POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS SPECTRUM GENERALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF PK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS SPECTRUM GENERALLY
POSITIVE ON PRESIDENT,S SPEECH AND STRATEGY

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Key contacts in Peshawar and Islamabad
across the political spectrum by and large reacted positively
to the way forward on Afghanistan and Pakistan that President
Obama outlined in his December 1 speech. Most of our
interlocutors were supportive of the U.S. increasing troops
in Afghanistan for now, while they also expressed approval
for the President's decision that the U.S. would begin
withdrawing its forces in mid-2011. NWFP Awami National
Party (ANP) President Afrasiab Khattak, however, said the
withdrawal announcement would strengthen the hand of those in
the military establishment who want Pakistan to continue
supporting the Taliban. The fact that the speech eschewed
direct criticism of Pakistan likely smoothed the way for its
relatively positive reception among these varied contacts.
End Summary.


2. (C) Peshawar Consul General met on December 2 with both
NWFP Awami National Party (ANP) President Afrasiab Khattak
and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) NWFP leader Zahir Shah to
discuss President Obama's newly announced way forward in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, she found both men to be
considerably more focused on Pakistan's internal political
struggle than on the long-term direction of the war in
Afghanistan. Zahir Shah, a confidant of President Zardari,
stated that support for the Taliban came from the same forces
in Pakistan (a reference to unspecified elements in the
military and intelligence establishment) that were targeting
Zardari. He thanked the U.S. for its commitment to assist
Pakistan and thought the strategy of withdrawing troops
within 18 months would send a good signal to press
Afghanistan to take responsibility for its security.


3. (C) Afrasiab Khattak noted that while Afghanistan had many
self-created problems, the ultimate source of the Taliban was
the machinations of Pakistan's military and, in particular,
its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Khattak, who has
traditionally been very critical of ISI activities in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, said that the determination to
control Afghanistan was a core principle of ISI's strategy,
and that the Taliban would remain confident that it could
outlast the American presence. In this regard, Khattak
suggested, President Obama's timeline of 18 months would
strengthen the hand of the ISI and those in the military who
argued that Pakistan's interests were better served by
maintaining proxies than by eliminating them as the U.S.
would prefer. (Comment: This has been a misunderstood portion
of the speech which we have tried to correct in this
conversation and others during the day. End Comment.) He
questioned the Pakistani military's real commitment to
defeating the militants, saying that key leaders like
Hakimullah and Qari Hussain were enjoying refuge in North
Waziristan. Khattak also opined that GOP would likely
officially complain about the surge, saying that it would
push militants out of Afghanistan and into unguarded areas of
Pakistan.


4. (C) Peshawar Consul General also discussed the speech with
representatives of NWFP opposition parties. Jalil Jan, the
NWFP Information Secretary for the religious party
Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) told the CG that
he had been a bit surprised by the content of the speech. He
said that he and his friends, having seen recent reporting
that the U.S. was engaged in talks with the Taliban, had
assumed that the speech would announce a breakthrough in
these hitherto secret talks and a consequent reduction in
U.S. troop strength, rather than an increase. Showing some
lack of nuance in his understanding of the speech, he said he
had been glad to hear that the U.S. would withdraw its troops
from Afghanistan in July 2011. (Note: CG explained that July
2011 only marked the beginning of the withdrawal. End Note.)
Engaging on the speech's message that the U.S. and Pakistan
would need to enhance anti-terrorist cooperation, he
cautioned that the tradition of sanctuary was very strong in
Pakistan's tribal areas and it would be very difficult to
root out all militants from those areas. Jan noted that he
was expressing only his own point of view, as virtually all
of the JUI-F leadership had gone to Saudi Arabia on Hajj and
was still there. He anticipated that party leader Maulana

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Fazlur Rehman would give the official party reaction soon
himself, whether from Jiddah or upon his return to Pakistan.


5. (C) Peshawar Consul General also met with Pakistan
People's Party-Sherpao (PPP-S) NWFP leader Sikander Sherpao.
Sherpao praised the speech as putting to rest concerns that
the U.S. would precipitously pull out from Afghanistan, but
said that the issue of potential spillover of Taliban from
Afghanistan (as a result of the surge) and the U.S.
government's consequent intent to enhance cooperation with
Pakistan to ensure this did not happen should have been more
explicit. He thought that the language about the U.S.
transferring powers to local authorities would be
well-received, along with assurances that the U.S. would not
cease engagement upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the
area. This pairing, he thought, would address the Pakistani
government's main concern -- that the U.S. would pull out and
leave a vacuum -- while dampening popular perceptions that
the U.S. planned to stay in an "imperial" role. Sherpao also
noted recent press reports that the U.S. was negotiating with
the Taliban, saying it was a good idea if the U.S. could find
interlocutors; he suggested that perhaps a jirga could be a
good format for this. He added that the portion of the
speech dealing with Pakistan had been a pleasant change;
unusually, he said, there was no direct criticism of
Pakistan's role in the conflict, which would take the
Pakistani security services off the defensive and make them
more amenable to cooperation.


6. (C) We also discussed the speech with several key contacts
in Islamabad. PPP Senator Nayyer Bukhari, the Leader of the
House in the Senate, told us that President Obama's speech
was a positive development -- good for the region and for
Pakistan -- because Coalition forces should not stay in
Afghanistan indefinitely. He expressed hope that democracy
will be stabilized in Afghanistan before the U.S. starts
pulling out its troops. Bukhari said that the additional
U.S. forces should allow for more effective surveillance of
the Pak-Afghan border so that militants can not flee from
Afghanistan to the Pakistani side.


7. (C) PML Secretary General Mushahid Hussain Sayyed
described the President's speech to us as "encouraging" for
Pakistani policymakers, and noted in particular that it
affirmed Pakistan's status as a U.S. strategic partner based
on mutual trust and respect. Mushahid said the speech should
allay Pakistani fears about an undue "India factor" in the
Afghanistan policy of the U.S. and, as such, augurs well for
the region and for Pakistan in particular. He added that, in
his view, President Obama essentially acknowledged that the
war is unwinnable -- which Islamabad must to take into
account in devising its own policies to protect Pakistan's
interests.


8. (C) PML-N National Assembly member and political analyst
Ayaz Amir also reacted positively to the speech, noting that
President Obama had made clear the U.S. intention to
ultimately withdraw from Afghanistan. He said that the
decision to send additional troops now was understandable,
but what was more important is that the President underscored
that there will be no open-ended commitments to Afghanistan.
Amir added, however, that Pakistan should stand its own
ground and not buckle under U.S. pressure to "do more" to
support U.S. efforts.


9. (C) Senator Salim Saifullah, who heads the PML dissidents
group and is from NWFP, gave a positive appraisal to the
President's strategy, but said that in addition to the troop
surge, the U.S. must focus on development and negotiations.
He argued that talks with "moderate Taliban" in Afghanistan
as well as in Pakistan are feasible. Saifullah believes it
was a correct decision to announce the troop increase and the
beginning of a withdrawal in 2011 in tandem, though he
conceded that some countries may become concerned about the
impending departure. In any event, the fact that mid-2011
marks just the beginning of a withdrawal that may take months
or longer will buy the U.S. time. Saifullah added that for
training Afghan troops, the U.S. should consider using former
Pakistani military and police officials, so long as India
does not object. If using Pakistanis would be problematic,

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then another option would be to use trainers from other
Muslim countries, such as from Turkey or Malaysia.


10. (C) Comment: Pakistan's senior government and military
leadership feared that President Obama would single out
Pakistan for criticism in his speech. The fact that the
President's remarks, while underscoring the need to tackle
terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, instead focused on
building a long-term U.S-Pakistan partnership has likely
defused some potential Pakistan criticism, especially from
the political opposition.

PATTERSON