SWAT -- NO QUICK FIXES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000990

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SWAT -- NO QUICK FIXES

Classified By: CDA Gerald Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

Summary and Introduction
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1. (S/NF) Prime Minister Gilani's May 7 speech announcing the
government's intent to "eliminate militants" appears to be
the launching point of full scale military operations in
Swat. Although Pakistani civilian and military leaders are
sounding the right notes about tackling militancy, we should
remain cautious in perceiving any strategic shift in
Islamabad's thinking. A sustained commitment to defeating
militancy on Pakistan's home turf will become clear only when
the government devotes resources to military operations and
building civilian administrative capacity that matches the
dimensions and gravity of the problem.


2. (S/NF) At present, the army appears to be committing more
of its resources to renewed operations in Swat than in the
past. Retaking control of the district, however, will be a
long hard slog. Pakistan has a history of talking tough with
an initial burst of FORCE only to be followed by misgivings
and negotiations with militants once operations bog down and
public opinion turns critical. Militant control of
population centers, roads, and the heights in Swat is
formidable. Despite government efforts to evacuate the
population, the confrontation that is shaping up is likely to
inflict significant civilian casualties. Nascent popular
support will almost certainly be strained by the prolonged
military campaign that will be required. Swat's militants
are battle-hardened, tenacious, and unconventional, and the
Pakistan army's track record in Swat is poor.


3. (S/NF) The counter-insurgency nature of the fight in Swat
and the promised wave of retaliatory violence by militants
outside of Swat will test the patience and resolve of
Pakistani leaders. There are no fast, easy, or clean fixes
for Swat and other areas in Pakistan's northwest region that
have become deeply troubled by militancy. Timely,
well-targeted assistance, particularly humanitarian aid
(septel),however, can help give the military some of the
space it requires to succeed in Swat and to keep the focus of
the story on combating militants rather than the government's
failure to address the needs of those displaced by the
fighting. End Summary/Introduction.

Widening Operations in Swat
--------------


4. (S/NF) Over the past few days, the Pakistani military has
been conducting limited operations in Swat, including aerial
bombardment of the Peochar valley, artillery fire on selected
targets, and some patrolling. Five battalions of Special
Services Group (SSG) commandos (approximately 3,000 soldiers)
are preparing to infiltrate the Peochar valley over the May
9-10 weekend (weather permitting).


5. (S/NF) While Frontier Corps operations in Lower Dir and
Buner are aimed at sealing Swat from the west and south, it
is unclear whether the Pakistani forces have moved into
positions to the east around Shangla. (Note: In late
2007/early 2008 when the first army offensive in Swat began
to fizzle out, Mullah Fazlullah and core TTP leadership
reportedly managed to escape via routes through Shangla.)
The high mountains to the north around Upper Dir and Chitral
are less likely passages for militants in any substantial
numbers. There are reports, however, that militants from
South Waziristan are filtering into Swat through Dir.

Tough Terrain
--------------


6. (C) The Swat district is a long broad valley with rugged
hills. The principal north-south road hugs the eastern wall
of the valley above the Swat River. The route is paved but
narrow, winding over one lane bridges and descending into
stream beds in central Swat around Matta and Khwazakhela -
TTP's stronghold. Passage for army convoys will likely be
labored and exposed to militants who control the heights
above the road. Mingora and Saidu Sharif, Swat's two
principal towns, have been "thoroughly penetrated" by
militants, further complicating the military's position and

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objectives.

Nascent Popular Support
--------------


7. (C) Images of a young woman being flogged in Swat and
rapid militant expansion into Buner helped fuel what appears
to be growing Pakistani public support for military
operations to combat militants. Pakistani memories, however,
can be short and fickle. Despite government efforts to
evacuate Swat residents, the confrontation between the army
and the militants is likely to inflict a high number of
civilian casualties. Local civilian demands for "surgical
operations" with minimal collateral damage are unlikely to be
met. Without additional humanitarian aid, projected
estimates of 500,000 displaced Swatis (in addition to the
approximately 500,000 IDPs from earlier operations in Bajaur
and Mohmand Agencies) could overwhelm the capacity of the
Northwest Frontier provincial government, resulting in scenes
of chaos and misery. Those images could quickly erode public
support for sustained military action in Swat. There is
little to no evidence the GOP is prepared to initiate a media
campaign to cultivate supp
ort for military action against the militants.

Success on the Third Attempt?
--------------


8. (S/NF) The army launched operations twice in Swat -- in
November 2007 and January 2009 -- and failed. Heavy use of
indiscriminate artillery fire and failure to protect the
population from targeted militant violence soured local
public opinion on military intervention in the district.
Chief of Army Staff General Kayani has said that he now has
the necessary political support to launch a third offensive.


9. (C) However, the Pakistani military's orientation and
tactics remain that of a conventional FORCE with little
counter-insurgency training and that posture is unlikely to
change quickly. After an initial burst of requests for U.S.
intelligence and materiel support, the Pakistani military has
backed off because of continued concern about creating too
large a U.S. footprint. We expect the army will get bogged
down in Swat, disrupting its ambitious plans to continue this
fight into the Waziristans as early as June. Whether senior
Pakistani leaders as well as forces in the field have the
will to see through this prolonged campaign with unpopular
tactics is unclear at best. Militant offers of "surrender"
or "peace deals" could prove tempting if the public grows
weary of operations that have gone on too long without
conventional "victory."

Retaliation
--------------


10. (S/NF) Militant violence accelerated following the
collapse of other peace agreements (North Waziristan in July
2007 and Swat in July 2008) and resulted in multiple large
scale attacks. Announcing the Swat peace agreement "dead,"
TTP in the same breath threatened attacks on Pakistani
civilian and military institutions. Multiple spectacular
attacks could weaken leadership resolve and public support
for what may appear to be an open-ended military campaign on
home territory. Militants have also publicly linked current
Pakistani military operations to the United States, arguing
that the Pakistani military is doing Washington's bidding and
hoping to sow discord between Islamabad and Washington.

"Holding and Building"
--------------


11. (S/NF) Even if clearing operations show signs of success,
the much harder and longer requirements remain -- holding
territory taken back from the militants and building civilian
administration and delivery of services quickly enough to
shore up local confidence. As the army takes limited AIR
assets for the Swat operation, the FC is being left with
little to no AIR capability to hold areas of Bajaur and
Mohmand they have cleared. Frontier Corps' (FC) gains in
Bajaur are fragile, and the diversion of FC forces to Dir and
Buner has left some key operations unfinished. Local
officials note the recent assassination of a tribal leader in

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Khar as an indicator that FC's military achievements could
still unravel if trouble spots go unattended. That is a
caution that will apply to Swat as well.

Comment
--------------


12. (S/NF) There are no fast, easy, or clean fixes for Swat
and other areas in Pakistan's northwest region that have
become deeply troubled by militancy. Timely, well-targeted
assistance, particularly humanitarian aid (septel),however,
can help give the military some of the space it requires to
succeed in Swat and to keep the focus of the story on
combating militants rather than the government's failure to
address the needs of those displaced by the fighting.

FEIERSTEIN