FACEBOOK IN IRAN: DO YOU KNOW WHO YOUR FRIENDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000105 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM ECPS IR SUBJECT: FACEBOOK IN IRAN: DO YOU KNOW WHO YOUR FRIENDS ARE? REF: 2008 ISTANBUL 466 ISTANBUL 00000105 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In early February the Iranian regime reportedly unblocked internet access in Iran to social networking sites like Facebook. Since then tens of thousands of Iranians have signed up, according to Iranian contacts, and use the website not only for socializing but also for political advocacy (including in support of Iranian presidential candidates like Khatami). But there are risks to this expansion of cyber-freedom: Iranian bloggers have reported the use of fake or hijacked "friend" requests coming not from friends but from regime authorities. Observers suggest the regime may have concluded that rather than fight a losing battle trying to block Facebook, it is better to "herd" political and social activities towards using Facebook to facilitate easier regime monitoring of their activities and social networks. Comment: Although any granting of more (cyber) space for Iranians to express themselves is a positive development, activists who use Facebook to advocate controversial political views will continue to be at risk, and now could put their network of "friends" at risk as well. Despite those risks, however, one contact predicted that "like Khomeini's cassette tapes," this valuable tool of free expression will quickly grow beyond the regime's ability to monitor or control. End summary. Facebook in Iran: An inconsistent ban -------------- ¶2. (C) Several contacts of ours inside Iran have underscored to us in recent weeks the potential significance of an apparent decision by the Iranian regime in early February to unblock internet access in Iran to a range of previously banned social networking websites, including Facebook. ¶3. (C) Access to that site, and many other popular sites (including Google, Yahoo, and YouTube),had been at least intermittently blocked throughout Ahmadinejad's presidency, with an upswing in web-site filtering according to some accounts in the Fall of 2007. Many Iranians, however, were able to overcome that internet filtering relatively easily by use of filter-breaking software and proxy servers. Moreover the ban at that time appeared selective: Students at Iran's elite Sharif University of Technology told us last year (reftel) that they continued to enjoy uninterrupted access to Facebook via Sharif's servers, while Iranian Press TV's Istanbul correspondent told us this week that most of her contact with Press TV editors in Iran over the past two years has been via Facebook email. ¶4. (C) A Tehran-based contact who works for a mobile phone company told us that the ban in 2007 was never effectively enforced by the regime, and that as a result some internet service providers never applied the ban on their subscribers. As a result, according to web-tracking service alexa.com, Facebook in 2008 was still among the 30 most popular websites accessed by internet users in Iran. Even so, our contact added, most Iranian users were cautious enough to sign up for Facebook accounts under pseudonyms, and to list their locations on their "profile pages" as being outside of Iran. ¶5. (C) In mid-November 2008, according to our mobile phone company contact, the regime made an effort to tighten the ban by blocking access to as many as five million "western" websites. Iranian media that week reported remarks from by an Iranian judiciary official warning that "Iran's enemies" were using the internet to undermine the regime. That was followed within days by a statement from an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesman claiming that "internet, satellite, and text messages played an important role in color revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia." Our phone company contact speculated that the timing of that decision may have reflected an initial reaction by the regime to President Obama's election, fearing his election might provoke a wave of pro-Obama sentiment among Iranian civil society which could have been circulated instantly via the internet. He said Iranian authorities warned all ISPs that they would be prosecuted if they allowed access to proscribed websites, leading to a more effective shut-down in Iranian access to sites like Facebook. Unblocking Facebook: A valuable social tool... -------------- ¶6. (C) An Iranian journalist living in Istanbul first ISTANBUL 00000105 002 OF 003 informed us in mid-February of what appeared to be a decision by the regime around February 4 to lift domestic filters blocking access to sites like Facebook, a development she said had provoked lively discussion on many Iranian blogs. Moreover, a Tehran-based consulting company's newsletter assessing political and economic developments in Iran noted recently that the move coincided with the Interior Ministry's announcement that the MOI is easing its "social security" policy, under which it had been conducting surprise checks of Iranian offices and work-places to fine or arrest dress code offenders. ¶7. (C) Since the restrictions were lifted Facebook has jumped to become the eighth most visited website in Iran, according to alexa.com. Of six Iranian contacts that we pulsed on this development, five acknowledged having signed up for (or resumed) Facebook pages and many admitted that they have added dozens of "friends" in the past several weeks. Our mobile phone company contact estimated that "tens of thousands" of Iranians may have joined Facebook in the past five weeks. ¶8. (C) A Tehran-based contact who returned to Iran in December after a three-month visit to the U.S. described how she and her friends are now using Facebook not only for social networking and promoting social causes but also for political advocacy and organization. This contact had done some volunteer work for President Obama,s campaign in New York, specifically working on internet outreach. She is now using some of the lessons she learned to help support former President Khatami's presidential campaign, and considers Facebook to be "a uniquely valuable tool" for reaching potential voters. She said she and her friends have helped persuade hundreds of other Iranian "friends" to sign up to Facebook web pages devoted specifically to Khatami's presidency. (Comment: We found at least ten separate Facebook pages supporting Khatami's candidacy, the largest of which has over 15,000 members. There are also Facebook pages that support Tehran mayor Ghalibaf and former Majles Speaker Kerroubi. We found several dozen Facebook pages devoted to President Ahmadinejad, a majority of them negative.) This contact is also using her Facebook email to alert "friends" to election-related news and to strategize about other steps they can take to support his candidacy. ¶9. (C) This contact professed not to be concerned about the risk of regime surveillance of her activities, asserting that she was doing nothing illegal in using Facebook to support Khatami. She suggested, however, that some friends of hers now use Facebook to email "sensitive messages" to each other on more taboo topics (dating, purchasing alcohol and drugs for parties, complaining about the government) because they believe the regime has become very effective at monitoring cell-phone text messages. Sometimes those sensitive emails are often conveyed via simple "home-made" codes, she claimed, for example using a Facebook application that sends verses of poetry from the Persian poet Hafez, with some stanzas having pre-arranged meanings. She was not aware, however, of any friends using Facebook to organize more controversial activities, like rallies or protests, though she assessed that doing so "would be easy." ...But also useful for the regime -------------- ¶10. (C) Our journalist contact pointed out that that regime's decision to unblock Facebook and other proscribed websites followed on the heels of an article in the IRGC's official newspaper, Sobh Sadegh, announcing that the GOI was launching "10,000 revolutionary blogs" as a counter to "western efforts to sow velvet revolution." She suggested that promoting IRGC blogs and unblocking Facebook were part of the same GOI policy decision to use the internet more aggressively to monitor and counter civil society. Our phone company contact assessed that the decision to allow full access to Facebook and other sites was evidence that the regime recognized it could no longer effectively block such access, given the online ubiquity of free anti-filtering and proxy server software. "They realized they can't fight it so they might as well join it, and use it to their advantage." ¶11. (C) The journalist noted that concurrent with the unblocking of Facebook, the regime has moved to restrict or close down a number of websites supporting Khatami's presidency, including yaari.com and yaarinews.com, as well as a website that supports Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf's candidacy. She speculated that regime may be trying to "herd" pro-Khatami and Ghalibaf supporters and other activists ISTANBUL 00000105 003 OF 003 towards Facebook as the primary vehicle for internet advocacy of opposition candidates, to make tracking the networks and activities of those activists easier. ¶12. (C) She also recounted several recent claims from Iranian bloggers who had received "friend requests" on Facebook from people they thought were genuine friends, only to learn later that the "friends'" identifications were either "hijacked" from real friends, or entirely fake. The bloggers speculated that the source of those fake "friend requests" had been the IRGC or MOIS, and had used the access to the bloggers' Facebook pages as a means to record and monitor their "friend" lists, and then moved on to record and monitor those friends' "friend lists", and so on. "It may be that they want to use Facebook to map all of the social connections between activists, which may be easier than trying to monitor and track text messaging." She pointed out that the nature of social networking on Facebook, with easily traceable links between "friends" makes it an ideal platform for Iranian security service surveillance of activists, social networks. Comments -------------- ¶13. (C) Given the tight control that Iranian authorities have always exercised over domestic TV and radio programming, and the frequency (and unpredictability) of regime efforts to censor Iranian print media, the only media tool available to most private citizens and civil society that offers any space for free expression has traditionally been the internet. As a result, Iran by many accounts has the third highest number of blogs in the world (over 2.5 million blogs),behind the US and China. However, one consequence of the internet's popularity in Iran has been an ongoing cat-and-mouse game between the regime -- intent on preventing anti-regime activists from using the internet to advance their agendas -- and internet-savvy Iranians, who have proven they can almost always work around regime blocking and filtering. The regime's decision to allow unfettered Iranian access to Facebook may portend a subtle change in that dynamic. ¶14. (C) This move is encouraging on its surface because of the wider (cyber) space Iranians may now have to express themselves and build links with each other and the outside world. However, if the regime's real reason for lifting restrictions on Facebook and similar sites, as some of our contacts warn, is to more effectively monitor Iranian activists and their social networks, or even hijack their identities and foment suspicion among Iranian civil society, fast-expanding Facebook usage in Iran is indeed a double-edged sword. Activists seeking to use it to advocate controversial political views will continue to be at risk, and may also place their own network of" friends" at risk. Even in the face of those risks, however, one contact confidently predicted that the regime is "making a mistake if they think they can control how we use Facebook or the internet. It's like the Shah allowing distribution of Khomeini's cassette tapes only because he couldn't stop it. A tidal wave of free expression is coming." Wiener