PRESSING THE UN ON IMPROVING ITS PRESENCE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000640 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM UN PTER PREF PK SUBJECT: PRESSING THE UN ON IMPROVING ITS PRESENCE IN PAKISTAN REF: A. ISLAMABAD 78 ¶B. SECSTATE 4353 ¶C. USUN NEW YORK 29 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The UN system needs to appoint a humanitarian coordinator in Pakistan and fill its positions with permanent staff. These are urgent requirements necessary to respond to the problems of Pakistan,s internally displaced. The UN's ability to meet these requirements will be affected by the disappointing response to its appeal, and we recommend humanitarian funding be discussed in Abu Dhabi and in Tokyo. Perhaps more importantly, the UN (and member states) should start now to build a broad UN structure in Pakistan that can meet some of the longer-term challenges, such as improving donor coordination or supporting an eventual disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation process. We are certain Jean Arnault is up to the task, but he will need a strong UN structure to assist him. Post is highly appreciative of the efforts undertaken so far by colleagues, especially PRM and USUN, to provide support for Pakistan's internally displaced people. We recommend high level intervention with UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon on the issue. End summary. ¶2. (C) Pakistan is experiencing a growing humanitarian crisis in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),but to date the UN response has been slow and dysfunctional. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled combat between militants and the GOP has grown to over 500,000 victims, who are living either in IDP camps or with often impoverished relatives. We expect this situation to continue and probably grow over the next year or more. UN agencies in country are unable to cope and have asked New York to appoint a senior humanitarian aid coordinator to supplement an as-yet unfilled increase in mid-level workers from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). The UN, however, apparently has refused to appoint this senior humanitarian coordinator, arguing that it has already approved one senior advisor, Jean Arnault, to coordinate the political/donor work of the Friends of Pakistan. We welcome Arnault's appointment, but he is not a humanitarian aid specialist and his mission, as we understand it and as the situation requires, is not to coordinate this kind of aid. ¶3. (C) The UN has been unable to fill the needed mid-grade positions in the humanitarian agencies or to provide coordination through OCHA. In a conversation in Washington on March 18 with Rashid Khalikov, he argued that: 1) the unaccompanied nature of the posting; 2) the kidnapping of UNHCR official John Solecki; and, 3) the failure of the government to speed the import of armored cars and the GOP's general incompetence have made it difficult to fill the OCHA positions. We agree that these are considerations, but surely no worse than the UN faces in staffing its posts in other crisis and conflict-ridden posts around the world. But it is hard to imagine a more strategically important place for the United States. ¶4. (C) Post also shares Washington's concerns about the anemic response by donors to the appeal from UN agencies and the ICRC. Donor coordination is extremely weak in Islamabad -- in some cases because the Pakistanis believe they can work the seams among and between donors -- but also because there is no central point of contact. For this reason alone, we need a senior humanitarian coordinator from the UN who has good RELATIONS with Arnault, good reach back into the UN system, and effective contacts with the GOP and other agencies, like the ICRC. ¶5. (C) Mission strongly appreciates the efforts of colleagues, particularly USUN's and PRM's efforts with the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and in obtaining funding. To find us the resources we recommend high-level intervention with UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon on this issue. We must assure him that we are doing all we can to effect the release of kidnapped UNHCR Coordinator John Solecki, and we appreciate the difficulties of implementing humanitarian ISLAMABAD 00000640 002 OF 002 assistance in Pakistan. But the UN is our only conduit into many of these at-risk areas and the only method of delivering services. The IDP situation is creating suffering and is undermining the government's efforts to evict terrorists and stabilize this volatile region. ¶6. (C) A longer-term issue is the build-up of UN structures in Pakistan to address the humanitarian crisis, support Jean Arnault's mission, and provide a staff to support the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. We understand that the UN process across the border has taken some time to get its act together, particularly for staffing. While Pakistan does not want a UNAMA-type structure or the attention of the UN Security Council, there are still many needs that require an enhanced UN role. We urge the UN to increase its staffing here. We need this for improved donor coordination, to support any possibility of a DDR process with insurgents who can be reconciled, and to be another, credible voice with the government. PATTERSON