CONSTRAINTS ON NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000690


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP PK
SUBJECT: CONSTRAINTS ON NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
PAKISTAN

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. The Government of Pakistan has sought to
strengthen its nonproliferation image after the unmasking of
the A.Q. Khan network revealed significant gaps in its
ability to control and protect its nuclear assets. With
substantial U.S. and international assistance, Pakistan has
begun to improve its practices in several areas, such as
export control. More can be done, but Pakistan's limited
personnel and financial resources constrain USG options for
expanding engagement. Effective prioritization of
cooperative activities, including the extension by the USG of
overseas invitations to GOP officials, will be required to
best augment Pakistan's capabilities. End Summary.


2. (C) Following the A.Q. Khan affair, the Government of
Pakistan recognized it had serious deficiencies in its
nuclear control practices. Since then it has passed a
weapons of mass destruction law, improved physical protection
of weapons-related materials, established an interagency
export control authority, and expanded the mandate of its
nuclear regulator to enforce security and safety standards,
among other actions. These improvements have come about in
large part due to assistance from the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). It is clear the GOP takes these efforts seriously
and is committed to continued engagement, though Islamabad
also is motivated by a long-term desire to augment its
civilian nuclear energy capability. GOP officials have
conveyed their belief that nonproliferation bonafides are
prerequisite to any nuclear power deal, even if such is a
very distant reality.


3. (C) Despite this progress and Pakistan's stated interest
in stronger controls, nonproliferation practices remain
uneven. In many cases, the GOP has formulated plans for
strengthened capabilities that it has not managed to
implement fully. For instance, Pakistan's export control
authority has developed control lists and regulations, but it
is not yet operating its licensing review system. U.S.
nonproliferation cooperation programs can continue to help
with implementation. Given that Pakistan now possesses much
of the equipment and technology to carry out these missions,
U.S. efforts should focus on building capacity in the
agencies charged with implementing these activities.


4. (C) Pakistan's limited financial and personnel resources
constrain U.S. options for expanding engagement, however.
The government agencies with responsibility for implementing
nonproliferation programs--Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Federal Bureau of Revenue, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority, and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission--have little
if any budget for travel. Furthermore, the pool of expertise
at these agencies is very small and almost all cooperation
flows through just a few individuals. The Disarmament
Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example,
employs just three officials to handle the entire range of
nonproliferation issues, including bilateral and multilateral
cooperation.


5. (C) In recent weeks, Post has received several
invitations for GOP officials to attend a variety of
international nonproliferation meetings and conferences
related to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, nuclear forensics,
and the Megaports Initiative, in addition to
regularly-scheduled trainings and visits. The GOP probably
would like to participate in all of these events in order to
continue to rehabilitate its nonproliferation image. Post
believes, however, that there is a substantial risk that
overloading the GOP with these meetings will draw attention
and resources away from the work required to implement
effective proliferation controls.


6. (C) Effective prioritization of cooperative activities by
the Department, including invitations to overseas meetings,
will be required to best augment Pakistan's capabilities. It
will also help alleviate the strain on the few GOP officials
we rely on for cooperation. If GOP participation in a
particular meeting is deemed important by the USG to the
further development of Pakistan's nuclear security system,
then the invitation should include USG funding of
participation costs.


PATTERSON