WAY FORWARD ON AFGHAN REFUGEES REMAINS UNCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002942

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL EAID PHUM PK
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON AFGHAN REFUGEES REMAINS UNCLEAR

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Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A new inter-ministerial subcommittee has been
established to find a way forward on Afghan refugee status,
repatriation, and security-related issues in Pakistan. While
establishment of the subcommittee has rolled back progress on
finalizing Pakistan's draft Afghan Management and
Repatriation Strategy, it may permit attaining an interim
solution on Afghan refugee status before the December 31,
2009 expiration of both the Afghan refugees' Proof of
Registration (POR) cards and the current
Pakistan-Afghanistan-UNHCR Tripartite Agreement which governs
voluntary repatriation. The draft Afghan Management and
Repatriation Strategy, if it is ultimately approved by the
Prime Minister, would extend the right of Afghan refugees to
remain in Pakistan through 2012 and would permit extension,
also through 2012, of the Tripartite Agreement. However,
Ministry of Interior (MOI) dissent, based on security
concerns, has blocked the intra-governmental consensus
necessary for the Prime Minister's approval of the strategy.
Pakistan's Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON)
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) have been working hard to advance the
strategy and overcome MOI opposition.


2. (C) The Ministry of Interior and the intelligence agencies
advocate (in lieu of a three-year extension of stay) a grace
period for refugee returns with clear repatriation
benchmarks. In light of the inter-ministerial debate, a
November 20 inter-ministerial meeting chaired by the
Ministers of Interior and SAFRON created a new seven-member
subcommittee to establish, by approximately December 16,
repatriation benchmarks and grace period timelines. The new
subcommittee will be chaired by Afghan expert and former
Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah, and made up
of representatives of MOI, SAFRON, the Commissionerate for
Afghan Refugees (CAR),and the three intelligence agencies:
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),Military Intelligence (MI)
and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). While UNHCR and SAFRON are
heartened by the choice of Rustam Shah as subcommittee
chairman, the subcommittee's establishment puts into question
prior GOP understandings with UNHCR and the Government of
Afghanistan on the three-year renewal of Afghan refugee
status. End Summary.

Time Running Out
--------------


3. (C) As the December 31, 2009 expiration date of Afghan
refugees' Proof of Registration (POR) cards fast approaches,
Pakistan's draft Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy,
which would extend the right of Afghan refugees to remain in
Pakistan through 2012, remains in limbo due to dissent by the
Ministry of Interior. The Prime Minister, who must approve
the strategy to bring it into effect as policy, has required
that SAFRON and the MOI reach "consensus" before he will
grant approval. Both SAFRON and UNHCR have been pushing the
MOI to join consensus on the strategy. Approval of a
strategy is necessary also for the extension of the
Tripartite Agreement between Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR.


SAFRON Makes its Case to MOI
--------------


4. (C) In a November 4 letter to the MOI Secretary, SAFRON
Secretary Muhammad Raffat Pasha stressed that all other
members of the relevant inter-ministerial committee
(constituted in September 2009 by the Prime Minister
expressly to establish a 2010-2012 strategy) had endorsed the
current draft strategy and that the Prime Minister was
requiring that full consensus be reached. Pasha contended
that if the POR cards were left to expire, 1.7 million
registered Afghans would become illegal and join the
approximately 1 million unregistered Afghans not under the
mandate of UNHCR and thus would not henceforth receive UNHCR
assistance. He also claimed that absence of a strategy would
result
in expiration of the Tripartite Agreement, would lead to the
cessation of UNHCR's assisted repatriation program with its

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grant of USD 100 per returnee, and would thus have a negative
impact on repatriation.


5. (C) Pasha pointed out that in a March 2009 Letter of
Intent signed by SAFRON and UNHCR, SAFRON undertook to "take
measures for extension in the validity of the PORs as well as
the Tripartite Agreement" until December 31, 2012, and UNHCR
agreed to continue to support voluntary, safe, dignified, and
gradual repatriation of Afghans and to arrange assistance for
refugee-affected and hosting areas in Pakistan. Thus,
according to Pasha, also at risk if the strategy is not
finalized is the five-year, $140 million RAHA program
initiated by UNHCR and UNDP to be implemented in 29 districts
in four provinces to rehabilitate affected sectors "through
improvement of social infrastructure, provision of basic
amenities, forestation, clean drinking water, sanitation and
communication, etc." Finally, he pointed out that GOP policy
with regard to the repatriation of Afghan refugees is one of
"adhering to the principles of voluntarism and gradualism in
accordance with international law and norms. Therefore,
forceful and involuntary repatriation is not an option."

UNHCR Appeals to Pakistan's Self-Interest
--------------


6. (C) UNHCR has made additional arguments in an effort "to
get to yes" on the strategy. UNHCR representatives note that
Afghans in Pakistan contribute to the economy and that
registered refugees are only very exceptionally involved in
crime. UNHCR makes the case that mass deportation is
unrealistic and would likely just result in the return of the
deported as undocumented aliens. Similarly, camp closures
would not resolve security issues but would just disperse the
refugees and might leave disgruntled and/or radicalized
former camp residents. UNHCR advocates development of an
integrated border management system and notes that
unregistered or deregistered Afghans become untraceable,
whereas registering Afghans (both refugees and migrants)
would permit the government to manage them and address
security concerns. The NADRA (National Database and
Registration Authority) database of Afghans includes
biometrics that allow law enforcement agents to verify the
identity of registered Afghans. UNHCR also argues that
donors cannot be expected to continue to support a program to
benefit refugee-affected and hosting areas if the rights of
registered refugees are not respected.

MOI Cites Security Concerns, Establishes Subcommittee
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Following receipt of the SAFRON Secretary's letter,
the Ministry of Interior arranged a meeting co-chaired by the
Ministers of Interior and SAFRON and attended by several
Ministry of Interior representatives, the Chief Commissioner
for Afghan Refugees, the Joint Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
one representative each from ISI, MI and the Intelligence
Bureau, the Director General of the National Crisis
Management Cell, and consultant (and former Pakistan
Ambassador to Afghanistan) Rustam Shah. In its minutes of the
November 20 meeting, the Ministry of Interior indicated that
the meeting was held at the direction of the Prime Minister
to reach consensus on "the third-time extension (2010-2012)
of the Tripartite Agreement" and that the agenda was "to take
all stakeholders on board regarding the security concerns
vis-a-vis Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan and discuss
future strategy for effective implementation of the UNHCR
repatriation program."


8. (C) The Minister of Interior argued that many Afghans go
back and forth across the border and are not fleeing
persecution. He said that recent reports indicate
"connections between Afghan settlements and Talibans."
Claiming that the Afghan presence had caused "a menace", he
shared his views "on a way forward to voluntary, dignified,
yet expeditious departure of Afghan refugees from Pakistan."
He criticized UNHCR for lack of cooperation and for failing
to meet repatriation targets. While calling the Tripartite
Agreement "inevitable," he indicated that "instead of
extension there needs to be some kind of grace period with
clear bench marks for expeditious repatriation of Afghan

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refugees from Pakistan." He recommended that a sub-committee
look into the Tripartite Agreement in view of the security
situation and devise a methodology for timely achievement of
repatriation targets showing tangible progress.


9. (C) In response to the Interior Minister's position, the
Minister of SAFRON stressed the distinction between Afghan
refugees and other Afghans in Pakistan. The Chief
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees reiterated the importance of
Pakistan's international commitments with regard to the
refugees. Rustam Shah noted that forced repatriation would
further destabilize the region and be a waste of good will
with Afghanistan. He stressed the need to manage, regulate
and document Afghans in Pakistan and to be guided by human
compassion as well as security concerns. The MFA
representative reiterated the need for effective border
control and said that it was necessary to push UNHCR to meet
its repatriation target and to encourage the international
community to create pull factors, such as model villages and
employment opportunities in Afghanistan, to encourage Afghan
repatriation. Reiterating the need to cultivate goodwill
with Afghanistan, he recommended, in lieu of the proposed
three-year extension of refugee status, "a one-year grace
period with clear benchmarks." The security/intelligence
agencies were unanimous in advocating a grace period (of
indeterminate length) with clear benchmarks and a work plan
to show progress on repatriation.


10. (C) The November 20 meeting led to the establishment of a
seven-member subcommittee to be chaired by Rustam Shah and
comprised of the SAFRON Joint Secretary, the CAR Chief
Commissioner, the Joint Secretary of the MOI, and one
representative each from MI, IB and ISI. The Ministry of
Interior is looking to the subcommittee to establish
"benchmarks for repatriation of Afghan Refugees" and
"timelines in the extended grace period for the return of
Afghan refugees". The subcommittee was tasked to meet first
on December 2 and was given two weeks to produce a report and
roadmap.


11. (C) Comment: It appears that the Ministry of Interior
has arranged establishment of the subcommittee in order to
change the playing field: shifting attention from its sole
dissent on the draft strategy, refocusing attention on
repatriation and away from extending refugee status, and
advancing the idea of a grace period. While UNHCR and SAFRON
are encouraged by the choice of Rustam Shah as subcommittee
chairman and by an established timeline which may permit some
resolution before expiration of the POR cards and the
Tripartite Agreement, the subcommittee's establishment puts
into question prior GOP understandings with UNHCR and the
Government of Afghanistan on the three-year renewal of Afghan
refugee status. SAFRON and UNHCR had independently determined
to work bilaterally on a new Tripartite Agreement draft
pending resolution of the strategy issue and appointment of a
counterpart Afghan minister for trilateral negotiations,but
introduction of these new uncertainties will make this
preparatory planning more difficult. End Comment.
PATTERSON