Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD495
2009-03-07 16:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

ZARDARI-NAWAZ RECONCILIATION: PLEAS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL PTER 
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OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0495/01 0661644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071644Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1774
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9941
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9827
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4564
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1195
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6872
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5799
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000495 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI-NAWAZ RECONCILIATION: PLEAS FOR U.S.
INTERVENTION

REF: A. LAHORE 41
B. ISLAMABAD 488 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000495



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK

SUBJECT: ZARDARI-NAWAZ RECONCILIATION: PLEAS FOR U.S.

INTERVENTION



REF: A. LAHORE 41

B. ISLAMABAD 488 (NOTAL)



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (C) Summary. Amid flurries of political horse trading

and so-far unsuccessful efforts to mediate a resolution to

the Sharif brothers' disqualification from public office and

the imposition of governor's rule in Punjab, Chief of Army

Staff General Kayani and several political parties appealed

to the U.S. to intervene. Pakistan Muslim League (PML)

leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain indicated to Ambassador he

would align with Zardari if we would guarantee he became

leader of the Senate (next in line to the President); Shahbaz

Sharif told PO Lahore (Ref A) the Pakistan Muslim League-N

(PML-N) would need a guarantor for any reconciliation with

Zardari; the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) wanted U.S.

reassurance we still supported Zardari but also was concerned

that MQM would be damaged by its association with him.



2. (C) There are several common themes here: distrust of

Zardari; agreement on the need to find a way out of the

current political impasse to prevent disruptive street

violence; and abandonment of all pretense that the U.S.

should not intervene in Pakistani internal affairs.

Ambassador has been careful to keep the U.S. out of the

political souk; however, it is in our interests to ease

Zardari off the ledge he has walked onto and avoid the kind

of violence that will force the Army to restore law and

order. Even if a reconciliation package can be found, it is

unlikely Nawaz can back out of support for the lawyers'

march, scheduled to begin on March 12 and culminate in

Islamabad on March 16. We have no leverage over Nawaz but

continue weigh in with Zardari. We will urge him to resolve

quickly the political leadership issue in Punjab and avoid

further exacerbating the judiciary issue with a decision to

extend the current Chief Justice. End Summary.



MEDIATORS SHUTTLE

--------------



3. (C) On March 6-7, multiple political mediators,

including Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani,

Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan and Jamiat

Ulema-e-Islam c
hief Fazlur Rehman, conducted visits aimed at

reconciling President Zardari and Pakistan Muslim League-N

(PML-N) leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif in the wake of

mounting political pressure following the Sharifs'

disqualification from public office and Zardari's imposition

of governor's rule in Punjab. There was a mixed response to

PML-N's call for nationwide strikes on March 6; as expected,

the biggest support for strikes and PML-N rallies continued

to be in the Sharifs' home base of Punjab. Zardari and PM

Gilani met to review the situation, and Zardari saw Muttahida

Quami Movement (MQM) in-country leader Farouq Sattar.

Representatives of rival center-right parties PML-N and the

Pakistan Muslim League (PML) also met, while PML also offered

to mediate between Zardari and Nawaz. PML also reportedly

met with PM Gilani to discuss a possible alliance with the

Pakistan People's Party (PPP).



4. (C) Despite assertions by Fazlur that Nawaz and Zardari

were seasoned politicians who would come to an agreement,

Nawaz continued to address large crowds and Zardari has shown

no sign of budging on the judges' issue or the Sharifs'

disqualification. In impassioned speeches in Lahore and

Faisalabad this weekend, Nawaz asserted that the dispute

could only be settled on the street and predicted that the

lawyers' march would mark the beginning of "revolution" in

the country. Both Zardari and Nawaz have boxed themselves

into hardline positions.



MQM WORRIED

--------------



5. (C) On March 6, MQM leader Farouq Sattar asked urgently

to see Ambassador to convey the concerns of MQM leader Altaf

Hussain regarding the political upheaval. Sattar emphasized

that MQM continued to support Zardari 100 percent, but said:

(1) it was clear Zardari had not done his homework by

accurately counting votes before declaring governor's rule;



ISLAMABAD 00000495 002 OF 002





(2) the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) support for both the

disqualification and governor's rule was weak at best; and

(3) the coalition was not governing well and this latest

distraction would not help matters. His conclusion was that

Zardari's friends had to get together and find a way to help

him out of this mess, so that the coalition could concentrate

on the economy and growing militancy. Altaf Hussain wanted

to know if the U.S. still supported Zardari.



6. (C) Ambassador agreed with Sattar's analysis, said

emphatically that we continued to support the elected

government and asked Sattar for suggestions on how to

reconcile Nawaz and Zardari. Sattar described a formula he

had proposed to Zardari several days ago--enact a

constitutional amendment that would concurrently fire all/all

judges who had taken oaths to dictators (this would include

both the former and current Chief Justices Chaudhry and

Dogar) and, through a new judicial review board, hire new

judges with impeccable credentials (this could include judges

backed by Nawaz and Zardari). Sattar, whose MQM party

strongly dislikes the PML-N, did not suggest that the

disqualification of Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif be overturned.

MQM remains a key player the PPP cannot afford to lose;

Zardari did not move against Nawaz until MQM (with its 25

seats in the National Assembly) agreed to join the governing

coalition and return the PPP government to a slim majority in

the National Assembly.



PML IN THE SOUK

--------------



7. (C) On March 7, Ambassador met with Pakistan Muslim

League (PML) leaders Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz

Elahi. PML holds the votes to enable either the PPP or the

PML-N to form a coalition government in Punjab but has been

sitting on the fence courting offers from both Zardari and

Nawaz. A significant (30 plus) forward block within PML has

made it clear it supports joining Nawaz, and many in the

party agree it would make more sense to bring these two

center-right parties together again. However, uniting PML

and PML-N would precipitate a leadership struggle between the

Sharifs and the Chaudhrys. Others within the party believe

an alliance with the PPP makes more sense because Zardari now

controls a larger share of the spoils.



8. (C) Shujaat made it clear to Ambassador he would like

U.S. support for his bid to become leader of the Senate

(second in line to the President); Elahi would like to return

to his former post as Chief Minister of Punjab. Shujaat told

Ambassador, however, that he does not trust Zardari to follow

through on his promises without a guarantor. (Note: Shahbaz

Sharif told PO Lahore (Ref A) that PML-N would also like a

guarantor to any reconciliation deal because of questions

about Zardari's trustworthiness.)

9. (C) Comment: With the lawyers' march scheduled to begin

on March 12, and election of a new Senate leader expected the

same day, time is running short for a resolution of these

disputes. The media, which overwhelmingly has criticized

Zardari for both the Sharifs' disqualification and governor's

rule, will have a field day covering the long march.

Meanwhile, the situation in Swat and even the Sri Lankan

cricket team attack have receded from the front pages to make

way for the current political drama. As Awami National Party

leader Khattak told Polcouns March 5, "Zardari will not be

able to concentrate on anything else but the Punjab crisis

from now on." This has all become reminiscent of Musharraf's

obsession with the former Chief Justice, to the detriment of

his own rule and government control over the tribal areas.

PATTERSON

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