PM GILANI STAYS ABOVE THE FRAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000506 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK SUBJECT: PM GILANI STAYS ABOVE THE FRAY REF: ISLAMABAD 441 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. In a March 9 meeting with Ambassador, Gilani criticized the decision to impose governor's rule in Punjab and supported compromise to end the dispute between Zardari and the Sharif brothers. However, Gilani offered little in terms of immediate ideas that would be acceptable to the Sharifs and asked the Ambassador what Zardari wanted to do. He confirmed that the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had turned down Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat's bid to become leader of the Senate; the PPP had nominated Law Minister Naek, and Shujaat was reviewing whether to agree to name a PML candidate for deputy leader. While decrying political "horse trading," Gilani noted that if the PML "forward block" in Punjab grows to 42, it will be a party that can switch sides without penalty. Gilani's main concern about the upcoming lawyers' march in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad is the prospect of a terrorist attack on demonstrators; if the government has to call out the Army to maintain law and order, said Gilani, it will. Gilani's engagement with all political factions has adroitly positioned him to come out ahead, regardless of who prevails in this political battle. End summary ¶2. (C) In a March 9 meeting with Gilani, Ambassador asked what could be done to resolve the current dispute between Nawaz Sharif and President Zardari. The U.S. wanted to support the civilian government and avoid violence that could cause the Army to be called in during the lawyers' march, and it would be important to demonstrate political stability for the upcoming Donors' Conference. Gilani continued (reftel) to avoid a direct answer. Gilani outlined his three major concerns: (1) election of a new Senate leader, second in line to the President; (2) balancing the need for law and order with the rights of demonstrators in the lawyers' long march; and (3) working to enact the provisions of the Charter of Democracy, signed jointly by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) in 2002. He described his personal history of good relations with the Sharifs, despite at one point defeating Nawaz in a Punjab election, and noted he had scrupulously avoided becoming embroiled in the controversy over the Chief Justice -- he had fired his press secretary, who had attempted to use the PM's office to help resolve the exam scandal involving Chief Justice Dogar's daughter. Implicitly criticizing Zardari, Gilani repeated his view that imposing governor's rule in Punjab was unnecessary and said that the current governor could reconvene the Punjab Assembly at any point. ¶3. (C) The political reality, explained Gilani, was that the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, was in the driver's seat because neither the PPP nor Nawaz could form a government in Punjab without the PML. Gilani confirmed that Shujaat's price was being named chairman of the Senate; Gilani brought that idea to the PPP, which March 8 had decided the Senate leader should be a PPP candidate as the PPP had the majority of seats. The PPP had chosen to nominate Law Minister Farouq Naek as Senate leader (next in line to the President) but offered that Shujaat could choose the deputy leader, preferably a PML candidate from Balochistan. Shujaat, said Gilani, was thinking that over as of 9 March. Gilani reported that Shujaat believed he could regain control of 28 of the PML's "forward block" members in the Punjab that were ready to defect to Nawaz; if that number rose to 42, said Gilani, it would be a party and no longer a forward block subject to disqualification penalties for switching parties. ¶4. (C) Gilani confirmed that to support reconciliation the PML-N wanted restoration of Shahbaz Sharif as Punjab Chief Minister, reversal of the Sharifs' disqualification and restoration of the deposed judiciary. Gilani did not explain Zardari's counter offer -- in fact, he asked the Ambassador what Zardari's position was -- but outlined his own view that the PPP should form a consensus to enact the Charter of Democracy agenda. This included abolition of the 17th ISLAMABAD 00000506 002 OF 002 amendment (including the two term limit on the prime minister) and enactment of a new method to vet and appoint judges. The government could ask the Supreme Court to review its disqualification of the Sharifs; asked if parliament could address the issue, Gilani said he would have to check on the legality of this. ¶5. (C) Ambassador pressed on the possibility of violence stemming from the lawyers' march, set to begin on March 12. Gilani expressed the view that the government should allow the demonstrators to voice their concerns. However, he had called Shahbaz Sharif to say that the PML-N should not turn a march in favor of restoring the judiciary into a march to restore the Sharifs as this would undermine PML-N's own agenda. Gilani said his biggest concern was that terrorists would exploit the situation to launch another attack. The Rangers were on standby, he said, and if the Army had to be called in, then the government would call them in. The top priority was maintaining law and order. ¶6. (C) Comment: The PM's plans to enact the Charter of Democracy are unrealistic but play well politically. Gilani does have a sound gut instinct for politics in Pakistan. He is well-liked by virtually all political parties and is seen as a sincere and trusted consensus builder. Wittingly or not, he has positioned himself to come out ahead regardless of who wins the current dispute between Zardari and the Sharifs. PATTERSON