Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD2963
2009-12-11 08:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

CONTINUED POST-CONFLICT PLANNING FOR SOUTH

Tags:  ECON PREL EAID PK MOPS 
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VZCZCXRO3477
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2963/01 3450832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110832Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6351
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1283
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1971
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5860
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 2673
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8272
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 7327
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002963 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: ECON PREL EAID PK MOPS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED POST-CONFLICT PLANNING FOR SOUTH
WAZIRISTAN

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2837

B. PESHAWAR 218

C. PESHAWAR 213

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002963 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019 TAGS: ECON PREL EAID PK MOPS SUBJECT: CONTINUED POST-CONFLICT PLANNING FOR SOUTH WAZIRISTAN REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2837 ¶B. PESHAWAR 218 ¶C. PESHAWAR 213 Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary. In meetings December 3 with CG and Assistance Coordinator, Northwest Frontier Province Governor Ghani and FATA Additional Chief Secretary Habibullah Khan confirmed support for USAID's proposed supporting post-conflict reconstruction in South Waziristan. Both approved in principle the concept of providing an initial $50 million directly to the FATA Secretariat through a Fixed Amount Reimbursement process; the FATA Secretariat would then subcontract out to the para-statal Frontier Works Organization for roads and to other GOP entities for electricity, water, et cetera with a focus on restoring services for the return of those displaced by the fighting in the spring. The Pakistani Army will provide security. Both interlocutors understand the USG need for independent monitoring, but Ghani in particular was nervous about American civilians moving about in the area. Post will follow up on this issue through additional meetings with the Governor and the Army this week. Both Ghani and Habibullah reported on a jirga with Mehsud elders in which the government demanded the tribe turn over 387 militants and accept conditions upon their return to the area. End Summary. Current Status of Operations -------------- ¶2. (C) Habibullah Khan, the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) told Peshawar CG and Civilian Assistance Coordinator (AssistCoord) Ambassador Raphel December 3 that military actions in South Waziristan have proceeded better than expected. He and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ghani in separate meetings reported on a December 1 jirga in Tank with displaced elders of the Mehsud tribe. Habibullah said they were giving the Mehsuds an opportunity to choose: accept state control or get used to life as an IDP. The jirga requested ten days to reply to the following conditions for the Mehsud tribe's return to South Waziristan: - The Mehsuds must turn over to the political administration 387 militants named in a list presented to the elders. - They must agree to a revision of riwaj (Note: An informal legal code administered by tribal elders, generally through jirgas. End Note.) to
limit the tradition of offering sanctuary so that in the future it applies only to tribesmen from their own area. This would no longer allow sanctuary for foreign terrorists, non-South Waziristan Pakistanis, or criminals in Mehsud lands. - The Mehsud tribes must agree that outside of Pakistani law and riwaj, they would not honor any other legal code, including decisions by the shari'a courts maintained by militant groups. - The Mehsud's must give up all heavy weapons, such as rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, etc. ¶3. (C) Elsewhere in FATA, Habibullah confirmed reports that the military was launching operations against militants who had fled from South Waziristan into Orakzai and Kurram agencies. Habibullah repeated his often expressed concern that militants fleeing into Afghanistan were using bases and support from Afghan officials to launch attacks back into Pakistan. He highlighted the need for the GOP to formulate and implement a strategic communications plan to retain the hearts and minds of the population in favor of continued operations against militants. After the Military Operations -------------- ¶4. (C) Habibullah reported that the government will have a definitive plan in place by December 15, 2009, to quickly provide assistance to South Waziristan. He reported that the Army had already begun emergency work on electricity, water and road repairs. He supports the concept but is reviewing ISLAMABAD 00002963 002 OF 002 details about the latest draft Implementing Letter from USAID that outlines how the U.S. will spend an initial $50 million to support South Waziristan reconstruction through a Fixed Amount Reimbursement process that requires specific monitoring. Before beginning work beyond basic infrastructure, Habibullah wants a damage needs assessment (DNA) similar to that conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank in Malakand. (Comment: The ADB had earlier told AssistCoord that they are not currently involved in any conversations regarding a DNA in South Waziristan. End Comment.) Monitoring and the Role of NGOs -------------- ¶5. (C) Acknowledging donor concerns about accountability, Habibullah said the FATA Secretariat could work with the USG to ensure transparency. Although Chief of Army Staff General Kayani has made it clear to Ambassador that the Army will not allow NGOs to operate or enter South Waziristan, Habibullah indicated that could change over time. Governor Ghani also assured AssistCoord that spot checks on projects would not be an issue but he recommended they be done through Pakistani monitors. AssistCoord reiterated that the USG would require some inspections by their own employees. The FATA Secretariat Version of Assistance -------------- ¶6. (C) Optimally, Habibullah said that large scale projects could be carried out by para-statals like the Frontier Works Organization with the Army providing security. Small to medium projects would be coordinated by the FATA Secretariat through various government entities. Habibullah suggested that these projects could be modeled on the model used by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, i.e., a community approach that brings together the tribal leaders, the military, the Political Agents and the donors agree on priorities. The initial priority would be projects that enhance the return of the displaced population (both IDPs and seasonal migrants). Habibullah expressed strong reservations about building new facilities such as schools, clinics and hospitals, as new construction could provide a high value target for militants who want to demoralize the public. He prefers to upgrade existing structures (hospitals, clinics and schools) that have local buy-in for the services provided. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Each conversation with the FATA Secretariat and other NWFP officials brings a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of our plans to fund damaged public infrastructure in South Waziristan relatively quickly and in close cooperation with the Pakistan Army. Our hope is to tie up most remaining loose ends in our meeting with General Zubair, commander of the Army Corps of Engineer, on 11 December. End Comment. PATTERSON

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