IMPLICATIONS OF THE LONG MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000560



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK

SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LONG MARCH



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (C) Opposition parties and lawyers are dancing in the

streets. Asif Zardari's sudden decision late March 15 to

capitulate to Nawaz Sharif exposed his political weakness and

isolation after the debacle of imposing governor's rule in

Punjab. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's late night

meetings with Zardari and Gilani may have helped them decide

on the merits of avoiding more street violence after a

troubled day in Lahore. Interestingly, Zardari allowed PM

Gilani to take the public credit for plans to restore Punjab

Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and former Chief Justice

Iftikhar Chaudhry.



2. (C) This alleged win for civil society was really a

victory for Nawaz Sharif, and whether he presses for more may

determine Zardari's future. Nawaz does not have the votes to

bring down the government or impeach Zardari, but that does

not mean he would not try. A weakened Zardari may not be

able to prevent enactment of constitutional reform to shift

powers from the President to the Prime Minister.



3. (C) It is too soon to count Zardari out--we expect he

still has cards to play--but we need to consider the

consequences of our most effective interlocutor in Pakistan

losing the political strength to pursue a shared agenda.

Increasingly, we may have to deal with an empowered PM Gilani

who supports a close U.S.-Pakistan relationship but is

concerned about U.S. strikes in the tribal areas and prefers

reconciliation to combat with militants. To retain coalition

support, Zardari may feel compelled to sign the Swat deal on

Shari'a law. Interior Minister and Zardari confidant Rehman

Malik has been our strongest partner in pressing for Mumbai

prosecutions, but he also has lost standing as a result of

this crisis.



4. (C) Longer-term, if Gilani becomes the face of Pakistan,

we will lose Zardari's ability to project confidence to both

Donors and Friends. He also may be unable to deliver on his

promise to give former President Musharraf indemnity; a

reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry could challenge his old

nemesis Musharraf on a number of grounds. Chaudhry could

renew his efforts to release the "disappeared," and we will

need to engage to protect our equities on a small number of

these terrorist detainees. On a positive note, U.S. efforts

to mediate the Zardari-Sharif dispute generally have been

well-received by the public and the opposition parties alike.

High-level Washington intervention with the Sharifs has

helped build relations with the brothers and should

strengthen our hand in future interactions. End Summary.



5. (C) It will take some time for all the consequences of

the lawyers' "long march" to play out. In the short term,

Prime Minister Gilani's announcement that the judges

(including former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry) deposed by

then President Musharraf would be restored and the government

would file a review petition challenging the Supreme Court's

decision to disqualify Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from office

is good news. It will end governor's rule, restore Shahbaz

Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab, and resolve a two-year

struggle by lawyers to overturn Musharraf's

extra-constitutional action to sack uncooperative judges.

The government's sudden capitulation and the Pakistan Muslim

League-N (PML-N) decision to stop the march ended an

unnecessary political crisis that was creating violent street

protests.



Sudden Capitulation

--------------



6. (C) Several factors contributed to the government's

sudden change of heart. Despite repeated polling that showed

Nawaz Sharif as the most popular leader in Pakistan (by a

favorability factor of 83% to Zardari's 20% in the latest IRI

poll),Zardari underestimated Nawaz's ability to bring people

into the streets. In spite of extensive efforts, neither the

GOP nor the Punjab government under Pakistan People's Party

(PPP) Governor Taseer was able to limit or control the

crowds. Zardari believes that Taseer misled him in

estimating the reaction to imposing governor's rule. As

resignations of mid-level police officers in Punjab and the

ability of the Sharifs to "evade" police blockades

demonstrated, many of the police sided with Nawaz and were



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reluctant to use force to stop the protests. It was never

clear exactly why Zardari so feared the proposed sit-in in

the capital, which the GOP should have been able to manage

peacefully.



7. (C) Zardari lost support within the PPP and among his

coalition partners after he over-reached and imposed

governor's rule in Punjab. PM Gilani, Awami National Party

leader Asfundyar Wali Khan and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader

Fazlur Rehman had made it clear publicly that they disagreed

with the disqualification ruling and the move to impose

governor's rule. Two PPP ministers (Raza Rabbani and Sherry

Rehman) resigned over Zardari's decisions to support his

lawyer (Law Minister Farouq Naek) as Chairman of the Senate

and to shut down a TV station critical of Zardari. Gilani,

Naek and other key PPP members believed that it was time to

compromise on the judges' issue, despite Zardari's continued

intransigence on the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry. Late

March 15, even coalition partner Muttahida Quami Movement

(which controls a critical block of 25 votes in the National

Assembly) was warning Zardari he had to compromise. Last,

but perhaps not least, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani

reportedly met yet again with the President and the Prime

Minister late on March 15.



Restoring the PPP's Reputation

--------------



8. (C) In his short speech, Gilani emphasized the long

relationship between the PPP and the lawyers and said that

Benazir Bhutto had supported restoration of the judiciary and

of Iftikhar Chaudhry. (Note: Benazir most assuredly did not

support restoration of Chaudhry.) This was an attempt to

reverse a twist in which the populist PPP had ceded the moral

high ground on the independence of the judiciary to the

PML-N. In fact, Nawaz has been expanding PML-N's base into

PPP territory for months on traditional liberal/democracy

issues. Meanwhile, Zardari has been creating rifts within

the PPP by appointing cronies at the expense of Benazir

loyalists and ignoring the need to rebuild the party in the

wake of her death. Also in his speech, Gilani made it a

point to say that the decision to restore the judiciary

fulfilled a promise (made by Zardari to Nawaz in 2008); in

this, Gilani was responding to Zardari's serious credibility

problem and trying to restore the PPP's reputation as a

reliable partner with the PML-N. Gilani and the PPP will

emerge from this crisis stronger than before.



Seeds of Conflict

--------------



9. (C) This is a clear victory for Nawaz, who did agree to

cancel the long march and is expected to meet with PM Gilani

later today on the way forward. We expect a show of

reconciliation in the form of joint committees on

implementing the PPP/PML-N Charter of Democracy. If Nawaz is

smart, he will consolidate his winnings and wait while the

PPP-led government continues to struggle with economic and

security challenges. However, flush with success, Nawaz may

use the PML-N government in Punjab to create political

gridlock (as it did in the 1990s) for the PPP in the center.

Nawaz does not have the votes to bring down the government or

to impeach Zardari (both require a two-thirds parliamentary

majority),but he may at least make life difficult for

Zardari, perhaps by keeping alive corruption allegations.

Nawaz surely will press for enactment of an 18th amendment to

transfer power from the President to the Prime Minister, and

we expect Gilani will support this popular initiative. Nawaz

will also support any effort by Chaudhry to go after his old

nemesis Pervez Musharraf; Zardari was never enthusiastic

about securing Musharraf's indemnity, and now Zardari may be

too weak to win approval. (Nevertheless, even Nawaz will

understand the need for caution in taking on Musharraf for

fear of provoking the Army.) Nawaz may win yet another

victory if Zardari ousts PPP Punjab Governor Taseer for

giving him bad advice on the PPP's prospects to take over the

Punjab Assembly.





Zardari's Future

--------------



10. (C) It is curious that Zardari chose to have Gilani



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make the concession speech. While it allowed Zardari to

avoid personally conceding defeat to Nawaz, it also permitted

Gilani to take all the credit for what is a very popular

decision. We do not expect any immediate changes in

Zardari's status, but he definitely has lost political power

and influence in this self-inflicted drama, and many will be

asking how long he can last. Whether or how he will survive

in the longer term will depend on Nawaz, Justice Chaudhry and

PM Gilani. If Zardari expects to face impeachment or be

forced to cede his presidential powers to the Prime Minister,

he may resign after concluding that remaining in office

simply isn't worth it. Despite his loss, we believe Zardari

is unlikely to give up even a reduced hold on power

voluntarily, at the least because he will want to preserve

the family franchise for Bilawal. At a minimum, PPP Co-Chair

Zardari will need to concentrate on mending fences within his

own party and expanding his circle of advisors to include

more old-line PPP politicians.



A Not-So-Independent Judiciary

--------------



11. (C) Civil society, particularly Pakistan's

long-suffering lawyers, will tout this as a step toward an

independent judiciary. The reality is not quite so pristine.

Despite his decision to stand up to Musharraf in 2007,

Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of many judges who took an oath to

Musharraf in 1999. Chaudhry now is deeply politicized, and

the temptation to use his newly restored status to strike out

at Zardari and/or Musharraf or again become judicially active

will be strong and difficult for the government to control.

Beginning in 2007, the media used its new-found freedoms to

publicize and support the lawyers' movement. In this latest

crisis, the media lost some objectivity in its overwhelming

bias against Zardari and the government; Zardari's efforts to

shut down two TV channels simply backfired and probably

deepened the media's long-time animus against him.



Kayani: Adroit Moves

--------------



12. (C) Kayani also emerged as a winner, due to his adroit

behind-the-scenes maneuvering. He effectively worked to

encourage U.S. and UK intervention and managed his Corps

Commanders. Perhaps more importantly, he made the Army's

concerns clear without being alarmist. The Army remained on

stand-by to protect law and order, but Kayani was not seen as

publicly intervening in any negative way. Assurances that

the Army was not ready to step in reinforced Kayani's

reputation as a friend of democracy and preserved his options

if any intervention becomes necessary in the future.



Effect on USG Interests

--------------



13. (C) It is too soon to predict the extent of fallout

from this weekend's capitulation to Nawaz. However, Zardari

has been our most effective interlocutor in Pakistan, and his

reduced power will affect negatively our ability to get

things done. Above all, if Zardari continues to be focused

on his own political future, he will not concentrate on the

economic or security situation. The most obvious fallback to

Zardari, especially if parliament shifts constitutional

powers, is PM Gilani. In the fight against extremism, Gilani

agrees with Zardari on goals but not necessarily on tactics.

Gilani has serious concerns about U.S. strikes in the tribal

areas and believes that dialogue will go further than

military action in defeating the militants. Under pressure

to restore coalition support, Zardari may now be more willing

to sign on to the Swat Shari'a accord negotiated with local

taliban.



14. (C) On the Mumbai investigation and the arrests and

detention of the Lashkar-e-Taiba masterminds, our strongest

partner has been Interior Minister Rehman Malik, but he was

largely responsible for the GOP's over-zealous reaction to

the demonstrators and is cited by many as giving Zardari bad

advice during this political crisis. As a close Zardari

advisor, Malik's future is not at all clear at the moment.



15. (C) Zardari may not be a sophisticated economist, but

he understands and projects confidence to the international

community far better than Gilani; this confidence will be



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important as we move towards a Donors/Friends conference in

April. Zardari may not now be in a position to push against

the military on approving trans-shipments of wheat from India

to Afghanistan. Chaudhry may also decide to again champion

the "disappeared," and we will have to engage to protect our

equities over a small number of detained terrorists.



16. (C) Comment: Sorting through the fallout of this

political crisis will take some time. With the glory will

come pressure on Gilani to find a way forward on forming a

government in Punjab and enacting the ambitious agenda of the

Charter of Democracy. Don't count Zardari out yet--we expect

he has more (and not necessarily good) cards to play.

PATTERSON