WAY FORWARD ON AFGHAN REFUGEES REMAINS UNCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002942 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019 TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL EAID PHUM PK SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON AFGHAN REFUGEES REMAINS UNCLEAR ISLAMABAD 00002942 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A new inter-ministerial subcommittee has been established to find a way forward on Afghan refugee status, repatriation, and security-related issues in Pakistan. While establishment of the subcommittee has rolled back progress on finalizing Pakistan's draft Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy, it may permit attaining an interim solution on Afghan refugee status before the December 31, 2009 expiration of both the Afghan refugees' Proof of Registration (POR) cards and the current Pakistan-Afghanistan-UNHCR Tripartite Agreement which governs voluntary repatriation. The draft Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy, if it is ultimately approved by the Prime Minister, would extend the right of Afghan refugees to remain in Pakistan through 2012 and would permit extension, also through 2012, of the Tripartite Agreement. However, Ministry of Interior (MOI) dissent, based on security concerns, has blocked the intra-governmental consensus necessary for the Prime Minister's approval of the strategy. Pakistan's Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have been working hard to advance the strategy and overcome MOI opposition. ¶2. (C) The Ministry of Interior and the intelligence agencies advocate (in lieu of a three-year extension of stay) a grace period for refugee returns with clear repatriation benchmarks. In light of the inter-ministerial debate, a November 20 inter-ministerial meeting chaired by the Ministers of Interior and SAFRON created a new seven-member subcommittee to establish, by approximately December 16, repatriation benchmarks and grace period timelines. The new subcommittee will be chaired by Afghan expert and former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah, and made up of representatives of MOI, SAFRON, the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR),and the three intelligence agencies: Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). While UNHCR and SAFRON are heartened by the choice of Rustam Shah as subcommittee chairman, the subcommittee's establishment puts into question prior GOP understandings with UNHCR and the Government of Afghanistan on the three-year renewal of Afghan refugee status. End Summary. Time Running Out -------------- ¶3. (C) As the December 31, 2009 expiration date of Afghan refugees' Proof of Registration (POR) cards fast approaches, Pakistan's draft Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy, which would extend the right of Afghan refugees to remain in Pakistan through 2012, remains in limbo due to dissent by the Ministry of Interior. The Prime Minister, who must approve the strategy to bring it into effect as policy, has required that SAFRON and the MOI reach "consensus" before he will grant approval. Both SAFRON and UNHCR have been pushing the MOI to join consensus on the strategy. Approval of a strategy is necessary also for the extension of the Tripartite Agreement between Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR. SAFRON Makes its Case to MOI -------------- ¶4. (C) In a November 4 letter to the MOI Secretary, SAFRON Secretary Muhammad Raffat Pasha stressed that all other members of the relevant inter-ministerial committee (constituted in September 2009 by the Prime Minister expressly to establish a 2010-2012 strategy) had endorsed the current draft strategy and that the Prime Minister was requiring that full consensus be reached. Pasha contended that if the POR cards were left to expire, 1.7 million registered Afghans would become illegal and join the approximately 1 million unregistered Afghans not under the mandate of UNHCR and thus would not henceforth receive UNHCR assistance. He also claimed that absence of a strategy would result in expiration of the Tripartite Agreement, would lead to the cessation of UNHCR's assisted repatriation program with its ISLAMABAD 00002942 002 OF 003 grant of USD 100 per returnee, and would thus have a negative impact on repatriation. ¶5. (C) Pasha pointed out that in a March 2009 Letter of Intent signed by SAFRON and UNHCR, SAFRON undertook to "take measures for extension in the validity of the PORs as well as the Tripartite Agreement" until December 31, 2012, and UNHCR agreed to continue to support voluntary, safe, dignified, and gradual repatriation of Afghans and to arrange assistance for refugee-affected and hosting areas in Pakistan. Thus, according to Pasha, also at risk if the strategy is not finalized is the five-year, $140 million RAHA program initiated by UNHCR and UNDP to be implemented in 29 districts in four provinces to rehabilitate affected sectors "through improvement of social infrastructure, provision of basic amenities, forestation, clean drinking water, sanitation and communication, etc." Finally, he pointed out that GOP policy with regard to the repatriation of Afghan refugees is one of "adhering to the principles of voluntarism and gradualism in accordance with international law and norms. Therefore, forceful and involuntary repatriation is not an option." UNHCR Appeals to Pakistan's Self-Interest -------------- ¶6. (C) UNHCR has made additional arguments in an effort "to get to yes" on the strategy. UNHCR representatives note that Afghans in Pakistan contribute to the economy and that registered refugees are only very exceptionally involved in crime. UNHCR makes the case that mass deportation is unrealistic and would likely just result in the return of the deported as undocumented aliens. Similarly, camp closures would not resolve security issues but would just disperse the refugees and might leave disgruntled and/or radicalized former camp residents. UNHCR advocates development of an integrated border management system and notes that unregistered or deregistered Afghans become untraceable, whereas registering Afghans (both refugees and migrants) would permit the government to manage them and address security concerns. The NADRA (National Database and Registration Authority) database of Afghans includes biometrics that allow law enforcement agents to verify the identity of registered Afghans. UNHCR also argues that donors cannot be expected to continue to support a program to benefit refugee-affected and hosting areas if the rights of registered refugees are not respected. MOI Cites Security Concerns, Establishes Subcommittee -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Following receipt of the SAFRON Secretary's letter, the Ministry of Interior arranged a meeting co-chaired by the Ministers of Interior and SAFRON and attended by several Ministry of Interior representatives, the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, the Joint Secretary of Foreign Affairs, one representative each from ISI, MI and the Intelligence Bureau, the Director General of the National Crisis Management Cell, and consultant (and former Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan) Rustam Shah. In its minutes of the November 20 meeting, the Ministry of Interior indicated that the meeting was held at the direction of the Prime Minister to reach consensus on "the third-time extension (2010-2012) of the Tripartite Agreement" and that the agenda was "to take all stakeholders on board regarding the security concerns vis-a-vis Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan and discuss future strategy for effective implementation of the UNHCR repatriation program." ¶8. (C) The Minister of Interior argued that many Afghans go back and forth across the border and are not fleeing persecution. He said that recent reports indicate "connections between Afghan settlements and Talibans." Claiming that the Afghan presence had caused "a menace", he shared his views "on a way forward to voluntary, dignified, yet expeditious departure of Afghan refugees from Pakistan." He criticized UNHCR for lack of cooperation and for failing to meet repatriation targets. While calling the Tripartite Agreement "inevitable," he indicated that "instead of extension there needs to be some kind of grace period with clear bench marks for expeditious repatriation of Afghan ISLAMABAD 00002942 003.2 OF 003 refugees from Pakistan." He recommended that a sub-committee look into the Tripartite Agreement in view of the security situation and devise a methodology for timely achievement of repatriation targets showing tangible progress. ¶9. (C) In response to the Interior Minister's position, the Minister of SAFRON stressed the distinction between Afghan refugees and other Afghans in Pakistan. The Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees reiterated the importance of Pakistan's international commitments with regard to the refugees. Rustam Shah noted that forced repatriation would further destabilize the region and be a waste of good will with Afghanistan. He stressed the need to manage, regulate and document Afghans in Pakistan and to be guided by human compassion as well as security concerns. The MFA representative reiterated the need for effective border control and said that it was necessary to push UNHCR to meet its repatriation target and to encourage the international community to create pull factors, such as model villages and employment opportunities in Afghanistan, to encourage Afghan repatriation. Reiterating the need to cultivate goodwill with Afghanistan, he recommended, in lieu of the proposed three-year extension of refugee status, "a one-year grace period with clear benchmarks." The security/intelligence agencies were unanimous in advocating a grace period (of indeterminate length) with clear benchmarks and a work plan to show progress on repatriation. ¶10. (C) The November 20 meeting led to the establishment of a seven-member subcommittee to be chaired by Rustam Shah and comprised of the SAFRON Joint Secretary, the CAR Chief Commissioner, the Joint Secretary of the MOI, and one representative each from MI, IB and ISI. The Ministry of Interior is looking to the subcommittee to establish "benchmarks for repatriation of Afghan Refugees" and "timelines in the extended grace period for the return of Afghan refugees". The subcommittee was tasked to meet first on December 2 and was given two weeks to produce a report and roadmap. ¶11. (C) Comment: It appears that the Ministry of Interior has arranged establishment of the subcommittee in order to change the playing field: shifting attention from its sole dissent on the draft strategy, refocusing attention on repatriation and away from extending refugee status, and advancing the idea of a grace period. While UNHCR and SAFRON are encouraged by the choice of Rustam Shah as subcommittee chairman and by an established timeline which may permit some resolution before expiration of the POR cards and the Tripartite Agreement, the subcommittee's establishment puts into question prior GOP understandings with UNHCR and the Government of Afghanistan on the three-year renewal of Afghan refugee status. SAFRON and UNHCR had independently determined to work bilaterally on a new Tripartite Agreement draft pending resolution of the strategy issue and appointment of a counterpart Afghan minister for trilateral negotiations,but introduction of these new uncertainties will make this preparatory planning more difficult. End Comment. PATTERSON