly protect),told us that the timing of the President's Nowruz message was clever, given the start the next day of a two week holiday in Iran. The positive and respectful tone of the message forced Khamenei to issue a reply immediately, not only to convey a formal reaction to Washington, but to set redlines within the Iranian political system. "President Obama's tone was so different from past U.S. messages that the Supreme Leader basically had to tell his followers what to think. In this case, the Rahbar (comment: Farsi for "guide", a reference to the Supreme Leader) really had to be Iran's guide." ¶4. (S) Tabatabaee noted that since formally retiring from the MFA in January, he no longer has access (via the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul) to Iranian MFA reporting, so he claimed ignorance about the details of internal GOI deliberations on next steps. But he offered several points of advice based on his understanding of how the Iranian political system operates: "First, avoid publicity." He asserted that the regime "hates it when the western media shines the spotlight" on sensitive domestic or political issues in Iran. When that happens, the regime is often forced into making "embarrassing and ridiculous claims", citing the GOI's denial that Iran's envoy to the March 31 Afghanistan Conference in The Hague spoke with SRAP Holbrooke. "It was a childish denial", but it also reveals how sensitively the GOI will react to the media spotlight as the regime navigates whether, how, and when engage with the USG. ¶5. (S) Given the Nowruz outreach and SRAP Holbrooke's encounter with Akhounzadeh, Tabatabaee suggested that the USG not "over-extend" itself. He argued that Washington had already done much to change the tone, and despite the clear call from Khamenei for a more concrete USG gesture there was no need at the moment for "a bold next step" from Washington. Instead, he assessed that both sides should "keep building trust incrementally. A lower profile to this process puts them at ease, and puts less pressure on Khamenei." Initial bilateral engagements with Iran, if they happen before Iranian elections, should happen according to Tabatabaee at working levels -- Embassy Counselors, DCMs, and Ambassadors -- but not political appointees or policy-makers. "Let the working-level professionals make contact, and build trust by starting to develop normal diplomatic contacts with each other." He added that the USG would also have "less to lose" with such an approach. He said none of the officials close to Ahmadinejad is "of the right mindset" to have useful engagement. "They'd only respond with rhetoric." Instead, ISTANBUL 00000138 002 OF 003 Tabatabee recommended the USG reach out to Iranian diplomats based in multilateral and UN cities, like New York ("The Iranian PermRep there is good; not as brilliant as Javad Zarif was, but still good"),Geneva, and Vienna, where they already have experience sitting in meetings with U.S. diplomatic officials. ¶6. (S) Tabatabaee warned that the USG must "be very careful and meticulous as we get closer to Iranian elections." He cautioned that even though the Khamenei has put this issue off-limits to election sloganeering, "it's still a super-charged issue in Iran." He recommended that the USG take a "Hippocratic oath" when thinking about the next steps: "First do no harm." A big, bold move before June 12 would add dangerous unpredictability to the election campaign, and give spoilers in Iran valuable ammunition to poison what Tabatabee termed a growing consensus among Iranian policymakers that engagement is inevitable, but still must proceed on Iran's terms. "Nowruz this year was particularly hopeful for many Iranians, but we all need to take care not to expect or hope for too much too soon, or we'll all be regretful...like a Nowruz hangover." The countdown to normalization -------------- ¶7. (S) A physics professor at the University of Mashhad (please protect) reaffirmed other observers' views that Khamenei's March 21 remarks should not be read negatively, but rather as an effort to buy more time for the Iranian system to judge more accurately Washington's true intentions, as well as judging the costs to Iran if it agrees to engagement. Khamenei and the regime have "capitalized on several issues, like the nuclear program, which they are not going to sell for cheap." Following Khamenei's careful remarks, the contact noted that at least several political blogs in Iran posted reminders of a past pledge from the Supreme Leader that "the day the American Embassy is re-opened in Tehran, we have to pack up and leave." Khamenei wants to allow just enough engagement to further legitimize the regime and guarantee its survival (especially through enhanced trade with the west) but not so much engagement that the regime loses control or the population starts to believe there may be a political alternative to the current system, a difficult balancing act. "Iran's deepening social, political, and economic problems, though, have so paralyzed the nation that the very existence of the regime may now be at stake, and the Supreme Leader knows this." ¶8. (S) Khamenei thus feels that he has no choice but to pursue engagement carefully, on Iran's terms, and always with the goal of regime survival in mind, according to this contact. Khamenei and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani -- "they are bitter rivals, but they know they are aligned on the need for such engagement" -- have started a count-down to improving relations with the United States, and now are meticulously building consensus among Iran's various power brokers to define the boundaries and then initiate the process. The contact warned, however, that both Iran and the U.S. must watch out for hardliners on both sides who benefit from the status quo and will become ever more desperate in coming months to sabotage the process. "Khamenei himself will try to prevent this, but it is likely still to happen. Be ready for it, but don't let it stop you." "Spoilers working overtime" -------------- ¶9. (S) An Istanbul-based western news correspondent with long experience in Iran passed on the sentiment expressed to him recently by a GOI contact urging that Washington "ignore the negative messages" emanating from hardliners, and instead exercise patience until after elections. The correspondent said that numerous influential Iranian contacts had welcomed the respectful tone of President Obama's message, and hoped the respectful tone will continue, even as the nascent engagement process "lurches into an inevitably rocky stretch." ¶10. (S) Hardline spoilers abound, the correspondent predicted, who may yet be loyal to Khamenei's authority but believe his Mashhad remarks give them latitude to test the USG's true intentions, for example by continuing to detain Iranians (or Iranian-Americans) perceived to be promoting western values too aggressively with Iranian civil society. Those hardliners remain convinced, regardless of the new tone from Washington, that USG is committed to regime change, and to using Iranian civil society, ethnic groups in Iran, and ongoing bilateral and UN sanctions to effect that regime change. Unless and until they can be convinced that the USG ISTANBUL 00000138 003 OF 003 is not supporting violent ethnic groups in Iran, ceases funding pro-democracy efforts inside Iran, and is not using exchange programs to "brainwash" Iran's middle class and youth, these spoilers -- including several powerful IRGC commanders -- will be "working overtime" to take provocative steps intended to scuttle efforts by pragmatists on both sides. ¶11. (C) The correspondent, based on soundings from contacts in Iran, recommended that one step to defuse the spoilers' efforts would be to issue a clear, authoritative statement confirming that the USG does not support violent ethnic groups in Iran, like Jond'allah Similarly, an effort by the USG to either end the current "Iran democracy funding" programs, or give those programs full transparency, perhaps even implementing them through the UN or directly with the GOI, would also weaken the hardliners position. A third step to address the spoilers, he suggested, would be to offer economic benefits that clearly accrue to their own interests, like lifting certain financial sanctions or by "sun-setting" requirements within USG Executive Orders 13224 and 13382 that name and target specific (mostly IRGC) officials. Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) Comment: These contacts, as well as our ref B contact, either represent or are well-plugged in to the "pragmatist" elements of the GOI, and their views may well reflect the current thinking of Iranian officials like Rafsanani and his camp. Our contacts' warnings to "beware the spoilers" -- which track closely with IRPO Dubai's ref C observations -- may also mirror real concerns from some members of this group that they could find themselves targets for pressure and provocation from anti-engagement hardliners. What this perspective lacks, however, is more insight into precisely who the "spoilers" are, and what degree of control Khamenei could potentially exert over them to prevent show-stopping sabotage of the nascent engagement process. We will continue to pulse our contacts on those specific questions. End Comment. Wiener