COLUMNISTS DEBATE THE FUTURE OF TURKEY UNDER AKP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000124 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019 TAGS: KPAO ECON TU PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE SUBJECT: COLUMNISTS DEBATE THE FUTURE OF TURKEY UNDER AKP REF: ANKARA 298 ¶1. (U) Summary. During a lively luncheon at the Consul General's Residence, four senior Turkish columnists exchanged views and barbs about Turkey's future course. While all agreed that Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will be setting the course, there was great disagreement about whether it would be in a positive or negative direction. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Invited to discuss their views on this Sunday's local elections were Nazli Ilicak, a columnist at pro-government Sabah newspaper (and a former MP from the now-defunct Virtue Party, who a decade ago was barred from politics for allegedly anti-secular activities); Etyen Mahcupyan, a columnist at the independent muckraking newspaper Taraf and editor-in-chief of the Armenian newspaper Agos (whose previous editor, Hrant Dink, was assassinated two years ago), who is generally supportive of AKP; Leyla Tavsanoglu, a columnist at the fervently Kemalist newspaper Cumhuriyet; and Cuneyt Ulsever, a columnist at the secular mainstream newspaper Hurriyet. Hurriyet is owned by the Dogan Media Group, which recently received a 500 million dollar equivalent tax assessment from the GOT (Ref),which it strenuously claims is retaliation for its lack of support for AKP. ¶3. (C) The discussion was unusually animated, and the attendees quite open in their disagreements. While each considers him or herself to be a rationalist, each repeatedly accused the others of irrationality. Towards the end of the lunch, Mahcupyan summed up the problem with the following elliptical reference to Turkey's cultural wars: "This is all about the remaking of the republic, not democracy. We can't agree because we have different psychological backgrounds; the Turkey we want is different." The participants disagreed most significantly about the following: ¶4. (C) The Consequence of Local Election Results: The participants, like everyone else in Turkey, expect AKP to prevail in the March 29 local elections, and by a large margin. As explained by Mahcupyan, AKP will win "despite all of their shortcomings" because CHP and MHP (the two main opposition parties) are even less competent. The participants disagreed, however, about whether this would be a good thing. Cumhuriyet's Tavsanoglu, echoed by Ulsever, expressed the fear that if AKP achieves a 50 percent share of the vote (at the upper end of consensus estimates) "they will be free to do whatever they want," and darkly predicted that "they will perhaps confiscate the Dogan Media Group and Cumhuriyet." Ilicak likewise "disapproves" of Prime Minister Erdogan's "attitude" toward Dogan and acknowledged that the election presents dangers. According to her, if AKP got either under 40 percent or over 50 percent it would be destabilizing, and that the sweet spot of victory was 42-45 percent. Mahcupyan, by contrast, thinks the media and AKP should share the blame for their unending squabbles. From his perspective, Turkish media "is not acting like a media. They are acting like POLITICAL parties and the real POLITICAL parties are noticing that." While Mahcupyan does not approve of AKP's media strategy, he said it is a logical response by one POLITICAL actor to attacks by another POLITICAL actor. He views a big AKP win as an opportunity for the media to examine its own behavior and start acting more responsibly. Indeed, he says that the Dogan Group has already begun to rein in its anti-AKP rhetoric. ¶5. (C) The Future of Reforms: Ulsever thinks that AKP will not pursue EU reforms no matter what happens in the elections. (Note: AKP spokespersons have repeatedly pledged that AKP will renew its flagging pursuit of reforms after the elections.) Ilicak disagreed, and listed a number of initiatives that indicate AKP is sincerely interested in accession: The appointment of Egemen Bagis as Minister for EU Affairs, the creation of a Kurdish language channel on Turkish National Television; Turkish President Gul's meeting with Iraqi President (and Kurd) Talabani, the Cyprus initiatives, and even the Ergenekon investigation. Ilicak summed up her confidence in AKP with the statement, "democratization is a change of minds, not change of laws." Mahcupyan agreed with Ilicak, stating that the people who criticize AKP for not making enough reforms did not themselves make any reforms when they were in power. ISTANBUL 00000124 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) RELATIONS With The U.S.: All participants, like most Turks, welcomed the election of President Obama as a new beginning in Turkish-American relations. As Tavsanoglu put it, while Turkey and the U.S. have had their ups and downs "how can you be antagonistic against Americans?" Ilicak noted, however, that "U.S. policies are also important" -- for instance, once the U.S. leaves Iraq, "things will change for the better." Ulsever, however, was a bit more cautious, worrying that Turks' expectations for Obama were too high, since Obama "will always think about U.S. national interests first," and those won't always be aligned with Turkey's interests. Ulsever said many Turks were scared about the Iraq pullout, since it might be perceived as the U.S. "leaving Iraq on its own and imposing on Turks to take care of it." ¶7. (C) Comment. The divergent views of our guests well illustrate how modern Turkey is a work in process. Mahcupyan is quite right that different groups have very different visions for the future of Turkey. The one point on which all our interlocutors were in agreement was that, in the near term, the AKP will be the primary architect for the project. The details of the design and speed with which changes are implemented will depend, in part, upon the extent of the AKP victory in this weekend,s elections. End comment. Wiener