POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS SPECTRUM GENERALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002890 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF PK SUBJECT: POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS SPECTRUM GENERALLY POSITIVE ON PRESIDENT,S SPEECH AND STRATEGY Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Key contacts in Peshawar and Islamabad across the political spectrum by and large reacted positively to the way forward on Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama outlined in his December 1 speech. Most of our interlocutors were supportive of the U.S. increasing troops in Afghanistan for now, while they also expressed approval for the President's decision that the U.S. would begin withdrawing its forces in mid-2011. NWFP Awami National Party (ANP) President Afrasiab Khattak, however, said the withdrawal announcement would strengthen the hand of those in the military establishment who want Pakistan to continue supporting the Taliban. The fact that the speech eschewed direct criticism of Pakistan likely smoothed the way for its relatively positive reception among these varied contacts. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Peshawar Consul General met on December 2 with both NWFP Awami National Party (ANP) President Afrasiab Khattak and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) NWFP leader Zahir Shah to discuss President Obama's newly announced way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, she found both men to be considerably more focused on Pakistan's internal political struggle than on the long-term direction of the war in Afghanistan. Zahir Shah, a confidant of President Zardari, stated that support for the Taliban came from the same forces in Pakistan (a reference to unspecified elements in the military and intelligence establishment) that were targeting Zardari. He thanked the U.S. for its commitment to assist Pakistan and thought the strategy of withdrawing troops within 18 months would send a good signal to press Afghanistan to take responsibility for its security. ¶3. (C) Afrasiab Khattak noted that while Afghanistan had many self-created problems, the ultimate source of the Taliban was the machinations of Pakistan's military and, in particular, its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Khattak, who has traditionally been very critical of ISI activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, said that the determination to control Afghanistan was a core principle of ISI's strategy, and that the Taliban would remain confident that it could outlast the American presence. In this regard, Khattak suggested, President Obama's timeline of 18 months would �0A;strengthen the hand of the ISI and those in the military who argued that Pakistan's interests were better served by maintaining proxies than by eliminating them as the U.S. would prefer. (Comment: This has been a misunderstood portion of the speech which we have tried to correct in this conversation and others during the day. End Comment.) He questioned the Pakistani military's real commitment to defeating the militants, saying that key leaders like Hakimullah and Qari Hussain were enjoying refuge in North Waziristan. Khattak also opined that GOP would likely officially complain about the surge, saying that it would push militants out of Afghanistan and into unguarded areas of Pakistan. ¶4. (C) Peshawar Consul General also discussed the speech with representatives of NWFP opposition parties. Jalil Jan, the NWFP Information Secretary for the religious party Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) told the CG that he had been a bit surprised by the content of the speech. He said that he and his friends, having seen recent reporting that the U.S. was engaged in talks with the Taliban, had assumed that the speech would announce a breakthrough in these hitherto secret talks and a consequent reduction in U.S. troop strength, rather than an increase. Showing some lack of nuance in his understanding of the speech, he said he had been glad to hear that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. (Note: CG explained that July 2011 only marked the beginning of the withdrawal. End Note.) Engaging on the speech's message that the U.S. and Pakistan would need to enhance anti-terrorist cooperation, he cautioned that the tradition of sanctuary was very strong in Pakistan's tribal areas and it would be very difficult to root out all militants from those areas. Jan noted that he was expressing only his own point of view, as virtually all of the JUI-F leadership had gone to Saudi Arabia on Hajj and was still there. He anticipated that party leader Maulana ISLAMABAD 00002890 002 OF 003 Fazlur Rehman would give the official party reaction soon himself, whether from Jiddah or upon his return to Pakistan. ¶5. (C) Peshawar Consul General also met with Pakistan People's Party-Sherpao (PPP-S) NWFP leader Sikander Sherpao. Sherpao praised the speech as putting to rest concerns that the U.S. would precipitously pull out from Afghanistan, but said that the issue of potential spillover of Taliban from Afghanistan (as a result of the surge) and the U.S. government's consequent intent to enhance cooperation with Pakistan to ensure this did not happen should have been more explicit. He thought that the language about the U.S. transferring powers to local authorities would be well-received, along with assurances that the U.S. would not cease engagement upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the area. This pairing, he thought, would address the Pakistani government's main concern -- that the U.S. would pull out and leave a vacuum -- while dampening popular perceptions that the U.S. planned to stay in an "imperial" role. Sherpao also noted recent press reports that the U.S. was negotiating with the Taliban, saying it was a good idea if the U.S. could find interlocutors; he suggested that perhaps a jirga could be a good format for this. He added that the portion of the speech dealing with Pakistan had been a pleasant change; unusually, he said, there was no direct criticism of Pakistan's role in the conflict, which would take the Pakistani security services off the defensive and make them more amenable to cooperation. ¶6. (C) We also discussed the speech with several key contacts in Islamabad. PPP Senator Nayyer Bukhari, the Leader of the House in the Senate, told us that President Obama's speech was a positive development -- good for the region and for Pakistan -- because Coalition forces should not stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. He expressed hope that democracy will be stabilized in Afghanistan before the U.S. starts pulling out its troops. Bukhari said that the additional U.S. forces should allow for more effective surveillance of the Pak-Afghan border so that militants can not flee from Afghanistan to the Pakistani side. ¶7. (C) PML Secretary General Mushahid Hussain Sayyed described the President's speech to us as "encouraging" for Pakistani policymakers, and noted in particular that it affirmed Pakistan's status as a U.S. strategic partner based on mutual trust and respect. Mushahid said the speech should allay Pakistani fears about an undue "India factor" in the Afghanistan policy of the U.S. and, as such, augurs well for the region and for Pakistan in particular. He added that, in his view, President Obama essentially acknowledged that the war is unwinnable -- which Islamabad must to take into account in devising its own policies to protect Pakistan's interests. ¶8. (C) PML-N National Assembly member and political analyst Ayaz Amir also reacted positively to the speech, noting that President Obama had made clear the U.S. intention to ultimately withdraw from Afghanistan. He said that the decision to send additional troops now was understandable, but what was more important is that the President underscored that there will be no open-ended commitments to Afghanistan. Amir added, however, that Pakistan should stand its own ground and not buckle under U.S. pressure to "do more" to support U.S. efforts. ¶9. (C) Senator Salim Saifullah, who heads the PML dissidents group and is from NWFP, gave a positive appraisal to the President's strategy, but said that in addition to the troop surge, the U.S. must focus on development and negotiations. He argued that talks with "moderate Taliban" in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan are feasible. Saifullah believes it was a correct decision to announce the troop increase and the beginning of a withdrawal in 2011 in tandem, though he conceded that some countries may become concerned about the impending departure. In any event, the fact that mid-2011 marks just the beginning of a withdrawal that may take months or longer will buy the U.S. time. Saifullah added that for training Afghan troops, the U.S. should consider using former Pakistani military and police officials, so long as India does not object. If using Pakistanis would be problematic, ISLAMABAD 00002890 003 OF 003 then another option would be to use trainers from other Muslim countries, such as from Turkey or Malaysia. ¶10. (C) Comment: Pakistan's senior government and military leadership feared that President Obama would single out Pakistan for criticism in his speech. The fact that the President's remarks, while underscoring the need to tackle terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, instead focused on building a long-term U.S-Pakistan partnership has likely defused some potential Pakistan criticism, especially from the political opposition. PATTERSON